

Immigration, Integration and Support for Redistribution in Europe

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Abstract

Immigration poses individual or collective economic risks that might increase citizen support for government redistribution, but can also generate fiscal pressure or undermine social solidarity to diminish such support. These offsetting conditions obscure the net effects of immigration for welfare states. This paper explores whether immigration's effects are mediated by the economic and social integration of immigrants. Integration can be conceptualized and measured as involving the extent to which immigrants have unemployment levels, rely on the welfare state, and harbor social attitudes similarly to the native population. Such integration may alter how immigration reduces solidarity and poses fiscal and macro-economic pressures, but not so much how immigration spurs economic risks. Where migrants are more integrated by such measures, immigration should have less negative or more positive implications for native support for government redistribution and welfare states than where migrants are less integrated. The paper explores these arguments using survey data for 22 European countries between 2002 and 2010. The principal finding is that economic integration, more than socio-cultural integration, softens immigration's tendency to undermine support for redistributive policies.

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Among the most salient issues in contemporary politics is how immigration affects social and economic life of receiving countries. Such consequences include welfare states and income redistribution to address economic inequalities. Policymakers, media commentators, and scholars have debated how and whether immigration affects social, economic and political relations shaping welfare and tax systems.¹ On the one hand, immigration might undermine social solidarity or altruism prevailing in a country, or might increase the costs of re-distribution efforts, all in ways that undermine public support for redistribution.² On the other hand, such exposure to immigration poses individual economic risks to income or employment that might, in turn, increase support for redistribution and welfare protection to indemnify against such risks.³ Empirical studies support both of these views, and have suggested that immigration's implications might be mediated by host-country attitudes towards immigration or concerns about the economic consequences of immigration.⁴ The jury remains very much out about immigration's net effects for redistribution, or certainly about which social and economic conditions in host societies might mediate such effects.

This study seeks to clarify the relationship between immigration and social policy by exploring how social and economic integration of immigrants in host societies mediates that relationship. Observable aspects of such integration – particularly, the degree to which immigrants are similar to natives in their unemployment levels, dependence on the welfare state, and social attitudes – should influence how immigration affects redistributive politics. They should do so, this paper argues, by influencing how immigration affects solidarity and/or poses fiscal and macro-economic pressures, while less strongly altering immigration's spurring of individual economic insecurities. The resulting hypotheses, here, are simple: higher immigration should more negatively affect support for government redistribution to the extent that immigrants are more unemployed than natives, more dependent than natives on social benefits, or do not share the native population's socio-cultural values.

The paper empirically tests these arguments using five waves of European Social Survey data on individual attitudes in 22 European polities between 2002 and 2010. The focus is on whether the considerable variation across these country-years in foreign-born stocks influences support for redistribution and welfare states conditional upon observable gaps between immigrants and natives with respect to unemployment rates, social-benefit dependency, and socio-cultural values. Estimating these gaps using the survey and other data sources reveals considerable variation in economic and socio-cultural non-integration that cannot be reduced to differences in the origins of immigrants.

The analysis reveals that exposure to higher foreign-born percentages tends to diminish support for redistribution and social protection, but that this effect is substantively and statistically-significantly more negative when migrants have proportionately higher unemployment rates and dependency on social benefits. In contrast, the gap between foreign-born and native respondents in socio-cultural values has a more modest and less consistent negative effect on the relationship between immigration and redistribution. Further analysis reveals that these patterns likely involve worries about the fiscal viability of social policy: economic non-integration with respect to unemployment and social-benefit dependency, though not with respect to socio-cultural values, exacerbates how immigration increases individual concerns about fiscal costs of social protection without altering immigration's implications for their attitudes towards altruism or economic insecurity. The patterns suggest, in short, that economic, more than socio-cultural, integration may be important to dampening immigration's negative effects on welfare states in Europe.

1. Immigration's Offsetting and Uncertain Implications for Government Redistribution

Immigration involves people from abroad settling in a country to live and work in ways that can reshape a host-country's politics of redistribution and the welfare state.

Existing research suggests that immigration can have offsetting implications for such politics, in some ways increasing and in other ways decreasing support for redistribution. The best-known links involve broad economic and social implications of immigration that spell bad news for generous redistribution and welfare states. The economic implications are principally fiscal in nature. Immigrants into European countries tend to be less educated and to perform on standardized tests more poorly than the native population into which they move.⁵ They also tend to find employment in sectors in which unemployment waves with cyclical downturns have hit hardest.⁶ With the added possibility of discrimination, it is little surprise that foreign-born residents often have significantly lower employment rates and higher unemployment rates than their native counterparts – as evidenced by foreign-born unemployment rates averaging 8.5 percent compared to the 5.3 percent for natives in OECD countries in 2008.⁷

Immigrants are also thought to disproportionately use many social policy programs and contribute little to the revenue base compared to natives, fostering a common view that they are net fiscal burdens.⁸ In reality, immigrants often rely less on contributory transfers and services, such as pension programs financed largely through payroll taxes. However, because immigrants tend to have more children, to be less wealthy, and to be more likely and longer unemployed, they also usually rely more than do natives on non-contributory government services and welfare programs – such as social assistance, housing benefits, and public schooling.⁹ According to one recent estimate pooling the experiences of nine EU countries, migrants are 20 percent more likely to rely on such benefits.¹⁰ As for net tax contributions, Europe's migrants often pay lower shares of total revenue than their native counterparts. Boeri calculates that, in nine countries surveyed, migrants pay on average only 57 percent of the level proportional to their population share.¹¹ Estimates of immigration's

net fiscal burden vary widely, but most studies identify a modest net burden for European countries (mostly less than 1 percent of average national GDP).¹²

In any event, pluralities of European polities surveyed consider immigrants to contribute less in taxes than they receive in social benefits (47.3 %) and judge immigration to be bad for the economy as a whole (38.6%).¹³ Several studies on support for immigration have found that respondents in countries or regions with more generous redistributive policies are more hostile to immigration, compared to those with less generous such policies, a pattern thought to reflect the fiscal burden of immigration (a burden not accompanying other faces of globalization, like trade).¹⁴ The reality or belief that immigrants pose net fiscal burdens, particularly with respect to social-policy benefits, can be expected to make European publics facing higher immigration see government redistribution as more economically costly. Hence, immigration can lower support for redistribution out of concern for the higher net fiscal costs of immigration.

Separate from such fiscal calculations, immigration has social implications that might also lower support for redistribution. Polities facing more immigration may experience social fragmentation and interact less with one another, even among their own ethnic peers. Such patterns inform some research findings that immigration, particularly that constituting ethnic heterogeneity, may lower solidarity, trust and social capital – though this is now a matter of fierce theoretical and empirical debate.¹⁵ To the extent that immigration really is bad news for solidarity, rising immigration could diminish support for government redistribution, since a unanimous body of scholarship has shown that trust and solidarity are significantly positively related to support for social policy and redistribution.¹⁶

Related to such solidarity issues are attitudes about deservingness of immigrants. Native populations in Europe generally see immigrants as substantially less deserving of social benefits and protections than are other vulnerable groups, such as the elderly, disabled,

or the unemployed.¹⁷ If so, rising immigration increases the “less-deserving” proportion of the population pool, in turn diminishing support for social protection and redistribution. All these economic and social channels combine to suggest, hence, that immigration may be a force for retrenchment of social-policy protection and redistribution – giving rise to what has been called a “progressive’s dilemma.”¹⁸

The channels spelling bad news for government redistribution, however, are not the whole story. Studies of political economy have long articulated ways in which immigration might spur rather than stall public support for redistribution. The Stolper-Samuelson or specific-factor Ricardo-Viner models, expect factor-price equalization to result from migration as well as from goods and capital – as it doesn’t matter to such equalization if trade moves jobs to people, or immigration moves people to jobs. Both should yield convergence of wages and working conditions between the “sending” and “receiving” labor markets. In most European countries where the scarce factor is un- and semi-skilled workers, higher immigration, particularly of less-skilled migrants, can lower wages and working conditions, and raise risks of unemployment and income-loss, particularly among less-skilled natives. Such changes can unleash stronger interest in redistribution to indemnify against such risks, particularly among less skilled workers.¹⁹ Furthermore, immigration may also increase *elasticity* of labor supply and demand – regardless of the relative factor-profiles of sending and receiving countries. Such elasticity can increase income and employment insecurities beyond particular skill categories in host countries. Immigration may, here again, increase insecurities that spur interest in and support for redistribution and welfare states.

These individual-economic implications could also aggregate to create inequalities and social exclusion that publics recognize as problems needing mitigation or compensation. Such collective risks might provoke socio-tropic concern and support for social-policy

protections and redistribution.²⁰ In short, immigration might heighten collective or individual insecurities to boost rather than burden the political sustainability of redistribution.

As an empirical matter, most studies have revealed the net relationship between immigration and support for, or actual, social-policy protection or redistribution to be modestly negative. Soroka et.al., for instance, finds evidence at the level of country-years that higher foreign-born proportions decrease growth in social policy spending.²¹ Alesina and Glaeser find cross-sectional survey evidence that ethnic heterogeneity correlates negatively with support for redistribution.²² Mau and Burkhardt find similar survey evidence that European countries with higher foreign-born proportions, particularly non-western proportions, are modestly less supportive of redistribution.²³ Senik et.al. identifies similarly modest negative effects in cross-sectional patterns.²⁴ Some of these studies have given attention to the off-setting links between immigration and redistribution, suggesting that background conditions might mediate immigration's effects – conditions such as welfare-state types, or anti-immigrant attitudes or concern about economic effects of immigration.²⁵

However, none of these or other studies has articulated how immigration's effects on redistributive politics might be mediated by the social and economic integration of immigrants. This is an important silence, and for two reasons. First, a number of the above arguments about how immigration either undermines or spurs support for redistribution rest upon conditions related to integration – where integration patterns are treated as constants but clearly vary across countries and time. For instance, immigration might pressure altruism or fiscal health only to the extent that immigrants are not integrated into labor markets or assimilated into the cultural mores of host societies. And that “extent” varies across countries and time, as some studies of immigration have already observed.²⁶

Second, the role of integration in welfare politics is prominently discussed in real politics and mass media, suggesting that integration is salient enough to influence the way

ordinary citizens think about immigration and welfare states. Discussions of immigration, integration and welfare policies are particularly common in European settings. For instance, the Danish Minister for Employment and Minister of Finance, Claus Hjort Frederiksen, proclaimed, based on his Department's rough estimates, that "if immigration from Third World countries were blocked, 75 per cent of the cuts necessary to maintain the welfare state would be unnecessary."²⁷ And in 2009, Kai Pöntinen of the Finnish National Coalition Party stirred substantial controversy with his campaign speeches and television advertisements touting the slogan: "Stop Welfare-bum Immigration."²⁸ Statements like these in media and political debate make it more likely that public attitudes about welfare policies and redistribution are influenced by immigration and migrant integration.

The understudied, relevant and salient interaction between immigration and integration raises important questions about the future of welfare states. Might greater migrant integration or assimilation help sustain public support for redistribution and social assistance in the face of immigration? Might the possibly negative implications of immigration for the welfare state – the "Progressive's Dilemma" – be confined to polities where immigrants are poorly integrated socially or economically? Might immigration's implications be more strongly mediated by some aspects of integration than others, such as by economic more than by socio-cultural integration?

2. Argument: How Integration Mediates the Redistributive Politics of Immigration

Answering such questions requires clarifying immigrant integration and its implications for redistributive politics. Doing so fully is a taller order than this paper can fill, given integration's many subtle and contingent dimensions. Scholars disagree strongly on which aspects of social, economic and political relations or differences between immigrants

and native populations matter to either integration and/or assimilation.²⁹ Amidst such controversy and complexity, however, it is possible to identify commonly discussed and observable aspects of immigrant integration and assimilation and to clarify their implications for redistributive politics. The intuitively important aspects are economic and socio-cultural integration patterns relevant to the three channels discussed above that plausibly link immigration to support for social policy and redistribution: the economic insecurities, fiscal pressures, and solidarity/altruism.

The patterns on which I focus are three aspects of integration – specified here as the opposite, “non-integration” – that emerge from the economic and socio-cultural characteristics of immigrants and natives.³⁰ The first two are relevant to economic non-integration of immigrants. One is the gap between foreign-born unemployment and native-born unemployment that captures the degree to which the foreign-born population is successful in the labor market relative to the native population. A second important gap is that between foreign-born and native dependency on social benefits – capturing more downstream dependence on the fiscal purse. A third gap, separate from economic integration, involves socio-cultural integration or assimilation: the gap between foreign-born and native populations in their respective attitudes about gender relations, religion, political values, and social standards. These three gaps, or aspects of “non-integration,” can be expected to vary across countries and time – reflecting attributes and origins of immigrants themselves, but also labor-market and integration policies in host countries.³¹

All three gaps between foreign-born and native populations can be expected to have important implications for redistributive politics. They may affect redistributive politics directly, though this is unclear – as poor integration of immigrants is less relevant in places with few immigrants to integrate. What *is* clearer is that each aspect of non-integration can

alter the channels discussed above by which immigration can undermine or under-gird support for redistribution.

I argue that all three gaps between migrants and natives, while differing from one another in their implications, can be expected to intensify immigration's negative more than positive effects for redistribution. Figure One summarizes these arguments, where the three aspects of non-integration have distinct implications relevant to the politics of redistribution: the *gap in unemployment* should have implications captured by 1A, 1B and 1C (combining how each of the arrows "A", "B" and "C" emerge from "1. Gap in Unemployment"); the *gap in social-policy dependency* by 2A, 2B and 2C; and the *gap in socio-cultural values* by 3A, 3B, and 3C. These implications involve the gaps in unemployment, in social-benefit dependency and in social values in different ways amplifying immigration's tendency to undermine solidarity and/or raise macroeconomic costs of redistribution that lower support for redistribution, but not amplifying immigration's tendency to raise those economic insecurities that nourish support for redistribution. Such implications are themselves empirically testable, but they culminate in what I most want to emphasize: three Hypotheses on how each gap mediates immigration's net effects on support for government redistribution.

[[Figure One here]]

Gap in unemployment. If immigrants have higher unemployment than their native counterparts, immigration may spark concerns in a polity about collective risks – as gaps in unemployment manifest inequalities and social exclusion in labor-market experience. Given this possibility, any mediating role played by this aspect of non-integration may intensify any tendency of immigration to raise socio-tropic concern about collective inequalities – thereby spurring support for redistribution. Such a pattern is captured in Figure One by a positive sign

for the mediating role of non-integration with respect to unemployment, given by arrow 1A. On the other hand, a gap in unemployment has unclear implications for *individual* economic insecurities: natives facing more immigration amidst such labor-market gaps are unlikely to experience more job or income risks. Hence, Figure One's arrow 1A can be labeled "Ø."

In contrast, unemployment gaps can be expected to alter how immigration affects fiscal costs and solidarity/altruism, and thereby support for redistribution (arrows 1B and 1C, respectively, in Figure One). Higher immigrant unemployment means that rising immigration likely lowers the tax base and increases reliance on social benefits. Such can affect perceptions of fiscal cost of social benefits, regardless of the general level of unemployment. Conversely, where foreign-born unemployment is lower than native unemployment, natives could see immigration making marginally positive contributions to productivity and fiscal sustainability of redistribution. Such logic suggests, hence, a strong positive mediation between immigration and unemployment gaps in shaping actual or perceived macroeconomic costs of redistribution (a positive sign for arrow 1B in Figure One). Finally, the lack of labor-market integration captured by a large unemployment gap could tarnish native feelings of solidarity and welfare deservingness for those struggling in labor markets. Hence, gaps in unemployment should intensify any negative effect that immigration has on solidarity and altruism, thereby diminishing support for redistribution (captured by the negative sign for arrow 1C in Figure One). These putative links underlie the following first hypothesis:

Hypothesis One (H1):

Gaps in unemployment (e.g. higher unemployment rates than natives) should enhance the degree to which immigration decreases, and/or diminish the degree to which immigration increases, native support for government redistribution.

Gap in social-benefit dependency. The end result should be similar for non-integration of immigrants with respect to disproportionate reliance on social benefits. Such reliance could stem, in part, from a gap in unemployment, but also from lower inactivity (e.g. fewer

homemakers), higher reliance on child allowances, or sickness and disability, or other sources of take-up rates or welfare dependency. Or it could reflect variations in discrimination and in access given to immigrants in different social-policy settings.³² Gaps in social-benefit dependency, in any event, should have more modest implications for individual and collective economic insecurities than that hypothesized to emerge from gaps in unemployment, because the former manifests and signals society doing something to address immigration-related inequality or social exclusion. Hence, gaps in social-benefit dependency ought not to alter how immigration affects support for redistribution via individual or collective insecurities (null sign for arrow 2A).

On the other hand, a gap in social-benefit dependency might, more than the gap in unemployment, enhance the extent to which immigration lowers solidarity or altruism among natives, and in turn native support for redistribution (an equally negative sign for arrow 2C). More clearly still, gaps in social-benefit dependency directly capture fiscal pressure on the spending side (and presumably also lower tax contributions). Hence, gaps in social-benefit dependency ought to more significantly and directly increase fiscal pressure resulting from higher immigration – more so than do unemployment gaps (a more positive arrow 2B). These considerations support the second hypothesis.

Hypothesis Two (H2):

Gaps in social-benefit dependency (e.g. foreign-born being more dependent on social benefits than natives) should enhance the degree to which immigration decreases, and/or diminish the degree to which immigration increases, native support for government redistribution.

Gap in social values. More clearly than holds for economic aspects of non-integration, the more *social* aspects of non-integration, such as gaps in or clashes of cultural values held by immigrant and native populations, can intensify the degree to which immigration diminishes solidarity or altruism. Where immigration introduces alien and different values than those held by the host population, it likely undermines social unity and

solidarism. Of course, as the literature on “culture clash” makes clear, this is a complicated matter, depending among other things on which aspects of social values one addresses.³³

However, substantial gaps with respect to values on any or all social, cultural or political issues should intensify immigration’s negative effect on solidarity (negative sign for 3C). On the other hand, gaps in social values can be expected to have few implications for how immigration affects either individual or collective risks, or for fiscal costs of redistribution (3A and 3B, respectively). Hence, gaps in values should make immigration more negatively or less positively influence redistribution support.

Hypothesis Three (H3):

Gaps in social values of foreign-born population relative to native (e.g. different attitudes on religion, gender relations, sexuality, etc.) should enhance the degree to which immigration decreases, and/or diminish the degree to which immigration increases, native support for government redistribution.

In sum, the arguments culminate in three principal hypotheses that larger gaps between immigrants and natives in unemployment (H1), in social-benefit dependency (H2), and/or in social values (H3) ought to make the effects of immigration on support for redistribution more negative or less positive than when such gaps are smaller. These are, to be clear, related but separate hypotheses, since the three gaps do not always hang together – for instance, economic non-integration may well swing free of cultural non-integration – and since the three aspects of non-integration should have distinct implications for how societies respond to immigration. Looking across the three principal Hypotheses, we can explore which aspect of non-integration is particularly important in shaping how immigration plays out for redistributive politics – an issue that I treat as an empirical rather than theoretical question. In any event, the nine intervening conditions that each Hypothesis implicates, summarized in Figure One, are testable sub-hypotheses. For instance, gaps in unemployment and social-policy dependency might interact with immigration to particularly influence perceived fiscal costs of social benefits (captured by 1B and 2B in Figure One), but not to influence either

economic insecurities (1A and 2A) or solidarity/altruism (1C and 2C). And gaps in socio-cultural values might interact with immigration to particularly influence social altruism or solidarity (3C in Figure One) but not to influence economic insecurity or perceived fiscal costs of social policy (3A or 3B).

3. Survey Evidence in Europe

I test these various expectations on time-series cross-sectional data of individual attitudes in 22 countries in Europe, combining the five existing waves of the European Social Survey (ESS).³⁴ The dataset encompasses between two and five survey waves for seventeen Western European advanced democracies (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom) and five Central and East European countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia). This yields a combined sample of some 160,000 respondents. The dataset is particularly suitable for testing the above arguments, because it harbors substantial national and individual variation in support for government redistribution, and provides a basis for identifying variation in national-level exposure to immigration over a substantial cross-section of countries and meaningful period of time. These provide substantial leverage to explore the above arguments.

3.1. Dependent variables

The ESS directly surveys what I seek to explain: public support for government redistribution and welfare protection. Respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: “Government should reduce differences in income.”³⁵ I recoded the answers to create measures of support for government redistribution.

The baseline is an ordinal measure *Support Redistribution (ordinal)* ranging from 1 to 5 (1=strongly disagree; 2 somewhat disagree; somewhat agree; 3=neither agree nor disagree; 4=somewhat agree; 5=strongly agree).³⁶ This question about government redistribution is the only social-policy question in all waves of the ESS. How such redistribution ought to be accomplished is left unstated in the survey. Government redistribution reflects combinations of more or less progressive taxation, and various income transfers or social services (e.g. job training). I presume that respondents answering the redistribution question might have these policy provisions in mind but might also only consider the broad principle of redistribution evoked by the question. The sample mean of *Support redistribution (ordinal)* is 3.86 in 2010 (a modest rise from the 2002 average of 3.76), suggesting that most Europeans support redistribution on the 1-5 scale.³⁷

To get a better idea of the variation over time and space, Figure Two summarizes the national sample means (weighted for sampling but not population) for *Strongly support redistribution (binary)* in 2002 and 2010. The grand mean is .27, suggesting that substantial minorities of European publics strongly support redistribution. But the averages vary substantially, from a low of .08 in Denmark in 2002 to a high of .57 in Hungary in 2010. Such a distribution reminds us that support for government redistribution is likely influenced, at least partly, by existing levels of inequality and/or actual redistribution. The over-time developments in these data suggest substantial changes in support for redistribution, averaging-out as a modest rise (3.9 percentage points between these two years), though the pattern again varies across countries: for instance, where France and Norway experienced substantial drops in support, Germany and most Eastern European countries experienced increases. More generally, respondents in the five East-European countries are more supportive of redistribution (e.g. .34 compared to .26 for the West European polities), though have not proportionately risen more than their West-European counterparts.

[Figure Two here]

In robustness tests I consider other specifications of support for redistribution and welfare provision. I consider, for instance, binary specifications, such as *Strongly support Redistribution (binary)* (1= strongly agree; 0=strongly or somewhat disagree, or neither agree nor disagree, or somewhat agree). And I consider questions asked about social spending and taxes or about unemployment protection from the 2008 ESS wave.

3.2. Independent variables

Foreign-born percent. The principal explanatory variable is the most reliable and cross-nationally valid measure of international immigration for the sample countries, *Foreign-born % population*.³⁸ This measure is preferable to alternative measures such as asylum seekers, immigration flows, non-citizens, or net migration, because it better captures actual stocks of immigrants in a given country and year, and is less sensitive to annually and nationally-varying differences in measurement of such.³⁹ The downside of this measure is that it is only available since 2000, precluding study before the 2000-2010 years relevant to ESS data. Figure Three summarizes the national values in 2001 and 2009 (to capture a one-year lag relevant to ESS 2002 and 2010, respectively), revealing significant variation in the European sample (Italy is not measured for both years): from just over two percent for Poland in 2001 to nearly 37 percent for Luxembourg in 2009. We also see substantial increases over this relatively modest period – more than 50 percent increases in Finland, Greece, Ireland, Norway, Spain and Slovakia, and averaging 43 percent (of 3.2 percentage points) across the sample – Portugal being the only exception.

[Figure Three here]

Equally central are the integration measures emphasized in Hypotheses One through Three. I focus on three measures, as close to the concepts in the Hypotheses as existing data allow. A snapshot of all three is provided by Figure Four below. The first integration measure is the simplest, having been measured well across time and space in OECD countries: *Gap in unemployment*, the ratio of foreign-born unemployment to native unemployment.⁴⁰ The left-most bars in Figure Four capture the country means for all five one-year lags used in the analysis (2001, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009). By this measure, we see that in all but two countries the ratio is higher than one – that is, foreign-born population has higher unemployment than natives. The ratio is highest in Belgium, Netherlands and Switzerland, whose foreign-born populations are more than two-and-a-half times more likely to be unemployed than their native counterparts. The exceptions are Hungary and Italy, where natives are more likely to be unemployed than their foreign-born counterparts. These averages, however, mask substantial variation over the sample years, with several countries having lower than one-to-one ratios in at least one year in the panel.

[[Figure Four here]]

More difficult to measure is the social-benefit dependency of the foreign-born versus native-born population. It is difficult to gauge due to the lack of systematic measurement across European or industrialized countries in take-up rates or use of quite disparate features of social policy, at least not for a significant number of countries and years.

To approximate such dependency, I use the leverage provided by the ESS dataset itself, with its large and high-quality sampling properties, by estimating the likelihood that foreign-born respondents rely on non-pension social benefits for their income. Such estimation is based on answers to a standard question in the ESS panel on income sources, including the possibilities of “unemployment or redundancy benefits” and other “government social benefits” – leaving out explicitly mentioned “pension benefits.” Based on these answers, I construct the individual-level measure of incidence of (non-pension) *Social-benefit dependency* (1=income mainly from unemployment/redundancy benefit or other social benefits; 0=other sources of income). I then estimate, using probit models, the marginal likelihood that a respondent’s being *foreign-born* (1=born abroad; 0=born in country of residence) predicts that respondents rely on social benefits for their income (i.e. *Social-benefit dependency*=1), net of education, age, and gender of respondents. The results provide the basis for the country-year-specific integration measure *Gap in social-benefit dependence*: z-statistic of the marginal effect ($\partial F/\partial x$) that being *foreign-born* predicts *social-benefit dependency*.

The middle bars in Figure Four summarize the resulting country means across the five survey waves. These estimates correlate highly with studies of social benefits based on larger samples but for smaller cross-sections of countries and years.⁴¹ They also correlate positively with *Gap in unemployment* (nation-year sample R-square is .29 and coefficient of correlation of 0.54). But because social-benefit dependence reflects many other conditions – such as varying social-policy systems granting varying accessibility to immigrants – there are plenty of outliers, such as Hungary or Denmark. As measured, in any event, *Gap in social-benefit dependency* is lowest in the Czech Republic and Hungary and highest in Switzerland and Germany.

Most difficult to measure are cultural features of non-integration, the broad social attitudes or values of foreign-born versus native populations relevant to non-integration into host societies. Existing scholarship disagrees on which sub-dimensions matter to such assimilation, and we lack in any event good cross-national and temporal measures of any of these dimensions.⁴² My approach is to again use the leverage provided by the ESS data, focusing on respondent answers to several questions tapping-into key social values. The ESS includes a number of salient questions across all ESS waves and sample countries: (1) belief that gays should be free to live as they wish; (2) that men should have more right to a job than women when jobs are scarce; (3) belief in the importance of religion; (4) in importance of individual freedom; and (4) that anti-democratic parties should be banned. With respect to these questions, I first calculate the sub-population averages for *foreign-born* respondents and *native* respondents (after standardizing their scales and taking account sample weighting). I then calculate the sum of the absolute values of the differences between those sub-population averages for a particular country-year in the survey. The results give *Gap in social values*, capturing the average difference between native and foreign-born populations in attitudes toward the above five values-question in a given country and year.⁴³

The right-most bars in Figure Four are country means of that *Gap* for the five years of the sample. The cross-national distribution is different than the economic aspects of integration – illustrated by how Hungary, Estonia and Portugal score very high in the *Gap in social values* and low in terms of the economic-related *Gaps*. Indeed, there is no statistically significant relationship between *Gap in social values* and the other two measures – a pattern that comports with research suggesting that economic position does not strongly predict social integration of migrants.⁴⁴

It is worth emphasizing that the above measures of economic and social non-integration are unlikely to be mere artifacts of national backgrounds of immigrants. The three

measures correlate weakly with non-Western immigrant shares (more specifically, shares of those born in Latin America, Asia or Africa).⁴⁵ Appendix Figure One overviews this relationship, where the correlation involving *Gap in unemployment* is insignificantly positive, while that involving *Gap in socio-cultural values* is not even positive.

As controls, in any event, I consider individual and nation-year parameters that plausibly influence both support for redistribution and immigration. *Age* can be expected to affect pension-related and other economic interests in and values towards redistribution. *Female* gender captures occupational selection and has been found to spur support for social policy interventions. *Education* affects occupational selection and conditions whether respondents are likely to be net beneficiaries or benefactors of redistribution. *Household income* has direct implications for work choices and for redistribution, and as a possible consequence of immigration patterns will tend to lead us to understate implications of the latter for attitudes on redistribution. *Married* respondents have income sources and responsibilities affecting work choices and social-policy attitudes. *Employed* captures labor-market vulnerability and taste for redistribution. *Elementary occupation* measures manual, unskilled work orientation of respondents. *Union member* captures organizational interest that affects redistributive attitudes. *Satisfied with national government*, satisfaction with the central government's functioning, to capture general subjective quality of governance and confidence in the quality of government's tax, spending and other policies. I also consider crucial national-level controls: *existing Redistribution* (the difference between post-transfer-post-tax Gini index and market Gini index), to control for taxes and social spending policies already in place to redress market inequalities⁴⁶; and *Unemployment rate*, the standardized percentage of total unemployment in the population year, relevant to economic demand and supply of redistribution, as well as to possible attraction of immigrants.⁴⁷ Beyond these

controls, I also considered in robustness tests alternative individual and national-year controls, such as existing inequality levels and social-policy spending.⁴⁸

3.3. Estimation strategy

To explore the three Hypotheses, I fit models of *Support for redistribution* among the native population, taking account both individual variation across respondents in country-years and country-year variation in the integration and immigration measures. Ignoring the multilevel nature of such data violates the assumption of independent errors and can lead to underestimation of standard errors associated with contextual variables.⁴⁹ Therefore, I fit random-intercept maximum-likelihood models grouped by country, with nationally-varying intercepts, distinctly estimated variances and covariances, and robust standard errors (clustered by country). The models take the following form:

$$\text{Support government redistribution}_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}\text{Foreign-born percent}_j + \gamma_{02}\text{Gap measure}_j + \gamma_{03}\text{Foreign-born perc.} \times \text{Gap measure}_j + \gamma_{04}\text{Aggregate-controls}_j + \gamma_{10}\text{Individual-level-controls}_{ij} + u_{0j}$$

Most important are the effects of *Foreign-born percent* conditional upon the non-integration measures (i.e. *Gap in unemployment*, *Gap in social-benefit dependency*, or *Gap in social values*), with these parameters and their interactions estimated in separate models due to limited degrees-of-freedom for country-year variables of interest. I report models with the full controls described above, plus year dummies.⁵⁰ In addition to these baseline models, I explore sensitivity and robustness tests, and the intervening conditions plausibly underlying how immigration and integration interact to shape support for redistribution.

4. Results and Discussion

Discussion of the results can be divided into three sub-sections. The first two focus on testing the main Hypotheses One through Three, first with respect to a baseline specification and then with respect to robustness and sensitivity checks. A final sub-section then explores the links putatively underlying these Hypotheses using a separate series of estimations on the relevant sub-sample of data.

4.1. *Baseline Effects on Support for Redistribution*

Table One summarizes the baseline results focused on *Support redistribution*. The first model considers how *foreign-born percentage* influences *Support for redistribution* directly, and the remaining models consider how this influence is mediated by measures of non-integration between foreign-born and native populations. As for the controls, respondents who are older, female, in elementary occupations and union-members are more supportive of government redistribution than their counterparts. And more educated, wealthier, married, and employed respondents, and those satisfied with the national government, tend to be less supportive of redistribution. As for country-year controls, neither the national-level unemployment rate nor existing redistribution are significant, net of foreign-born stocks. Leaving our key independent variable out of the estimates (models not shown), unemployment tends to spur support for redistribution, suggesting that macroeconomic downturns inspire redistributive tastes, while *ex ante* redistribution weakly reduces such support, consistent with the possibility of diminishing marginal returns to redistributive effort. Year dummies (included but not shown) are positively signed and significant, particularly from 2008 to 2010 – consistent with increasing support for redistribution between 2006 and recession-laden 2010.

[Table One here]

Most importantly, the baseline results provide support for Hypotheses One and Two, and little support for Hypothesis Three. Model 1 shows the direct effects of *Foreign-born percentage*, ignoring the possible role of non-integration: immigration statistically-significantly diminishes support for redistribution, and in this panel setting somewhat more strongly so than in previous studies focused on fewer countries and single waves of ESS data.⁵¹ Models 2-4, then, directly test Hypotheses One through Three, respectively, suggesting that particularly the economic non-integration measures diminish the degree to which *foreign-born percent* has a negative effect. This can be seen by the significant interaction-terms in Model 2 for interaction with *Gap in unemployment* (Hypothesis One); and in Model 3 for interaction with *Gap in social-benefit dependency* (Hypothesis Two). In Model 4 we see that the interaction with *Gap in social values* (Hypothesis Three) is significant only at the $p < 0.1$ level, just under conventional standards of significance.

The substantive meaning of these interactions cannot be read-off of the Table, however, since the coefficients for *Foreign-born percent* are conditional, showing the effect where the non-integration measure is zero – a value outside the sample range for either *Gap in unemployment* or in *Gap socio-cultural values*, and in the middle of the distribution for *gap in social-benefit dependency*. The significant positive component-coefficients for the three *Gaps* are also conditional upon *Foreign-born percent* being zero, the coefficients becoming significantly less so as exposure to immigration rises. In separate models (not shown), none of the non-integration measures (gap in unemployment, in social-benefit dependency, or in socio-cultural values) has significant direct effects (negative or positive) on support for redistribution. The key issue for the present analysis is to clarify what such interactions mean for redistribution support.

Simulations based on the reported models reveal the point in the distribution of the non-integration measures where *Foreign-born percent* becomes significantly negative (see Appendix Figure Two): that point is reached when the *Gap in unemployment* is above 1.3 at roughly the twenty-fifth percentile of the sample distribution; when the *Gap in social-benefit dependency* reaches .8, also at roughly the twenty-fifth percentile of the distribution; and it applies throughout the distribution of *Gap in socio-cultural values*. This translates into empirical findings that immigration significantly undermines support for redistribution, except when economic integration is high (that is, except in the lowest quartiles of non-integration with respect to gaps in unemployment or in social-benefit dependency).

Figure Five graphically captures the conditional effects of immigration: the substantive effects of varying *Foreign-born percent* where gaps between foreign-born and native respondents are low (at the tenth percentile) compared to such effects where gaps are high (ninetieth percentile), holding the other parameters at their means or medians. The results shown are based on the baseline models using the categorical measure *Support redistribution* (from strongly oppose=1 to strongly support=5), but the pictures are very similar using results from multi-level logit models reported below. The scales of the axes, measuring the predicted *Support for redistribution* and *Foreign-born percent*, are the same for each panel, allowing direct comparison of the effects of different faces of non-integration.

[[Figure Five here]]

Where the *Gap in unemployment* is low (Figure Five's upper-left panel), at the tenth percentile (1.07 ratio of foreign-born to native unemployment), increases in *Foreign-born percent* do not significantly decrease support for redistribution (as can be seen by the slopes of the schedules for the lower and upper confidence intervals). Where the *Gap in*

unemployment is high, on the other hand, the full range of *foreign born percent* (from the 1st to the 99th percentile in the sample distribution) predicts a drop in *Support redistribution* from 4.49 to 2.2 – what can be seen as a shift from a predicted attitude that is between somewhat and strongly supporting government redistribution, to an attitude that is somewhat opposed to redistribution. The predicted results are more modest for the scale of increases in foreign-born shares that most countries have actually experienced – something easier to visualize with reference to shifts from the 50th to the 90th percentile (captured by the broken vertical lines in each panel). The results are substantively more modest for *Gap in social-benefit dependency* (right-hand panel) and *Gap in social values* (lower left panel). It is important also to put such results in perspective by recognizing that in settings where non-integration is high and *foreign-born percent* is low (below 7.6 percent of the population) the predicted support for redistribution is higher or about the same as when non-integration is low and *Foreign-born percent* is low. It is particularly at higher exposure to immigration that we see non-integration making such exposure take a bite out of support for redistribution.

In all cases, however, rises in *Foreign-born percent* where foreign-born populations are not well integrated in host societies predict substantively meaningful declines in support for redistribution. But where foreign-born populations *are* well integrated with respect to *gap in unemployment* and *gap in social-benefit dependency*, this negative effect is no longer statistically insignificant.

Table One's results are further corroborated by many alternative specifications. Some of these are close to those just discussed and need only brief mention. For instance, including all measures of non-integration and their interactions with foreign-born together in a single estimation yields very similar results – though poses high collinearity (VIF scores above 37 for some parameters, and an average VIF score of 6.1). And one can also generate composites of the standardized values of the gaps in unemployment, social-benefit dependency and socio-

cultural values. Doing so yields results corroborating those in Table One: in fact, the size and significance of the interaction term is greater than the baseline results for either *gap in unemployment* or *gap in social-benefit dependency* – suggesting that different aspects of non-integration might well have cumulative effects.⁵²

The baseline specification from Table One also harbors interesting information about sub-samples of countries, though small sub-samples can lack the degrees of freedom to investigate the effects of interactions between country-year immigration and non-integration.⁵³ The results are particularly strong in support of Hypotheses One and Two among the sample's 17 West European countries, and are similar if one restricts the sample to the EU-15 or even to just the Southern European countries (Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal). In the sub-sample of countries experiencing the largest increases in foreign-born shares – for instance, the six experiencing more than 50-percent increases between 2002 and 2010 – non-integration has again a negative, but substantively more modest, role in mediating the effect of foreign-born shares on support for redistribution. Most noteworthy, perhaps, is how immigration has played out in the five East European countries, where *Foreign-born percent* has positive rather than negative direct effects on support for redistribution. Economic non-integration in these settings dampens the effects of immigration, as in the full sample or West European subsamples, but this entails dampening the tendency of immigration to spur support for redistribution. In the East European states immigration may not be as bad news for redistribution support as it is in their seventeen West European counterparts. In short, although such small sub-samples lack the degrees-of-freedom to confidently gauge how immigration and non-integration interact, they suggest differences in how immigration plays out for redistribution while revealing patterns that corroborate Table One's baseline support for Hypotheses One and Two.

4.2. *Alternative Specifications of Support for Redistribution*

More challenging and important sensitivity and robustness tests are summarized in Tables Two and Three. Models 1-4 in Table Two show that the patterns of interaction discussed above are robust to an alternative specification of the dependent variable, particularly *Strongly support redistribution (binary)*, where 1=strongly agree that government should reduce income differences and 0=otherwise. This specification captures strong variation across the national samples and time, as summarized in Figure Two above. These entail random-intercept maximum-likelihood logit estimation (I include but do not report full controls to conserve space). Such models confront the discrete character of the survey question, though of course at the expense of the full nuance of the categorical measure above.⁵⁴ The results are in line with those reported in Table One, corroborating Hypotheses One and Two, but here also Hypothesis Three. *Foreign-born* percent tends to have significantly negative direct effect, but also to be negatively conditional upon *Gaps in unemployment, in social-benefit dependency and in socio-cultural values*. The mediating effects of non-integration are, in fact, stronger than in the baseline – even though *Foreign-born percent*, here, significantly diminishes support for redistribution even where non-integration is low. For instance, based on Model 2, when *Gap in unemployment* is at the 10th percentile (ratio of 1.06), the sample variation in *foreign-born* predicts a drop from 29 to 10 percent chance of supporting redistribution. But where that *Gap* is at the 90th percentile (ratio of 2.69), the same variation in *foreign-born* predicts a drop from 49 to 2 percent – substantively a much stronger diminishing effect of immigration in this binary specification.

Models 5-8 in Table Two summarize results for a specification involving a key alternative measure of immigration: Δ *foreign-born percentage*, the two-year differences (between survey waves) in foreign-born percent, rather than levels. This specification gauges

the influence of a politically-salient measure of exposure to immigration – recent shifts in immigration exposure – and focuses attention on the over-time variation in the data. The model is in other respects the same as in the baseline models in Table One (I present only the main results of interest to conserve space). The results are again in line with the baseline, clearly supporting Hypotheses One and Two but not Hypothesis Three. As a direct effect, Δ *foreign-born percentage* has no significant dampening effect (though the coefficient is negatively signed). Like the baseline models, however, the two measures of economic non-integration – *Gap in unemployment* and *Gap in social-benefit dependence* – significantly push the effect of Δ *Foreign-born percentage* downwards, in the direction of diminishing support for redistribution. In fact, such mediating effects are again stronger than in the baseline models. Simulations like those in Appendix Figure Two (not shown) suggest that the mediating effect of *Gap in unemployment* is strongest: Δ *Foreign-born percentage* is positively signed until *Gap in unemployment* gets above 1 (the seventeenth percentile), and significantly negative after the thirtieth-fifth percentile in that *Gap* (a ratio of 1.44).

[[Table Two here]]

Table Three focuses on two measures of support for welfare provision, as opposed to government redistribution. Both measures are drawn from the 2008 wave of the ESS (based on questions unfortunately not asked in other waves). The first of these, analyzed in models 1-4 of Table Three, is *Government social spending and taxes*: respondent answers to whether government, if it had to choose, should choose “increasing taxes and spending more on social benefits and services, or decreasing taxes and spending less on social benefits and services” (answers ranging from 0-10, 0=“decrease taxes a lot and spend much less on social benefits,” and 10=“increase taxes a lot and spend much more on social benefits and services”). The

second measure, analyzed in models 5-8 in Table Three, is *Government should help the unemployed*, based on answers to whether “government should ensure a reasonable standard of living for the unemployed” (answers ranging from 0=should not be government’s responsibility at all, to 10=should be entirely government’s responsibility).

[[Table Three here]]

Table Three’s models are based on the same specifications as in Table One, except that here the focus, by necessity, is on only one wave of the ESS – hence no time dimension and fewer countries, and in turn no further country-level controls or year dummies. The results command less confidence, hence, than those affording higher degrees of freedom. But Table Three’s models focus on substantive support for social policy directly. And we see from the results a pattern clearly in line with those in the baseline models of Table One. Here, exposure to *Foreign-born percent* does not have significant direct effects, but those effects are strongly mediated by gaps between foreign-born and native unemployment and social-benefit dependence. For instance, up until roughly the tenth percentile of *Gap in unemployment*, higher *Foreign-born percent* significantly increases support for higher social benefits and taxes; but at roughly the 75th percentile of *Gap in unemployment* the effects of *Foreign-born percent* is significant and negative. This constitutes clear corroboration of the principal findings from the baseline models: Measures of economic non-integration, more than socio-cultural non-integration, negatively mediate the effects of immigration on support for social policy as well as redistribution.

All these reported results stand up to a range of further robustness and sensitivity tests. The results are very similar if one considers fewer or other mixes of controls (including social spending and extant inequality), removes outliers in any of the key variables, or in a jackknife

analysis removes any single country or year of the panel. And the results are robust to alternative measures of non-integration (based on additional questions, such as on political values), or alternative measures of immigration (e.g. non-citizens, asylum seekers, net migration). They are also robust to alternative estimators, such as ordered probit or logit, or multinomial logit models. In short, substantial evidence in surveys of European publics points to the conclusion that economic non-integration increases immigration's broad tendency to dampen support for generous redistribution and social protection.

4.3. *Effects on Economic Insecurity, Macroeconomic Costs, and Altruism*

Further empirical exploration of the above arguments possible, however, by looking into the intervening links underlying Hypotheses One through Three, as discussed above: that different kinds of non-integration might in various ways make immigration more likely to increase worries about macroeconomic/fiscal costs of social policy, decrease feelings of solidarity or altruism, but should do less to increase immigration's implications for natives' economic risks (see Figure One above). Although most waves of the ESS data offer few questions to examine these links, the 2008 wave of the ESS data does include three questions relevant to them.

The questions are the basis of models summarized in Table Four. Relevant to respondent economic insecurities (corresponding to arrows 1A, 2A, and 3A in Figure One above) is *Poverty risk*, based on a question about the risk of poverty: "During the next 12 months how likely is it that there will be some periods when you don't have enough money to cover your household necessities? (answers ranging from 1-4, 1=not at all likely, 4=very likely). Relevant to concerns about macroeconomic costs of social-policy (corresponding to arrows 1B, 2B, and 3B in Figure One above) is *Social benefits strain the economy*, based on

the question whether “social benefits and services put too great a strain on the economy” (answers ranging from 1-5, recoded as 1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree). And relevant to respondent attitudes about altruism and solidarity (corresponding to arrows 1C, 2C, and 3C in Figure One above) is *Altruism*, based on whether respondents believe “it is very important to me to help the people around me. I want to help care for their wellbeing” (answers ranging from 1-5, 1=not at all like me to 5=very much like me). To be sure, these questions do not fully capture sentiments on individual or collective economic insecurity, macroeconomic costs, or altruism and solidarity. But they directly gauge key aspects of such sentiments given as the key intervening variables in Figure One connecting immigration to support for redistribution. In any event, each of these parameters very strongly influences, consistent with the arguments above and with the findings in other survey work, measures of support for redistribution and welfare policy: as the arguments summarized in Figure One above expected, *Altruism* and *Poverty risk* strongly and significantly positively spur support for redistribution and welfare, while *Social benefits strain economy* strongly and significantly reduces such support (not shown but available upon request).

[[Table Four here]]

The issue addressed in Table Four is whether these same three parameters are influenced by the interaction between measures of immigration and non-integration. The Table summarizes multi-level random-intercept models of *Poverty risk* (models 1-3), *Social benefits strain economy* (models 4-6), and *Altruism* (models 7-9), and, using the same specifications as in Table Three (only main results are shown). The expectations developed above involve the interaction, not direct effects, of *foreign-born population* and the three measures of non-integration. First, all non-integration measures ought not to have strong

mediating effects on how *foreign born percent* affects *Poverty risk* – expectations summarized above in Figure One, recall, as 1A, 2A, and 3A. Second, particularly the economic non-integration measures ought to significantly positively mediate the degree to which *foreign-born percent* increases belief that *social benefits strain the economy* – arrows 1B and 2B but not so much 3B. All the non-integration measures, finally, might significantly negatively mediate the degree to which *foreign-born percent* decreases belief in *Altruism* – arrows 1C, 2C and especially 3C.

The results corroborate particularly the economic-oriented expectations. Models 1-3 reveal that none of the measures of non-integration mediates the influence of *Foreign-born percent* on *Poverty risk* – consistent with expectation. Models 4-6 reveal, also consistent with expectation, that the two measures of economic non-integration – *Gap in unemployment* and *Gap in social-benefit dependence* – significantly increase the degree to which *foreign-born percent* increases belief that *Social benefits strain economy*. And we see that the *Gap in socio-cultural values*, as expected, has little such mediating effect. Models 7-9, however, reveal patterns less consistent with expectation: none of the measures of non-integration significantly mediates the influence of *Foreign-born percent* on *Altruism*. It is, hence, mainly measures of economic non-integration, not socio-cultural non-integration, that appear to matter to support for redistribution and welfare states. And it appears that such economic non-integration matters via a particular mechanism: by making immigration heighten concern about the broad economic viability of social policy and redistribution, not so much by exacerbating any negative effects immigration may have on altruism or positive effects it may have on individual economic insecurity. Further evidence that perceived economic burdens might be important mechanisms are that inclusion of *Social benefits strain economy* in estimates of support for redistribution or welfare states significantly reduces the coefficients and raises standard errors of interactions discussed in Tables One to Four.⁵⁵

Hence, the patterns in Table Four provide further support for Hypotheses One and Two and modest evidence to reject Hypothesis Three: economic non-integration is more relevant to welfare state politics than is socio-cultural non-integration, and the mechanism by which this is so involves concerns about fiscal costs. As with the main results on support for redistribution, these supplemental results hold for a wide range of alternative estimators and specifications of economic insecurity, fiscal concerns, and altruism.

5. Conclusion

This paper has explored how the economic and social integration of immigrant populations can strongly mediate the way immigration influences politics of redistribution and the welfare state. In light of the theoretical reasons to expect immigration to have offsetting implications for such politics, the analysis here has articulated how and why different measures of social and economic non-integration of immigrants might alter tastes for redistribution. The analysis suggests that economic non-integration (captured by *gap in unemployment* and *gap in social-benefit dependency*), more than socio-cultural measures of non-integration (*gap in socio-cultural values*), exacerbates negative effects that immigration has on support for redistribution and welfare states. And it clarifies important mechanisms for such effects: economic non-integration, again more than cultural non-integration, exacerbates how immigration can spark concerns about the fiscal viability of welfare states, while doing little to alter how immigration affects altruism or individual economic risks.

Such analysis, to be sure, only begins to explore how integration and immigration interact in the politics of redistribution and the welfare state. More should be done to explore how other, perhaps better measures of integration influence redistribution politics, given the complexity of social and economic integration of immigrants. And much more should be

done to consider the upstream conditions plausibly influencing levels of integration – net of and beyond the broad characteristics of immigrant populations themselves. For instance, a fruitful line of inquiry would explore how different integration policies and regulations of European states alter the way immigration plays out in redistribution politics. Finally, an important extension of this research agenda is to consider how and whether broad public attitudes putatively shaped by immigration, and the interaction between immigration and integration, actually influence party and policymaking agendas and ultimate revenue and spending policies of states. All of such further research will require deepening the kind of quantitative-inferential research pursued here, but will also require in-depth histories of the political economy of particular countries experiencing immigration in the context of ongoing reform of welfare states and redistributive policies.

In the meantime, this study reminds us that national-level measures of immigration can have important implications for social policy and politics, but in ways that are mediated by integration. It may be that national-level measures of immigration undermine the hitherto broad public support for government redistribution, net of a range of individual and national economic and social conditions. But greater economic integration of immigrants into labor markets can meaningfully diminish such negative effects. Greater socio-cultural integration or assimilation, on the other hand, appear to be less important, suggesting that socio-cultural diversity that might accompany immigration may not, as such, threaten public's acceptance of general social policies. Economic integration, hence, more than cultural convergence, can help cushion the social-policy implications of immigration in Europe and elsewhere.

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TABLE ONE:
IMMIGRATION, INTEGRATION AND SUPPORT FOR
GOVERNMENT REDISTRIBUTION

DV: *Support government redistribution*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Foreign-born percent _{t-1}	-0.025*** (0.008)	-0.001 (0.010)	-0.022** (0.009)	-0.017** (0.007)
Gap in unemployment _{t-1}		0.220** (0.099)		
Gap in social-benefit dependence			0.048** (0.020)	
Gap in socio-cultural values				0.040*** (0.014)
Foreign-born × Gap		-0.021** (0.008)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.003* (0.002)
Age	0.001** (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)	0.001** (0.001)
Female	0.125*** (0.018)	0.127*** (0.018)	0.128*** (0.018)	0.123*** (0.018)
Education	-0.021*** (0.004)	-0.020*** (0.003)	-0.021*** (0.004)	-0.021*** (0.004)
Household income	-0.166*** (0.019)	-0.164*** (0.020)	-0.165*** (0.020)	-0.166*** (0.020)
Employment	-0.041*** (0.013)	-0.044*** (0.014)	-0.044*** (0.013)	-0.044*** (0.013)
Union	0.175*** (0.021)	0.179*** (0.022)	0.180*** (0.020)	0.178*** (0.022)
Married	-0.026** (0.011)	-0.033*** (0.009)	-0.028*** (0.011)	-0.028** (0.011)
Satisfied with national government	-0.045*** (0.008)	-0.046*** (0.008)	-0.045*** (0.008)	-0.045*** (0.008)
Unskilled/elementary occupations	0.081*** (0.014)	0.084*** (0.015)	0.087*** (0.014)	0.077*** (0.014)
Unemployment rate _{t-1}	0.005 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.008)	0.002 (0.008)	0.005 (0.005)
Redistribution _{t-1}	0.002 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.004)
Constant	4.683*** (0.175)	4.406*** (0.223)	4.743*** (0.241)	4.672*** (0.166)
Log-likelihood	-214842.2	-203582.8	-201517.1	-206450.6
Intra-class correlation (ρ):	1.944	1.947	1.952	1.937
Observations	154,293	146,090	144,308	148,650
Number of groups	22	21	21	22
Number of years	5	5	5	5

Dependent variable: *Support government redistribution (categorical)*

Respondent answers to the question “Government should reduce differences in income” (answers recoded to 1=strongly disagree; 2=somewhat agree; 3=neither agree nor disagree; 4=somewhat agree; 5=strongly agree)

Multi-level random-intercept maximum-likelihood models grouped by country, with variances and covariances distinctly estimated, and with robust standard errors (clustered by country). Dummies for years included but not shown.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

**TABLE TWO:
IMMIGRATION, INTEGRATION AND SUPPORT FOR
GOVERNMENT REDISTRIBUTION (ROBUSTNESS)**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Foreign-born percent _{t-1}	-0.035*** (0.004)	0.018* (0.009)	-0.030*** (0.005)	-0.006 (0.005)				
Δ Foreign-born percent _{t-1}					-0.028 (0.021)	0.096** (0.048)	0.002 (0.024)	-0.015 (0.045)
Gap in unemployment _{t-1}		0.545*** (0.079)				0.048 (0.058)		
Gap in social-benefit dependence			0.081*** (0.019)				0.013 (0.011)	
Gap in socio-cultural values				0.152*** (0.015)				0.009 (0.012)
Foreign-born × Gap		-0.047*** (0.007)	-0.007*** (0.001)	-0.014*** (0.002)				
Δ Foreign-born × Gap						-0.076** (0.010)	-0.022** (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)
Log-likelihood	-88128.3				-196215.26	-196185.46	-188661.3	-189256.2
Observations	154,293	146,090	144,308	148,650	140,336	140,336	134,531	135,767
Number of groups	22	21	21	22	21	21	20	21

Columns 1-4: Dependent variable: *Strongly support government redistribution (binary)*

Respondent answers to question "Government should reduce differences in income" (answers recoded to 1=strongly agree; 0=somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat agree, or strongly agree). Multi-level random-intercept maximum-likelihood logit models grouped by country, with variances and co-variances distinctly estimated. Controls and dummies for years included as in Table One (but not shown).

Columns 5-8: Dependent variable: *Support government redistribution (categorical)*. Same as Table One (see above).

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

**TABLE THREE:
IMMIGRATION, INTEGRATION AND SUPPORT FOR
GOVERNMENT SOCIAL BENEFITS AND HELP TO UNEMPLOYED**

	Govt. social spending and taxes ^a				Govt. should help unemployed ^b			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Foreign-born percent _{t-1}	0.016 (0.027)	0.140*** (0.040)	0.101** (0.051)	-0.000 (0.056)	0.023 (0.034)	0.173*** (0.064)	0.157*** (0.053)	-0.103 (0.078)
Gap in unemployment _{t-1}		1.181*** (0.305)				0.654* (0.370)		
Gap in social-benefit dependence			0.662** (0.273)				0.800*** (0.292)	
Gap in socio-cultural values				-0.087 (0.199)				-0.360 (0.298)
Foreign-born × Gap		-0.071*** (0.019)	-0.054** (0.023)	0.004 (0.016)		-0.074*** (0.026)	-0.083*** (0.025)	0.039 (0.031)
Log likelihood	-58229.4	-58220.5	-58225.5	-58229.3	-62731	-62728.7	-62727.5	-62730.3
Observations	27,763	27,763	27,763	27,763	29,365	29,365	29,365	29,365
Number of groups	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17

a. Dependent variable: *Government social spending and taxes*: “Many social benefits and services are paid for by taxes. If the government had to choose between increasing taxes and spending more on social benefits and services, or decreasing taxes and spending less on social benefits and services, which should they do?” (respondent answers recoded as 0=Government should decrease taxes a lot and spend much less on social benefits and services; 10=Government should increase taxes a lot and spend much more on social benefits and services).

b. Dependent variable: *Government should help unemployed*: “Government should ensure a reasonable standard of living for the unemployed.” (respondent answers recoded as 0=Should not be government’s responsibility at all; 10=Should be entirely government’s responsibility).

Multi-level random-intercept maximum-likelihood models grouped by country, with variances and co-variances distinctly estimated.

Controls same as in Table One, except exclusion of unemployment rates and redistribution (all results for controls not shown).

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

**TABLE FOUR:
IMMIGRATION, INTEGRATION AND
POVERTY RISK, BELIEF IN SOCIAL-BENEFIT STRAIN AND ALTRUISM**

	<i>Poverty risk^a</i>			<i>Social benefits strain economy^b</i>			<i>Altruism^c</i>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Foreign-born percent _{t-1}	0.004 (0.011)	-0.004 (0.010)	-0.017 (0.013)	-0.066*** (0.015)	- 0.059*** (0.015)	0.002 (0.026)	0.033 (0.027)	0.025 (0.025)	-0.007 (0.023)
Gap in unemployment _{t-1}	-0.163** (0.076)			-0.561*** (0.091)			0.038 (0.104)		
Gap in social-benefit dependence		-0.094* (0.054)			- 0.398*** (0.091)			0.043 (0.103)	
Gap in socio-cultural values			-0.009 (0.048)			0.091 (0.117)			-0.141 (0.087)
Foreign-born × Gap	-0.001 (0.004)	0.002 (0.005)	0.005 (0.004)	0.030*** (0.007)	0.028*** (0.008)	-0.004 (0.010)	-0.005 (0.010)	-0.002 (0.011)	0.008 (0.010)
Log likelihood	-31410.9	-31413.1	-31415.9	-41347.8	-41348.2	-41354.2	-41822.2	-41822.1	-41821.1
Icc	0.00654	0.008517	0.011896	0.013307	0.01396	0.028269	0.024446	0.024276	0.021691
Observations	29,246	29,246	29,246	29,031	29,031	29,031	30,791	30,791	30,791
Number of groups	17	17	17	17	17	17	18	18	18

a. *Poverty risk* (relevant to Figure One's arrows 1A, 2A, 3A): "During the next 12 months how likely is it that there will be some periods when you don't have enough money to cover your household necessities? (answers recoded to 1=Not at all likely; 2=Not very likely; 3=Likely; 4=Very likely).

b. *Social benefits strain economy* (relevant to Figure One's 1B, 2B, 3B): "Social benefits/services put too great a strain on the economy" (answers recoded to 1=strongly disagree; 2=somewhat agree; 3=neither agree nor disagree; 4=somewhat agree; 5=strongly agree).

c. *Altruism* (relevant to Figure One's 1C, 2C, 3C): "It is very important to me to help the people around me. I want to help care for their wellbeing" (answers recoded to 1=not like me at all; 2=Not like me; 3=A little like me; 4=Like me; 5=Very much like me).

Multi-level random-intercept maximum-likelihood models grouped by country, with variances and co-variances distinctly estimated, and with robust standard errors (clustered by country). Controls same as in Table One, except exclusion of unemployment rates and redistribution (all results for controls not shown).

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1






FIGURE ONE:
HOW INTEGRATION MEDIATES IMMIGRATION'S EFFECTS ON
SUPPORT FOR REDISTRIBUTION




Source: ESS (rounds 1 and 5), own calculations

FIGURE TWO:
PROPORTION OF NATIONAL SAMPLES SUPPORTING
GOVERNMENT REDISTRIBUTION IN 2002 AND 2010



Source: OECD 2012

FIGURE THREE:
FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION AS PERCENTAGE OF
TOTAL POPULATION, 2001 AND 2009



a. Gap in unemployment: Ratio of foreign-born unemployment to native unemployment (2001-9 average).

b. Gap in social-benefit dependence: Marginal effect of foreign-born in predicting social-benefit dependence (2002-10 average).

c. Gap in socio-cultural values: Sum of absolute values of standardized differences between foreign-born and native attitudes towards women, gays, democracy, religion, materialism (2002-2010 average).

Sources: ESS and OECD, own calculations.

**FIGURE FOUR:
GAPS IN UNEMPLOYMENT, SOCIAL-BENEFIT DEPENDENCE, AND
SOCIO-CULTURAL VALUES.**





FIGURE FIVE:
 PREDICTED *SUPPORT FOR REDISTRIBUTION* AS A FUNCTION OF
 FOREIGN-BORN PERCENT AND VARYING LEVELS OF INTEGRATION.


Appendix Table One: Summary statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Support redistribution	160947	3.804	1.050	1	5
Strongly support redistribution (binary)	160947	0.272	0.445	0	1
Support more spending and taxes	28473	5.201	2.041	0	10
Support govt. support for unemployed	30206	6.817	2.192	0	10
Social benefits strain economy	29279	3.041	1.040	1	5
Poor likely	29428	1.980	0.875	1	4
Altruism/solidarity	152173	4.740	0.992	1	6
Foreign-born percent t_{-1}	159167	10.845	5.768	2.798	33.788
Δ Foreign-born percent t_{-1}	145225	0.371	0.524	-0.533	3.432
Gap in unemployment t_{-1}	160947	1.779	0.617	0.567	3.249
Gap in social-benefit dependence t_{-1}	153541	1.895	1.442	-1.070	5.190
Gap in socio-cultural values t_{-1}	154706	3.725	1.352	0.443	6.993
Age	160164	47.879	18.422	14	105
Female	160777	0.530	0.499	0	1
Education years	159251	12.092	4.117	0	56
Household income	156310	3.041	0.844	1	4
Employed	160947	0.526	0.499	0	1
Union member	160169	0.432	0.495	0	1
Married	160691	0.505	0.500	0	1
Satisfied with national government	154895	4.281	2.392	0	10
Manual-unskilled occupation	160947	0.096	0.295	0	1
Unemployment rate t_{-1}	160947	7.334	3.001	2.631	18.169
Redistribution t_{-1}	160947	35.755	13.275	0.160	50.925

Appendix Figure One: *Non-western percent of Foreign-born and Gaps in Unemployment and in Social Values, 2001-2010.*



Appendix Figure Two:
Marginal interaction between Integration and Foreign-born percent



¹ Nannestad 2007 provides a useful overview.
² See Freeman 1986, Luttmer 2001, and Eger 2010.
³ See van Oorschot 2008, Crepaz 2008, and Finseraas 2008. See Rehm 2011 for more general discussion of insurance and redistributive functions of welfare states..
⁴ Compare, for instance, Mau and Burkhardt 2009, Eger 2010, Finseraas 2008, Engelen 2003; Burgoon et.al. 2012, and Senik et.al. 2009.
⁵ See OECD 2009.
⁶ OECD 2010.
⁷ Ibid, 72, own calculations.
⁸ See Gilens 1995, 1996, and Luttmer 2001.
⁹ See, for instance, Borjas and Hilton 1996.
¹⁰ Boeri 2010, 660.
¹¹ Ibid, 657.
¹² Compare, for example, Rowthorn 2008; Fehr et.al. 2004.
¹³ ESS 2008, own calculations.
¹⁴ See Hanson et.al. 2007, Fiaschini and Mayda 2009, and Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010. Compare with Crepaz 2008.
¹⁵ For the view that immigration is in tension with trust, solidarity and altruism, see Easterly and Levine 1997, Alesina and La Ferrara 2005, and Putnam 2007. For critiques of such views, see Banting et.al. 2006, Hooghe et.al.2008, Kymlicka and Banting 2006; Gijsberts et.al. 2012 and McLaren 2012.
¹⁶ See Habyarimana et.al. 2006, van Oorschot and Uunk 2007, and Alesina and Glaeser 2004.
¹⁷ van Oorschot 2006; van Oorschot and Uunk 2007.
¹⁸ Banting 2010.
¹⁹ Such effects are likely to be moderated by the degree to which immigration takes place among countries with similar factor profiles and to the extent that effects on consumer-product prices disproportionately benefit lower income workers.
²⁰ Mansfield and Mutz 2009
²¹ Soroka et.al. 2006. See also Lismeyer and Zhu 2011 for evidence that immigration might lower generosity of unemployment provisions.
²² Alesina and Glaeser 2004.

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- ²³ Mau and Burkhardt 2009
- ²⁴ Senik et.al.2004 and Eger 2010.
- ²⁵ On the mediating effects of attitudes towards immigrants and organization of welfare states see Mau and Burkhardt 2009 and Finseraas 2008. On the mediating effects of immigration's economic effects, see Senik et.al. 2008. And on the mediating effects of a country's labor-market integration into EU labor markets, see Lipsmeyer and Zhu 2011.
- ²⁶ See, for instance, Causa and Jean 2006; Dustman 1996; Favell 2003; Bagley 1971; and Brubaker 2001.
- ²⁷ See Boeri 2012 (p.2).
- ²⁸ Helsingin Sanomat 2009.
- ²⁹ See for instance Bagley 1971; Waters and Jimenez 2005; McLaren 2012; Lucassen 2005; Joppke 2007; Ireland 2004, Koopmans 2010. For a useful review, see Bleich 2008. Of course, existing scholarship and popular discourse make clear that issues of integration and assimilation can differ substantially. For a discussion of competing visions of assimilation as opposed to integration, see Brubaker 2001 and Favell 2003.
- ³⁰ For the sake of clarity, the remaining discussion speaks in terms of "integration."
- ³¹ Causa and Jean 2006.
- ³² Sainsbury 2006; Ruhs 2008; Engelen 2003.
- ³³ Bottomley 1992; Fraga and Segura 2006; Favell 1998.
- ³⁴ ESS Combined File 2011, ESS 2012.
- ³⁵ ESS 4-2008 Appendix A3, Q.B30, 26.
- ³⁶ For both versions of the measure, "Don't know or refused" were coded as missing (including less than 0.5 percent of the sample).
- ³⁷ Summary statistics for this and all other variables on the full sample are provided in Appendix Table One.
- ³⁸ OECD 2009, OECD 2010, OECD 2012a.
- ³⁹ Lemaitre 2005, OECD 2012a. It is also preferable to a related but more encompassing measure, foreign-born or children of foreign-born, because the measure is most relevant to actual immigration as opposed to diversity debates, and because the measure used of foreign-born stocks is more nationally comparable across more countries and years.
- ⁴⁰ OECD 2010 and 2012b.
- ⁴¹ See Boeri 2010. The resulting measures are also not sensitive to no or more controls in the model specifications and estimators used to generate country-year specific social-benefit dependency of foreign-born respondents.
- ⁴² See for instance Waters and Jimenez 2005.
- ⁴³ I also consider each component aspect and different combinations of this composite, the results of which are similar to that for the baseline measure of *Gap in social values*, the full composite.
- ⁴⁴ Dustman 1996.
- ⁴⁵ Unfortunately, such break-downs of the foreign-born population are unavailable for years other than the one-time 2000-2001 measure.
- ⁴⁶ From Solt 2009(2011), based on revision of data from LIS and World Income Inequality Database.
- ⁴⁷ OECD 2012b.
- ⁴⁸ The panel character of the survey creates room for inclusion in multi-level models of a couple of country-year controls in addition to the *foreign-born* and *gap* measures. On the sensitivity of such issues, particularly in single wave models, see Van der Meer et.al. 2010.
- ⁴⁹ Steenbergen and Jones 2002.
- ⁵⁰ Embedding yearly waves within countries is not a good option given that there is only one observation per country-year for the variables on foreign-born stocks and non-integration.
- ⁵¹ Senik et.al. 2008 and Mau and Burkhardt 2009. The results are virtually identical if one includes one or more of the non-integration parameters.
- ⁵² All these results are not shown but are available in Supplementary Appendix, at <<www....>>).
- ⁵³ We see, for instance, that multicollinearity becomes a problem (mean VIF scores at or above 10) with multiplicative interaction terms of the immigration and non-integration measures on sub-samples fewer than six countries.
- ⁵⁴ Alternative specifications include multi-level logit analysis of *Support redistribution* (1=strongly or somewhat agree that government should reduce income differences; 0=otherwise) or ordered logit or probit analysis of *Support redistribution (categorical)*. The results of such models are very similar to those presented here (results not shown but available in Supplementary Appendix at www.<<...>>.)
- ⁵⁵ For instance, including the parameter *Social benefits strain economy* in models in Table Three appreciably reduces the coefficients of the interaction between *foreign-born percent* and *gaps in unemployment and in social-benefit dependence* by roughly twenty percent (e.g. for model 2 on *Government social-spending and taxes*, -.071 to -.059).