Participatory Evaluation of Development Interventions in a Vulnerable African Environment

Ton Dietz

Introduction

Many vulnerable areas in the world have experienced a multitude of external interventions to 'assist development', 'decrease vulnerability' or 'change people's culture and institutions'. There have been many project-specific evaluations of those interventions, but hardly any coherent multi-intervention evaluations. And despite the use of the word 'participatory' in many current development programmes, evaluations are often top-down 'professional' activities, and not at all participatory.

In the course of the last 20 years, West Pokot District in western Kenya can be regarded as a typical African example of a vulnerable area with withdrawing (and erratic) government presence, and increasing presence of foreign donor agencies – either with a government, a non-governmental organization (NGO) or a church background. Agencies from The Netherlands played a dominant role, first and foremost the Dutch-sponsored Arid- and Semi-Arid Lands Development Programme, which lasted from 1981 until 1999, and which withdrew under a cloud of anger.

Some two decades ago I was involved in a research project to reconstruct past performance of development initiatives until the early 1980s, which resulted in the PhD thesis *Pastoralists in Dire Straits* (Dietz, 1987). During those years Rachel Andiema and Albino Kotomei were my research assistants.
The same team of researchers was later involved in a participatory assessment of the impact of the development interventions, in the same administrative area, between the early 1980s and 2002. Three workshops were organized in 2001 and 2002, with about 150 participants from the area. This chapter is restricted to one of the areas, and to the results of one workshop in the most remote area: the current Alale and Kasei divisions in the upper north. It reports about approach and process, and provides some results concerning ‘indigenous impact measurement’. All of it is related to the core question: did those interventions indeed diminish the vulnerability of the inhabitants according to their own judgements?

The research area and its vulnerability

The current Alale and Kasei divisions are located in the most remote, northern area of West Pokot District in western Kenya, bordering Turkana District and the Karamoja area in Uganda (see Figure 11.1 for the location of the research area). From the 1930s until 1970 it was part of the ‘Karasuk’ or ‘Karapokot’ area (currently, Kacheliba, Alale and Kasei divisions), which was administered by Uganda, under Upe County of Karamoja. For Uganda, it was a marginal zone of a marginal area. After Uganda’s independence in 1962, it became a playground for the Ugandan army, under Field Marshal Idi Amin. When the area, independent since 1963, was rejoined with Kenya in 1970, very little had been done by any government agency, and hardly any non-governmental agencies or foreign churches had started any development activity either. There were virtually no schools and no health dispensaries. There were no roads, other than a few forest tracks made by a small camp of foresters. There were no shops. In 1952 the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) had drilled a few boreholes; but other than a bit of famine relief (in 1965 to 1966), their yield was poor.

The population lived rather autonomous lives as pastoralists whose existence depended upon cattle, goats, sheep and camels, both economically and culturally. They lived mainly in the semi-arid lowlands. Cattle raids and counter-raids with the neighbouring Turkana and Karimojong were accepted elements of life, and a source of pride and folk culture. For boys to become men, successful participation in raids was a *rite de passage*, and economically important as a source of bride-price payments. Agriculture was practised as a fall-back strategy for the poor, as the area’s hills had a sub-humid climate, allowing sorghum, millet and (later) maize cultivation during years with sufficient rainfall. However, crop cultivation was equated with poverty, and people told stories about the disastrous period around 1900, after a rinderpest epidemic and a disastrous drought killed most of the animals. Those who survived were forced to flee to the mountains with their remaining animals. This community of survivors consisted of a mixture of three ethnic groups (Pokot, Oropom and Karimojong), but was culturally dominated by the most northern section of the Pokot, one of the Kalenjin-speaking groups. After 1925
they gradually recovered lost territory, and, assisted by British colonial support (see Barber, 1968), people became mobile herders again, pushing rather far into Karimojong territory in the west. They no longer lived in the mountains and foothills, but in mobile camps (manyattas) in the plains. For 50 years their existence was not threatened, although insecurity increased after 1950 (Dietz, 1987). During the 1950s, a group of religious refugees also settled in their midst, practising agriculture in the foothills of the mountains. These were Pokot from the southern area around Kapenguria, who were prosecuted by the British authorities in Kenya for adhering to an indigenous religious movement (Dini ya Msambwa) that was regarded as an anti-colonial protest cult.
During the first seven years of Kenyan administration very little changed. In 1970 chiefs had been installed in Alale and Kasei; but communications with the then divisional headquarters at Kacheliba (110km away) and district headquarters in Kapenguria (150km away) were very difficult, and during the rainy season virtually impossible because of the impassable Kanyangareng River. In 1977 some changes were in the air: a road was built, a police post was established and the Roman Catholic Church started a small primary school. By then the area had between 10,000 and 15,000 inhabitants on 2900 square kilometres, a population density of 3 to 5 inhabitants per square kilometre (Republic of Kenya, 1981, p121); but people moved freely between the neighbouring Upe County in Uganda and the ‘Karapokot’ area that had now become Kenyan. Then a sequence of disasters hit the area and revealed a multitude of vulnerabilities.

Throughout the period of the dry season during 1978 to 1979, grazing was very poor. In the Pokot area in Karamoja (Upe County, around Amudat), severe Karimojong raids forced hundreds of women and children to move to the east, to the Alale area. When Idi Amin’s regime was toppled, part of his army fled through Karamoja and, hoping to get support, opened army stores, where new supplies of many Kalashnikovs had just arrived. The Karimojong were quick to use these arms against their Pokot enemies. To make things worse, the sorghum harvest failed and from June to August most of the goats died because of an epidemic that had killed most of the goats in Upe in May and June. The district officer urged the chief to organize a famine relief committee and to encourage parents to send their children to school. Many parents decided that their children would be better off in schools as they would have food and protection, and with the loss of animals they did not have much to do at home anymore. Next to the small Alale school, which was managed by the government, the Roman Catholics started a boarding school in Amakuriat. The number of pupils grew from 43 boys and 5 girls in 1978 to 154 boys and 11 girls in 1979.

In 1980, again the rains failed and a terrible rinderpest epidemic began to claim the lives of hundreds of cattle. Cholera reached the area and a Finnish Red Cross team started an anti-cholera campaign and provided famine-relief food. The Roman Catholic Church and the district officer also provided food, partly through Food-for-Work campaigns that consisted of building schools, water dams and roads. In June 1980 a large Karimojong force attacked the Pokot at a place just west of the growing centre of Alale. Pokot claim that 127 of them were killed and 11,000 head of cattle raided. Many people fled their houses and flocked near the famine relief centres of Alale and Amakuriat. Later, raids intensified, and Karimojong and Turkana forces even went far into the mountains to raid cattle that were hiding there. In April 1981 the Red Cross was feeding 5000 people in three famine relief centres. The total population had increased to between 20,000 and 25,000 people. School attendance had risen to 282 boys and 210 girls, many of them under the protection of the
Catholic boarding school. Probably 40 per cent of all eligible children were now in schools. The Red Cross had distributed seeds and, with better rains, a good sorghum harvest was produced. People were also making quite a lot of money by gathering miraa leaves and selling them to a few Somali traders. In October the Red Cross left the area.

When gold was discovered in 1980, a major gold rush started, attracting many people to the mountain. There was a major increase to the cash economy and an important role for Somali traders as a result. Cash opportunities were also increased by the activities of a new American missionary to the area, the African Inland Church, connected to the Reformed Church of America. When a peace treaty was arranged between Pokot and Karimojong elders, at the end of 1982, the Pokot of the Alale area had lost most of their animals and were ‘pastoralists in dire straits’. They had moved from the plains to their refuge areas in the mountains and survived through a combination of sorghum cultivation and selling miraa and gold. Many children had gone to missionary schools, and many of them (and some of their mothers and a few of their fathers) either became Catholics or African Inland Church Christians (Dietz, 1987).

Summarizing the experience of vulnerability, the people in the research region had to cope with:

- occasional droughts, resulting in poor grazing, livestock deaths, crop failure and hunger;
- livestock diseases (rinderpest; contagious caprine pleuropneumonia for goats), resulting in livestock deaths and undermined livelihood security for those partly or wholly depending upon livestock for their subsistence and survival;
- human disease epidemics (e.g. cholera), resulting in health costs and human deaths;
- raids by neighbouring pastoralists, and counter-raids by the Pokot, resulting in human deaths, loss of livestock, occasional no-go areas for herding, and destruction of property; and
- army actions, resulting in human deaths, livestock confiscation and deaths, and destruction of property.

There is hardly any evidence of ‘climate change’ as a cause of growing vulnerability due to lower and more erratic rainfall and higher average evapotranspiration. The rainfall data also does not show a clear long-term trend; but data is scarce and unreliable. In people’s perception, the most severe drought occurred during the 1979 to 1985 period; but that drought made the people vulnerable to hunger, disease and death due to its combination with all other causes of vulnerability.

In 1981, West Pokot District had also been adopted by the Dutch Development Agency. The Kenyan government had asked a number of donor countries to ‘adopt’ a district in the arid and semi-arid zones of the country. The Netherlands was eager to implement its area-based development philosophy, and chose West Pokot and another district (Elgeyo Marakwet), later to be followed by two more districts (Kajiado in the southeastern Masai area and Laikipia). In 1982 researchers from the University of Amsterdam joined the newly appointed Dutch Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASAL) programme adviser and the Dutch doctor who was the medical officer in charge of district healthcare. The researchers recruited a staff of local research assistants and began to make ‘locational development profiles’ and a district development atlas (Hendrix et al, 1985). Gradually a multi-sectoral development programme developed, first working mainly through government agencies, later trying to involve more local-level initiatives and NGO activities.

During the early years the remote parts of districts were not yet reached very well (although one of the first rapid rural appraisals – then called sondeo – in Kenya had been organized in Alale; see Dietz and van Haastrecht, 1983). Beginning in 1986, ever more ASAL projects started in the Alale and Kasei areas as well. Until about 1993 the approach thrived. The ASAL programme had become the ‘oil in the district machinery’, mobilizing civil servants in a large variety of sectors to develop and implement projects, and increasingly incorporating the ideas ‘from the ground’, as expressed in locational development committees, divisional development committees and, ultimately, the District Development Committee. These committees tried to involve indigenous leaders (chiefs, councillors, women’s group leaders, school teachers, etc.) and all the external players in a particular area, mostly foreign church leaders of a multitude of churches, which had come to the district after the 1979 to 1981 disasters. It was the era of the District Focus for Rural Development, the Kenyan form of decentralization. The relative importance of the ASAL programme in the district gave large powers to the Dutch programme advisers, who, in fact, operated as leaders of a pseudo-NGO. The programme money came directly from The Netherlands Embassy, and gradually the policy changes in The Hague, and through the embassy, caused tensions between a ‘bottom-up strategy’, based on continuous appraisal of the ideas of the development committees, and ‘requests’ from ‘above’ to integrate every whim of the Dutch development bureaucracy. On ‘environment’, it created major problems.

The political problems in the district itself also caused growing tensions. Increasing political ethnicity, which the Kenyan press and foreign donors/embassies perceived to be politically manipulated by the ‘King of the Pokot’, Member of Parliament Lotodo, resulted in ethnic clashes around 1993. As a result, approximately 30,000 non-Pokot people fled from the southern part of the district, and there was also a major out-migration of non-Pokot teachers.

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and other civil servants from remote areas, such as Alale. Diminishing Kenyan government finance, an increasing (Dutch) ASAL funding and growing cynicism made it too difficult for many civil servants to resist the temptation to ‘eat Europeans’. From 1993 until 1999 corruption became all too visible. Added to the changing opinions in Dutch development circles about the ‘lack of impact of area-based development programmes’, and a preference for large-scale, nationwide sector programmes in selected government ministries, it resulted in a decision to stop the ASAL programme in West Pokot in 1999 (see Dietz and de Leeuw, 1999). The other Dutch-supported ASAL programmes, renamed Sustainable Animal and Range Development Programme, would continue for a few more years, but all ended in 2003 as a result of the Dutch decision to get rid of Kenya as a preferential country for Dutch development aid.

From 1982 until 1991 the University of Amsterdam was involved as ‘backstopper’ of the ASAL programme in West Pokot (and elsewhere). However, attempts to convince the ASAL programme leadership, and the Kenyan civil servants, of the need to develop a sophisticated longitudinal (output, effect and impact) monitoring and evaluation ‘infrastructure’ failed (‘too academic’, but actually too threatening), and the ‘backstopping arrangement’ came to an end. In the meantime, two of the research assistants of the 1980s had been integrated within the ASAL staff, one as the programme’s secretary (Rachel Andiema), and one as the programme’s community liaison officer (Albino Kotomei). They would be among the few ‘locals’ recruited to the staff, to the growing dismay of the local population, who saw the greed of the non-local civil servants and the lack of local accountability as the main reason for ASAL’s unwanted withdrawal from the district. When the programme closed, there was a lot of anger.

**Follow-up research**

It was decided to do an *ex-post* impact evaluation study, and to do it as a university-driven exercise (a joint venture of the University of Amsterdam, using its own funds, and Moi University’s School of Environmental Studies in Eldoret, a long-term research partner). It was also decided to do it as a team of three co-researchers, with a group of local research assistants attached to them. A variety of research activities were carried out – for example:

- Make an update of parts of the district atlas, covering the 1985 to 2003 period.
- Conduct an analysis of press articles about the district.
- Study school enrolment and healthcare data.
- Make education and labour histories of all children in certain age groups who have gone to school.
- Conduct questionnaire surveys in the same villages as during 1982 to 1986.
- Construct geographical family genealogies of selected family groups.
• Carry out a study of intervening agencies and their recent history in the district.

The most important research activity, however, was the organization of three participatory impact-evaluation workshops. The researchers facilitated a local-level assessment of 20 years of 'change', of interventions and of the impact of interventions. One of those workshops took place in the Alale/Kasei area, in a village called Kiwawa, in June 2002 (Andiema et al, 2003b). This used to be the missionary station of a controversial American church group (the Associated Christian Churches of Kenya), which had to leave the country after a scandal.

The participatory impact-evaluation workshop in Kiwawa

More than 60 local leaders gathered for three days in June 2002 to discuss their ideas about the recent history of the study area. Participants came from four different sub-areas (two relatively accessible areas, Alale and Kiwawa, both on the western lowland and foothill side of the region, and two areas that are very difficult to reach: the Lokitanyala-Kalapata-Akoret-Chemorongit area in the northern and northeastern mountains and the Kasei area in the south-eastern mountains). Participants were (elected) councillors, (appointed) chiefs and assistant chiefs, local church leaders, women's group leaders, and teachers (both men and women). It became a 'local' gathering, with hardly any civil servants present, and with Pokot as the major language of discussion. Out of these more than 70 people, 52 actively participated, and this included writing a short autobiography. It appeared that, educationally, 42 per cent of them attained primary school education; 21 per cent, secondary school; 27 per cent, secondary up to college level; while 12 percent never went to school. The majority of the participants (54 per cent) were employed in one way or another, and the rest were either unemployed or still in college. Among the participants, a few were unmarried; 92 per cent were married; 46 per cent were monogamist men and 15 per cent polygamist men; while 31 per cent were married women. The participants had an average of four children per household and an average of two brothers and two sisters.

The workshop programme consisted of eight major elements:

1 introduction and a round of personal life histories, focusing on the importance of the disasters of 1979 to 1981 and of later years for their personal lives;
2 writing personal life histories (ongoing during the workshop, with some assistance from one another);
3 reconstruction of history since 1979, focusing on 'problem years';
4 reconstruction of all development projects in four sub-areas;
discussion about poverty and about the changes in ‘capabilities’ between
1980 and 2002, differentiating between natural, physical, human,
economic, cultural and socio-political capabilities, following the approach
of Bebbington (1999), and doing it in discussion groups for the four sub-
areas, separately for men and women;
6 assessment of the impact of projects and activities upon each of these six
groups of ‘capabilities’, and upon their importance for poverty alleviation;
7 grading of all projects per sub-area, per sub-group of men and women, and
selecting the ten ‘best’ and the ten ‘worst’ projects;
8 final discussion about the development prospects of the area and about the
virtues and vices of donor dependence.

Reconstruction of the recent past

The participants of the Kiwawa workshop were able to recall the events (good
and bad) that the community encountered between the years of 1979 and 2002
(see Table 11.1). Stories of raids and other aspects of insecurity dominated the
accounts of many. Most of the recalled raids were when the Karimojong and
Turkana seized large numbers of their livestock between 1979 and 1982 (a
period now known as the ‘dark age’). Life without livestock was no life and
had no meaning for the pastoral Pokot, and so went the saying: ‘A Pochon who
has no livestock/cow is as good as a dead one’. Their life rotated around their
livestock and therefore what threatened cattle (livestock) threatened the Pokot
pastoralists as human beings and people with cultural characteristics that are
unique to them.

As raiding is a traditional exercise of the pastoralists and has been there
since time immemorial, it has become part and parcel of their lives. The
pastoral Pokot participate in raiding their neighbours, who, in turn, raid the
Pokot. In both cases these operations are carried out as actions planned by the
elders and executed by their warrior sons. During the past these raids were
carried out throughout the dry season because the herds were usually far from
the villages at that time. During those dry periods there was, and still is, often
severe competition over water and pasture. In the traditional ‘scale of tribal
values’, the highest is the ability to increase one’s herd through intelligence,
force and even cunning. Therefore, whoever remains without livestock for a
certain period gives a sign of having lost those skills and is put aside, ignored
and sometimes even despised. The pastoralists feel that whoever endangers the
safety or existence of livestock automatically becomes an enemy, to be neutral-
ized or eliminated. However, during the period from 1979 to 1981, the
community experienced raiding at a much larger scale, and with much more
sophisticated weapons. They lost.

In addition, there were other calamities as well. Many human lives were
lost because of the outbreak of diseases such as cholera, meningitis, dysentery
and malaria. Workshop attendants also mentioned many cases of death
because of premature births and caesarean operations for women. During the
Table 11.1 A chronology of events, 1979–2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979–1980</td>
<td>Insecurity/raids; rinderpest; drought/famine; army operations; cholera;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Red Cross expands activities</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Same; Red Cross services; no dowry payments; gold mining (Korpu);</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Associated Christian Churches in Kenya (ACCK) and Reformed Church in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>America/Africa Inland Church (RCA/AIC) start activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982–1983</td>
<td>Raids; gold mining (many places); military coup; 'home guns' provided by</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>government for self-defence; Pokot-Karimojong peace treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984–1985</td>
<td>Raids (Turkana); major army operations; drought/famine; exodus to the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South; Pokot-Karimojong peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Major army operations; famine; start Turkwel Dam construction; start Kasei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>dispensary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Election problems; leaders rejected; political instability; famine (Anglican church intervened)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Pokot massacre during Karimojong raid; big raid in Alale; army assisted the Pokot defenders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Big raid on Masai by Karimojong; meningitis; bush clearing in Turkwel catchment; people chased away; first Pokot MP in Upe/Pokot County, Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Meningitis outbreak; to Turkana for relief food; big raid in Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Meningitis; big raid in Kiwawa; policemen died; people fled; multi-party elections; insecurity; famine; assistance from World Vision and Anglican Church of Kenya (ACK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993–1994</td>
<td>Army worms; Turkana raid; people moved to East Kasei; earth tremor; children drowned in new Turkwel Lake; registering of guns on Uganda site by Museveni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995–1996</td>
<td>Ruby found in Alale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>President Moi visited Alale; 50 Pokot children killed in Uganda raid by Karimojong; successful counter-raid by Pokot; elections; harvest failure; torture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Construction of new divisional headquarters in Alale, El Niño floods; landslides; water sources destroyed; roads damaged; children drowned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Drought/famine; POKATUSA formed as an NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Pokot leader and MP Lotodo died; famine; peace activities by POKATUSA and justice and peace groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Elections in Uganda; cost-sharing started in dispensaries; relief food; late rains and then floods; new Kanyangareng bridge threatened; insecurity problem in Turkwel area</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: chapter author

above-mentioned years, there were very few health facilities and a shortage of drugs and health personnel. The traditional herbalists were not able to treat some of these diseases because they were new to them (e.g. cholera and meningitis). The community also lost most of its non-raided livestock from various diseases during the years under review because of insufficient veterinary services in the area. The worst diseases were rinderpest and East Coast fever. Prolonged droughts were also mentioned among the most disturbing problems, as there had been no harvest at all for several years; this caused livestock loss as well. Due to the severity and length of the droughts, even fruits and roots were no longer available. This forced the community to look for other ways of survival. Because of these problems, some community members decided to migrate to other places, especially to the south (the highlands of southern West Pokot and the large farm area of Trans Nzoia). This was not an easy decision to make, but there was no choice. Their problems were not solved, however,
Table 11.2 *Perceived positive and negative changes in six capability domains*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capability domain</th>
<th>Perceived positive change</th>
<th>Perceived negative change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Natural</td>
<td>Permanent settlement is found in more fertile areas where more land is used for agriculture; through the use of fertilizer and manure, the land has improved. There is also enough pasture, improved afforestation and sufficient water supply (boreholes and gravity). Land is still communally owned. Because of the improved availability of drugs for livestock, their numbers have increased.</td>
<td>Water catchments have dried due to deforestation in some areas; soil erosion has increased because of population pressure; soil infertility is a result of overgrazing; documented loss of lives and displacement of people (e.g. at the man-made Lake Turkwel Gorge and in mining areas). Spread of diseases has increased in mining areas because of the interaction with outsiders. The topography of the land was destroyed due to mining. The climate has rapidly changed due to prolonged drought. Wildlife is increasingly vulnerable to poaching; scarcity of wild fruits due to persistent drought and no more shifting cultivation. The roads are poor and are frequently a cause of accidents. There is no electricity produced from Turkwel Gorge. Shortages of drugs exist in Government of Kenya dispensaries; building materials and management of boreholes are expensive. People in Upe were shocked that they were forced to surrender guns to the Ugandan government. Low employment and lack of job opportunities; poor production of both livestock and crops and inflation of commodity prices; no financial bodies to give sufficient loans to local businessmen/women; unlike stolen cattle, money is not traceable and can easily be stolen, creating poverty and envy. Civil servants who are employed far from home can easily divorce; there is increasing spread of diseases and use of drugs by youth. Loans without proper planning leads to stress.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical</td>
<td>Improved infrastructure. More roads have been constructed. Communication devices have been introduced, alongside improved road networks, houses, farming technology and cattle dips. More guns were bought between 1981 and 2001 for defence purposes.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic/financial</td>
<td>Many more businesses. Some income through miraa and mining of gold and rubies, and this has initiated interaction with other communities from Kenya and even beyond. Increased possibility of transacting business because of employment of teachers, nurses, chiefs, etc. More organizations and donors have come to assist the people. Money is an accepted medium of exchange by everybody and it is durable: people feel superior when they have it, it improves one’s living standard and as such one becomes a role model to the community. The availability and exchange of commodities have improved the development of the area.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human</td>
<td>The population has increased, alongside improved health facilities, more schools and higher school enrolment. Pokot are courageous by nature and have improved their skills to defend themselves against attacks from their neighbours. Population increase is a result of reduced mortality rates.</td>
<td>There are new diseases (e.g. HIV/AIDS and cancer).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
because the migrants faced many adversities – finding decent housing, discrimination and exploitation, as many were casual labourers. After numerous experiences perceived as ‘dehumanizing’, many of them went back to their original homes, with a grudge.

### Perception of change

Table 11.2 highlights the perceived positive and negative changes in the area’s living conditions during the last 20 years. We have organized it according to the six capability domains discussed above, although it is obvious that some changes in one domain also cause changes in another, and it is possible (and sometimes perceived as such) that some positively evaluated changes in one domain do impact negatively upon another.

#### The perception about ‘the government’

During the participatory evaluation workshop people discussed the roles of various external agencies in contributing to change. It became very clear that many had a ‘grudge’ against ‘the government’. Due to the continuous raids between the Pokot and their neighbouring communities, the government decided to disarm them a few times and this was not an easy task. The Pokot

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**Table 11.2 continued**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capability domain</th>
<th>Perceived positive change</th>
<th>Perceived negative change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social/political</td>
<td>‘Since independence the government and their elected leaders have done very little to help them as a community.’ This community hopes that there might be positive changes in this multi-party era. More Pokot became national leaders. More local people in local leadership positions, as well as more organizations (such as women’s groups, youth groups). Increased adherence to Christianity and Islam; many more churches; increased conservative dress codes; improved language abilities; better food diets; fewer ‘evil practices’; increased Pokot pride.</td>
<td>Little has been done by the elected leaders and the government. The community feels that they have been neglected for many years by their elected leaders as a result of greed and corruption. The government has also imposed leaders upon the people. Elected leaders frequently live far away from the people. Nepotism and tribalism occur. Threatened ethnicity and erosion of cultural traditions occur, although traditional religion has kept people together. Cultural styles of dress have been lost; new ‘modern’ clothes are expensive. Vernacular language skills have disappeared; there is a lack of differentiation between married and unmarried people. There is a heightened sense of immorality and an increase in crime; dowry payments rarely occur due to diminishing numbers of livestock among the poor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural</td>
<td>Increased adherence to Christianity and Islam; many more churches; increased conservative dress codes; improved language abilities; better food diets; fewer ‘evil practices’; increased Pokot pride.</td>
<td>Source: chapter author</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
resisted and the government decided to use power. In the process, many lives, both human and livestock, were lost. Everyone remembers the military operations of 1984 and 1986, and for many years 'the government' was equated with the army, who killed their people and animals. The government was also negatively connected with the way in which a large-scale hydro-electricity project (Turkwel Gorge, under the pseudo-government Kerio Valley Development Authority) was taking shape without any compensation for the Pokot, whose land had been expropriated. The government was active in the area through the provincial administration (each 'division' was headed by a district officer; from 1970 to 1985 the Alale area was under the Kacheliba Division; in 1985 a new Alale division was formed, and in 1996 this was split into the Alale and Kasei divisions). The district officer was responsible for the (appointed) chiefs of locations and sub- or assistant chiefs for sub-locations; but (mostly coming from among the local people) these chiefs were often caught between two fires. The local people also elected local councillors for the West Pokot District Council; but their powers (and money) were very limited. The council was responsible, though, for granting trade licences (although most of the trade in the area went beyond these licences to trade in livestock, gold, rubies, miraa and arms). Somali traders played an important role, but Pokot traders gradually increased their importance.

The district officer was supposed to coordinate the various representatives of line ministries in the area; but the Kenyan government did not provide those civil servants with needed project money or facilities, and non-donor money and purchasing power of their salaries dwindled to very little over the course of time. However, teachers (both trained and untrained) were increasing rapidly in numbers, and their salaries were paid by the government's Ministry of Education. The district officer was also responsible for coordinating famine relief operations in the area and for supporting and coordinating 'harambee' fundraising activities for 'development projects'.

The perception about non-governmental agencies

People were much more positive about the many non-governmental agencies that had come to their area. They easily mention the churches, with their acronyms: the Catholic Mission, the Reformed Church in America/Africa Inland Church (RCA/AIC); the Anglican Church of Kenya (ACK); the Pentecostal Full Gospel Church of Kenya (FGCK); the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Kenya (ELCK); the Associated Christian Churches in Kenya (ACCK); the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK); the Baptist Kenya Assemblies of God (KAG); and other Baptist missions. Connected to the Christian donors were NGOs such as the Christian Children's Fund (CCF) and World Vision. Non-Christian foreign-donor agencies also became visible entities in the area: the Red Cross, the World Food Programme, UNICEF, The Netherlands Development Organization SNV, the Dutch-funded Netherlands Harambee Foundation for Health, and another foundation for water. All NGOs active in the area were involved in 'development
Table 11.3 Development projects by NGOs, including churches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>Tractors for ploughing; provision of seeds and pesticides; horticulture in field demonstration plots; provision of farm tools.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livestock/veterinary</td>
<td>Provision of drugs; training of para-vets; mobile treatment services; disease identification and vaccination; supply of hand-spray pumps; mobilization of peace-keeping; introduction of community-based animal health workers who later sold animal drugs to the community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forestry</td>
<td>Provision of tree seedlings to farmers; planting of trees in water catchment areas and near schools and homes; introduction of tree nurseries and conservation of natural resources (forests).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Construction of primary and pre-schools; provision of boarding facilities; sponsoring poor children from primary to higher education levels; employment of Parent–Teacher Association (PTA) teachers; provision of food, clothing and books; training and employment of pre-school teachers; payment of subordinate staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Construction and renovation of dispensaries; primary healthcare; provision of drugs; employment of nurses; mobile clinics (flying clinics); sponsoring nurses in training colleges.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water</td>
<td>Drilling and renovation of boreholes; construction of sub-surface dams and ponds; piped gravity water; purchase of solar panels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>Building churches; employing evangelists and patrons in schools.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Famine relief</td>
<td>Supplying food to people during famine; coming together to work on a communal project (e.g. mudding a classroom, doing some road work or putting up a church) when there is food for work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social services</td>
<td>Assisting women's groups in income-generating activities; registration certificates for women and youth groups; fundraising for women and youth groups; establishment of youth workshops and hardware; employment of social workers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public works/roads</td>
<td>Churches and NGOs also play a role in maintaining some roads and constructing air strips.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>Provision of solar panels in schools and health facilities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: chapter author

projects' as well (see Table 11.3), some in only one or two sectors (often education), others playing a role as ‘pseudo government’ in particular areas, with projects in many sectors (even as far as ‘peace-keeping’ and, in the case of the Anglican Church in Kenya before they were ousted, arms maintenance).

Development activities of the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands programme

The local people also regarded the Dutch-funded Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASAL) programme as an NGO, although most of its work was carried out as part of the district government apparatus, the so-called ‘line ministries’ (agriculture, livestock/veterinary, forestry, education, social services, etc.). With a bit of exaggeration we may say that the perception of the Pokot was that anything ‘bad’ was connected to the government, and anything ‘good’ to NGOs, so even projects that were regarded as ‘good’, but came from the
PARTICIPATORY EVALUATION OF DEVELOPMENT INTERVENTIONS

Table 11.4 Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASAL) projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>Staff houses; demonstration plots; supply of seeds; introduction of animal traction; tours; seminars/workshops for farmers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livestock/veterinary</td>
<td>Provision of drugs; purchase of solar panels and fridges; vaccination and branding; construction of crushes and dips; growing Napier grass.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forestry</td>
<td>Planting of trees in various areas (e.g. schools); provisions of tree seedlings to the community; installation of water tanks for tree nurseries; tree demonstration plots; provision of water cans; community training on forest conservation and the environment; provision of soil-conservation tools.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Construction of classrooms, dormitories, water tanks, toilets, kitchens; provision of desks and text books; in-service, workshops and seminars for primary school teachers; provision of material for mother tongue booklets, school atlases, Pokot/English dictionaries; sponsorship for needy secondary and college female students and for both male and female university students; training of Parent–Teacher Associations (PTAs).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water</td>
<td>Sub-surface dams; rehabilitated boreholes; drilling boreholes; training of water committees and borehole attendants; water committee tours to other districts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social services</td>
<td>Construction of roof catchments, water jars and rental houses for women's groups; supporting income-generating activities for women; training women's groups on management; support for youth groups (e.g. buying tools).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public works/roads</td>
<td>Construction of the Kanyangareng Bridge; repair and maintenance of the road between Konyao and Alale.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>Introduction of energy-saving cooking stoves (jikos) through women's groups.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: chapter author

government, could not be seen as 'government' and were perceived as being related to foreign donors and their 'NGO-like' approach. The ASAL programme was a typical 'area development programme', with lots of small-scale projects in a variety of fields (see Table 11.4). Due to the donor's mandate (activities in the Ministry of Health were already supported through another Dutch development programme), health projects were excluded.

Assessing status and impact upon capability domains

Four geographical sub-groups made an inventory of all 'development projects' in their area since 1979. They classified all relevant sectors, the period during which the project lasted, the 'sponsor' (government, ASAL, churches, other NGOs), a first assessment of the project's status, and the type of 'capability' they thought the project would enhance (see Tables 11.5 and 11.6). In total, these four groups listed 294 different projects. Men and women conducted a separate assessment (hence, a minimum of 584 project scores). Here we present a summary of the assessments about the status and capability domains of the collective projects. Projects could receive more than one score (in total: 839 scores on status and 1265 on capability). More than one score on 'status' meant that members in a group had different opinions and could not agree. More than one score on 'capabilities' meant that a project was perceived to have an impact upon more than one capability.
Table 11.5 Status assessment of development projects in northwest Pokot, according to type of donor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Number of projects</th>
<th>No. of Project scores (total)</th>
<th>No. of on-going Project scores</th>
<th>No. of Finished Projects (category 3 only)</th>
<th>No. of finished Projects (percentage per status category)*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>47 19 17 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASAL programme</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>42 10 40 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Churches</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>48 8 35 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>47 27 22 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>839</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>529</td>
<td>47 15 29 9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * Status: 1 = project never really started or was negligible; 2 = project existed, but had no lasting impact, 'nothing to be seen on the ground' and was unsustainable; 3 = project is still ongoing; no impact yet; 4 = project was finished and had an impact that is perceived to be positive; 5 = project was finished and had an impact that is perceived to be negative.

Source: chapter author

Many projects were still ongoing in the area (310 scores out of 839), and the workshop members decided that they could not give an impact assessment of these projects at this time. Of the finished projects, many were regarded as so small that their impact was seen as negligible (47 per cent), and there were also a number of past projects that were 'a waste of time and effort', as nothing substantial remained (15 per cent). For an impact assessment exercise, those projects that were ready and that were perceived to have had an impact are most interesting: 29 per cent of the status assessment scores were positive and 9 per cent negative. It is interesting to note that men judged differently than women, and in the 'most developed' areas (Alale and Kiwawa), there were major differences of opinion: in Alale, particularly among the men, and in Kiwawa, both among the men and among the women. It is remarkable that the men in Alale and in Kiwawa had outspoken negative opinions about a considerable number of projects, while the women in those areas did not give any negative impact score at all.

We differentiated among four types of donors. In terms of numbers of projects, the churches were most active (123 projects, with 339 project scores), followed by the government (72, with 203 scores), non-church NGOs (56, with 176 scores) and finally by the ASAL programme (43 projects, with 121 scores). If we look at the status assessment data among the four types of donors, there are interesting differences. Projects that had been organized by the government (including the government administration, the county council, the Kenya African National Union, the Kerio Valley Development Authority and the Rural Development Fund) had a higher than average score on projects that were not sustainable, a much lower than average score on positive impact, and a remarkably high score on negative impact. Projects that were a result of the ASAL programme had a remarkably high score on positive impact, and much lower than average scores on negative and unsustainable impact. The same was true for projects organized by churches. Finally, non-church NGOs
had a remarkably high score on unsustainable projects, but a remarkably low score on negative impact.

The workshop members regarded the impact of all projects combined upon 'human capability' (skills, knowledge level, health) most pronounced. But their impact upon physical, economic/financial and social/political capability was also perceived as considerable. Less impact was noted upon natural and cultural capabilities. In all groups, women were much more inclusive than men: many projects were regarded as having an impact upon more than one capability. Women showed a much more 'holistic' approach in discussing the impact of projects. If we compare the impact assessment scores for the four different types of donors there is a striking overall resemblance in which all four types of donor agencies, including the churches, were, in fact, active in all domains and had a perceived impact upon all capabilities. However, there are a few interesting differences. The government had a higher than average score on economic capabilities and a lower than average score on physical capabilities. The ASAL programme had a higher than average impact upon natural capabilities ('the environment') and physical capabilities, and a lower than average impact upon the other four capabilities. The churches had a slightly higher than average impact upon human and cultural capabilities, and a slightly lower than average impact upon economic capabilities. Finally, the non-church NGOs had a lower than average impact upon natural capabilities and a higher than average impact upon social and political capabilities.

**Assessment of the most positive and negative impacts**

Finally, in each of the area groups, the workshop members, mostly men and women separately, were asked to choose ten projects that they regarded as the best ones (with most positive impact) for their area and ten projects that they regarded as the worst (with most negative impact, or the largest difference between expectations and outcome).

There are major differences among the groups and also between men and women from the same area. In some cases, projects that were regarded as a very positive contribution to capability development, by the women, were
Box 11.1 Overview of development projects with the most positively perceived impact

N = northern area; A = Alale; K = Kasei; W = Kiwawa; m = men; w = women.

Provision of tree seedlings and water cans (Km); training farmers to make terraces (Kw); provision of veterinary drugs (Kw); livestock vaccination (Wm, Ww); construction of roads (Km); drilling of boreholes (N, Am, Aw, Wm, Ww); construction of piped gravity water (Aw); construction of sub-surface dams (Kw); construction of primary and pre-primary schools (Am, Aw, Km, Ww); construction of dispensaries (Am, Wm, Km, Wm, Ww); new road building (Ww); building of churches (Wm); vaccination of children (Am, Aw, Km); medical treatment (Am); provision of medicines (N, Aw, Wm, Ww); cost-sharing of drugs (Wm); mobile clinics (N, Am, Aw, Km); ‘flying’ mobile clinics (‘Helimission mobile’) (N, Am, Aw); building of schools (N, Wm); provision of teachers (Kw); feeding and paying nursery school teachers (Kw); lessons about dress making (N); extension about growing crops (N); sponsoring students (Wm, Ww); registration of women and youth groups (Wm); evangelization (N, Kw); relief food (Km, Ww); school feeding programme (Wm); providing security (Kw); peace-keeping mobilization (Wm).

Box 11.2 Overview of development projects with the most negatively perceived impact

N = northern area; A = Alale; K = Kasei; W = Kiwawa; m = men; w = women.

Provision of forestry personnel (N); tree planting (Am); provision of seedlings and water cans (Kw); provision of tree seeds (Wm, Ww); training to make terraces (Km); provision of soil conservation tools (Wm); soil conservation (Ww); provision of seeds (Am, Km, Kw, Ww); provision of fertilizers and pesticides (Ww); extension to grow Napier grass (Wm, Ww); provision of livestock pasture and hay (Wm); provision of crop seeds and new varieties (Wm); building agricultural extension office (Km); supplying oxen ploughs (Km); animal vaccination (Am); training on forest conservation (Km); training on the ‘timing of rains’ (Wm); provision of engines for grinding of maize (N); provision of energy-saving jikos (Wm); maintenance/gravelling of the main road (N, Am, Aw, Wm, Ww); construction of Turkwel Gorge Dam (Km, Kw); renovation of boreholes (Kw); construction of water dams (Ww); provision of school building materials (Aw, Kw); provision of school desks (Kw); construction of a dispensary (N); improving the buying and selling of livestock and goods (Km); provision of loans (N, Am, Aw); sponsoring of nursing students (N); provision of school milk (N, Aw); provision of school books (N, Ww); sponsoring poor children’s education (N); training of pre-school teachers (N); providing extra-curricular activities at schools (Ww); women’s awareness training (Aw); harambee for women’s groups (Aw, Ww); harambee for youth groups (Aw); employment of nursery school teachers (Am); employment of party youth wingers (Am, Aw); peace initiative (Am); relief food supply (Am, Aw); school feeding programme (Kw); enforcement of law and order (Aw, Km, Kw); registration of party membership (Wm).

regarded as a very bad contribution to capability development and as having a major negative impact in other areas, by the men.

We compared the ‘best’ and ‘worst’ project scores for the four different types of donors (see Table 11.7).
Table 11.7 ‘Best’ and ‘worst’ projects for four types of project donors; separate assessments by men and women (all research areas combined)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Men Best</th>
<th>Men Worst</th>
<th>Women Best</th>
<th>Women Worst</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASAL programme</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Churches</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: chapter author

Conclusions

Impact assessments

- Both the men and women regarded the churches as the best ‘development agency’, and ‘the government’ as the worst.
- ‘Impact assessment’ does not depend only upon reaching the targeted result of a project, but upon the way in which a project was started and implemented.
- Projects that raised major expectations and could only fulfil a minor part of those were often evaluated negatively, even if they accomplished something.
- Projects that did not treat the local population with respect were also valued negatively.
- Projects that created (or increased) tensions in the local community were often seen as very negative, especially if ‘outsiders’ created these tensions and were no longer there to assist in restoring peace;
- The activities of some of the missionaries, who had stayed in the area for a long time and who had shared the area’s problems, were generally evaluated very positively, even by those who did not belong to the particular church affiliation of the missionary.

The long-term commitment to providing water, healthcare, veterinary care and education was valued most positively; hence, the overall positive judgement of church-based NGOs, who provided these services in a bottom-up way and with a long-term commitment.

Development agencies were particularly valued positively if they were flexible enough to change timing, spacing and content to the major fluctuations in the area’s environment, and if they provided some form of counselling to discuss the challenges, which the population faced (including harsh government/army behaviour).

Where ASAL and some other government projects had the same ‘style’ of flexibility and counselling, they were also valued positively. Where projects were perceived as ‘hit-and-run’, top-down implemented hobbies of some external donors, the overall assessment was often very negative.
Mitigating vulnerability

In an area such as northern West Pokot, mitigating vulnerability means preparing for drought- and epidemic-related crises, preventing war and violence, and assisting the people in defending themselves. In the first domain, various interventions were regarded as useful. The most important one was the provision of a sustainable water infrastructure, preferably one which did not have high maintenance costs, and which did not make people dependent upon an untrustworthy public water agency. Down-to-earth provision of veterinary care and accessible and dependable healthcare were important as well, as were support for drought-resistant crops and animals and fast recovery support after a crisis. The provision of education was favoured, as it supplied a long-term escape route which could also function as a means to geographically and sectorally widen the support structure. This was true both for remittance support to livelihoods and for political support, as educated people could become advocates for the plight of their ‘home area’, not only in government circles but also in NGO and church circles, in human rights agencies, and in their communications with potential donors.

Gradually, the focus among donors and among the local population shifted to the second domain during the period under review: providing basic security against violence, including that of government agencies. Human rights groups and churches provided important support to form a potential *cordon sanitaire* against outbreaks of violence (e.g. peace-building conferences; confronting army and police atrocities); but the people’s own defence forces were also important in cases where the ‘state monopoly of violence’ did not work (when armies did not provide security), or worked counterproductively (where army and police agencies were part of a predatory and rent-seeking force). In a situation where state violence did create havoc once in a while, other state agencies, ‘bringing development’, were often treated with caution or downright disrespect. Non-governmental agencies that had become rooted in local institutional life and had shown long-term commitment were seen as much more useful. In our research area, it was mainly churches that were regarded as allies. But churches, and the many local and international non-governmental agencies that became ‘swarms of support’, particularly in the aftermath of crises, were often treated with caution, as it was never clear from the outset if they could be trusted or if they formed part of a rent-seeking and distorting external threat to long-term survival. The people’s perception was not a simple matter of ‘bad government’ versus ‘good NGOs’. It was a matter of building and maintaining mutual trust and providing long-term commitment. These ingredients can be available in both government and non-government agencies, but they often were not.

**Bridging science and practice in vulnerability research**

In our long-term research project, we started close to a government agency, as was usual during the 1970s and early 1980s, among many ‘development
researchers’. We received research money from a donor agency, allied ourselves with a local development programme and local research institutions, and soon found out that a lot of the ‘development initiatives’ were rather donor-driven – part of perceived wisdom in the government-donor nexus, with its rapidly changing donor speak and ever-changing prevailing approaches. Despite the fact that the ASAL programme for which we conducted research started with a ‘process approach’, and that we soon initiated various participatory research approaches, the initial orientation was very much on strengthening the government machinery. Only gradually did the approach shift to include more NGOs and to take local initiatives more seriously. And only later did the importance of combining development initiatives with security and peace initiatives become more evident, as well as the importance of finding and working with local peace and development brokers. During the early years of our research work we spent considerable time and energy seeking to understand the ‘institutional logic’ of the intervening agencies, and particularly of the government machinery on the ground. We should have spent more energy on understanding the ‘institutional logic’ of people’s behaviour and its roots in culture. Bridging the evident gap between researchers/practitioners focusing on culture (and often standing with their back to the development industry) and researchers/practitioners focusing on development (and often standing with their back to culture) is one of the major challenges in vulnerability research and practice.

Acknowledgements

With thanks to the participants of the Kiwawa workshop in June 2002, in West Pokot, Kenya; to the participants of the livelihood sessions of the Ceres Summer School, June 2003, at the Royal Tropical Institute, Amsterdam; to participants at the International Geographical Union (IGU) conferences in Durban 2002 and Glasgow 2004; and to research partners Rachel Andiema and Albino Kotomei. An earlier version of this chapter appeared in the *Proceedings of the 2003 Ceres Summer School* (see Andiema et al, 2003a). Comparable publications appeared in a Canadian publication (Andiema et al, 2008), and in *The Netherlands Yearbook on International Collaboration* (Dietz and Zaanen, 2009). Experiments with this method of participatory assessment of development continued in Ghana and Burkina Faso in a project together with Tamale University of Development Studies and Expertise pour le Développement du Sahel, from 2007 onwards (for first results, see Dietz et al, 2009).

References


