Organisation

Photographer: FEB

prof. dr. E.C. (Enrico) Perotti


  • Faculty of Economics and Business
    Sectie Finance
  • Visiting address
    REC M
    Plantage Muidergracht 12  Amsterdam
    Room number: M3.29
  • Postal address:
    Postbus  15953
    1001 NL  Amsterdam
  • E.C.Perotti@uva.nl
    T: 0205254159

Positions

Professor of International Finance
Former Chair, Finance Group

Research programme

Corporate Finance & Financial Systems 

Research interests

Banking, corporate finance and governance; political economy of finance; organization theory; legal and financial history

Personal page

My personal webpage

Teaching activities

Current year

Financial Regulation (Master course)

Banking Theory (PhD Course)

Institutions and Financial Structure (PhD course)

Previous years

Advanced Corporate Finance

International Corporate Finance

International Finance

Emerging Markets

Corporate Governance (PhD course)

Thesis supervision

Supervised twelve PhD students over 2004-2014

Enrico Perotti is Professor of International Finance at the University of Amsterdam, a Fellow of the European Economic Association and a Research Fellow at the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) in London.  Previously he was on the faculty at the Graduate School of Management at Boston University and at LSE.

His research focuses on banking, corporate finance and governance, international finance, theory of the firm and entrepreneurial innovation. He has written on strategic financing choices, banking instability, corporate governance, formation of innovative firms, leadership. His publications appeared in major academic journals, such as the American Economic Review, Journal of Political Economy, Journal of Financial Economics, Journal of International Economics, and Management Science.

Enrico Perotti has held visiting appointments at MIT, IMF, London Business School, London School of Economics, and Central European University.  He actively organizes top level small scale academic workshops on current topics in finance and regulation, and acted as consultant to the EC, IMF, FSB, World Bank and as senior advisor on Macro Prudential policy at DNB. In 2011-12 he was nominated the Houblon Normal Fellow at the Bank of England, visiting the Financial Stability Area. In 2012-2014 he has advised the ECB on banking regulation and financial stability.In 2015 he has been nominated a Duisenberg Research Fellow at the European Central Bank. 

He is an Italian citizen and father of two daughter, an avid reader, traveller and hiker. He is sometimes found rowing in a vier-persoon-boot on the Amstel river. 

Banking and Financial Regulation

International Financial Flows and Instability

Political Economy of Finance

2015

  • E. Perotti (2015). The Roots of Shadow Banking. In S. Claessens, D. Evanoff, G. Kaufman & L. Laeven (Eds.), Shadow banking within and across national borders (pp. 249-264). Singapore: World Scientific.

2013

2011

2009

2008

2007

2006

2002

  • E.C. Perotti & J. Suarez (2002). Last Bank Standing: What Do I Gain if You Fail? European Economic Review, 1599-1622.
  • E.C. Perotti & B. Biais (2002). Machiavellian Privatization. The American Economic Review, 92 (1), 240-258. doi: 10.1257/000282802760015694

2001

2000

  • E.C. Perotti & F. Modigliani (2000). Security Markets versus Bank Finance: Legal Enforcement and Investor Protection. International Review of Finance, 1 (2), 81-96.

1998

  • E.C. Perotti & N. Kulatilaka (1998). Strategic Growth Options. Management Science, 44 (8), 1021-1031. doi: 10.1287/mnsc.44.8.1021

1995

  • E.C. Perotti (1995). Credible privatization. The American Economic Review, 85 (4), 847-859.
  • N. Kulatilaka & E.C. Perotti (1995). What is lost by waiting to invest. The Journal of Finance, 50 (3), 990-991.

1994

1993

  • E.C. Perotti (1993). Bank lending in transition economies. Journal of Banking & Finance, 17 (5), 1021-1032. doi: 10.1016/0378-4266(93)90069-P
  • E.C. Perotti & K.E. Spier (1993). Capital structure as a bargaining tool : the role of leverage in contract renegotiation. American Economic Review, 83 (5), 1131-1141.

2014

2011

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

  • E.C. Perotti & J. Suarez (2002). Last Bank Standing: What Do I Gain if You Fail? European Economic Review, 1599-1622.
  • E.C. Perotti & B. Biais (2002). Machiavellian Privatization. The American Economic Review, 92 (1), 240-258. doi: 10.1257/000282802760015694
  • E.C. Perotti (2002). Lessons from the Russian Meltdown: The Economics of Soft Legal Constraints. CEPR Working Paper.
  • E.C. Perotti & P. Jansen (2002). Valuation of Internet companies: A Survey of the Evidence. Advances in Financial Economics, 1-19.
  • E.C. Perotti & S. Gelfer (2002). Financial Constraints in Russian Groups. In A. Meyendorff & A.V. Thakor (Eds.), Designing Financial Systems in Transition Economies: Strategies for Reform in Central and Eastern Europe (pp. 283-306). MIT Press.
  • E.C. Perotti & E. von Thadden (2002). Investor Dominance and Strategic Transparency: On the Role of Corporate Governance for Product Market Competition. In L. Renneboog, J. McCanery, P. Moerland & T. Raaijmakers (Eds.), Convergence and diversity in corporate governance regimes (pp. 363-385). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

2001

2000

  • E.C. Perotti & N. Kulatilaka (2000). Valuation of Strategic Growth Options. In S. Grenadier (Ed.), Game choises: The intersection of real options and game theory. London: Riskwater Group Ltd..
  • E.C. Perotti & F. Modigliani (2000). Security Markets versus Bank Finance: Legal Enforcement and Investor Protection. International Review of Finance, 1 (2), 81-96.

1999

  • E.C. Perotti (1999). Collusive trade Credit and Stabilization Policy in Transition. In C. Helmenstein (Ed.), Capital Markets in Emerging Economies, Central and Eastern Europe, Vol. 1 (pp. 210-225). United Kingdom: Edward Elgar Publishing/Clarendon.
  • L. Zou, E.C. Perotti & L. Sun (1999). State-owned versus Township and Village Enterprises in China. Comparative Economic Studies, 41 (2-3), 151-179.
  • E.C. Perotti & F. Huibers (1999). The Performance of Privatization Stocks in Emerging Markets: The Role of Political Risks. In K. John, A.K. Makhija & M. Hirschey (Eds.), Advances in Financial Economics, 4 (pp. 1-27).

1998

  • E.C. Perotti & N. Kulatilaka (1998). Strategic Growth Options. Management Science, 44 (8), 1021-1031. doi: 10.1287/mnsc.44.8.1021
  • E.C. Perotti & F. Modigliani (1998). Corporate Law Enforcement and the Development of Security Markets: Theory and Evidence. Managerial and Decision Economics, 18, 519-528.
  • E.C. Perotti (1998). Inertial Credit and Opportunistic Arrears in Transition. European Economic Review, 42, 1703-1725. doi: 10.1016/S0014-2921(97)00099-8

1996

  • E.C. Perotti & O. Carere (1996). The evolution of bank lending quality during transition: Romania 1991-1994. In S. Zecchine (Ed.), Lessons from the economic transition. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

1995

  • E.C. Perotti (1995). Credible privatization. The American Economic Review, 85 (4), 847-859.

2015

  • E. Perotti (2015). The Roots of Shadow Banking. In S. Claessens, D. Evanoff, G. Kaufman & L. Laeven (Eds.), Shadow banking within and across national borders (pp. 249-264). Singapore: World Scientific.

2009

2005

2004

  • E.C. Perotti & L. Vesnaver (2004). Enterprise finance and investment in listed Hungarian firms. Journal of Comparative Economics, 32 (1), 73-87. doi: 10.1016/j.jce.2003.09.009
  • J.J.A.G. Driessen & E.C. Perotti (2004). Confidence building on Euro conversion : theory and evidence from currency options. (unknown, CEPR Discussion papers, no 4180). London: Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  • E.C. Perotti & L. Vesnaver (2004). Enterprise finance and investment in listed Hungarian firms. (unknown, CEPR Discussion papers, no 4194). London: Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  • E.C. Perotti & P. Volpin (2004). Lobbying on entry. (unknown, CEPR discussion paper, no 4519). London: Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  • E.C. Perotti & P. Volpin (2004). Lobbying on entry. (unknown, Discussion paper, no TI 2004-088/2). Amsterdam [etc.]: Tinbergen Institute.
  • E.C. Perotti & E.-L. von Thadden (2004). The political economy of dominant investors. (unknown, Discussion paper, no TI 2004-091/2). Amsterdam: Tinbergen Institute.
  • E.C. Perotti & S. Rossetto (2004). Internet portals as portfolios of entry. In J.A. McCahery & L. Renneboog (Eds.), Venture capital contracting and the valuation of high-technology firms. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • E.C. Perotti & E.-L. von Thadden (2004). The political economy of bank- and market dominance. (unknown, Discussion paper, no TI 2004-012/2). Amsterdam: Tinbergen Institute.

2003

2002

  • E.C. Perotti & E.-L. von Thadden (2002). Strategic transparency and informed trading : will capital market integration force convergence of corporate governance? (unknown, Cahiers de Recherches Economiques, no 9804). Lausanne: Universite de Lausanne, Departement d'Econometrie et d'Economie Politique (DEEP).
  • E.C. Perotti & P. Jansen (2002). Valuation of Internet companies : a survey of the evidence. In M. Hirschey, K. John & A.K. Makhija (Eds.), Hedging with financial futures for institutional investors : from theory to practice (Advances in Financial Economics, 7) (pp. 1-19). Amsterdam: JAI.
  • I. Schindele & E.C. Perotti (2002). Pricing initial public offerings in premature capital markets : the case of Hungary. (unknown, Working paper, no 116.2002). : Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  • E.C. Perotti (2002). Lessons from the Russian meltdown : the economics of soft legal constraints. (unknown, CEPR policy paper, no 9). London: Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  • E.C. Perotti & J. Suarez (2002). Last bank standing : what do I gain if you fail? European Economic Review, 46 (9), 1599-1622. doi: 10.1016/S0014-2921(02)00241-6
  • E.C. Perotti & S. Gelfer (2002). Financial reallocation in Russian groups. In A. Meyendorff & A.V. Thakor (Eds.), Designing financial systems in transition economies : strategies for reform in Central and Eastern Europe (pp. 283-306). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  • E.C. Perotti (2002). Lessons From the Russian Meltdown. In P. Weston (Ed.), The Wild East: Negotiating the Russian Financial Frontier (pp. 1-32). Prentice Hall.
  • E.C. Perotti (2002). Lessons from the Russian meltdown : the economics of soft legal constraints. International Finance, 5 (3), 359-399.
  • E.C. Perotti & E.-L. von Thadden (2002). The political economy of bank- and market dominance. (unknown, Cahiers de Recherches Économiques du Département d'Économétrie et d'Économie politique (DEEP), no 95). Lausanne: Université de Lausanne, École des HEC, Département d'Économétrie et d'Économie politique (DEEP).

2001

  • E.C. Perotti & E. von Thadden (2001). Outside Finance, Dominant Investors and Strategic Transparency. CEPR Discussion Paper Series, 2733 (March).
  • E.C. Perotti & J. Suarez (2001). Last Bank Standing: What Do I Gain if You Fail? CEPR Discussion Paper Series, 2933 (August).
  • E.C. Perotti & L. Laeven (2001). Confidence Building and Emerging Market Development. CEPR Discussion Paper Series, 3055 (November).
  • S. Rossetto & E.C. Perotti (2001). Strategic Advantage and the optimal exercise of entry options. CEPR Discussion Paper Series, 3061.
  • E.C. Perotti (2001). Banking regulation under extreme legal underdevelopment: Lessons from the Russian meltdown. In P. Westin (Ed.), The Wild East. London: Reuters Books.
  • E.C. Perotti & J. Suarez (2001). Last bank standing: what do I gain if you fail? (unknown, CEPR Discussion paper series, no 2933). London: Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  • E.C. Perotti & S. Rossetto (2001). Strategic advantage and the optimal exercise of entry options. (unknown, CEPR Discussion paper series, no 3061). London: Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  • J. A. Cherian & E.C. Perotti (2001). Option pricing and foreign investment under political risk. Journal of International Economics, 55 (2), 359-377. doi: 10.1016/S0022-1996(01)00083-6
  • L. Laeven & E.C. Perotti (2001). Confidence building in emerging stock markets. (unknown, CEPR Discussion paper series, no 3055). London: Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  • E.C. Perotti & J. Suarez (2001). Last bank standing : what do I gain if you fail? : .
  • E.C. Perotti & E.-L. von Thadden (2001). Outside finance, dominant investors and strategic transparency. (unknown, Discussion paper, no TI 2001-019/2). Amsterdam: Tinbergen Institute.
  • L. Laeven & E.C. Perotti (2001). Confidence building in emerging stock markets. (unknown, FEEM Research Paper Series, no 101.01). Milano: Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  • N. Kulatilaka & E.C. Perotti (2001). Valuation of strategic growth options. In E.S. Schwartz & L. Trigeorgis (Eds.), Real options and investment under uncertainty : classical readings and recent contributions. Cambridge, MA: The MIT press.
  • E.C. Perotti (2001). Lessons from the Russian meltdown : the economics of soft legal constraints. (unknown, William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series, no 379). Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Business School, William Davidson Institute.
  • E.C. Perotti & E.-L. von Thadden (2001). Outside finance, dominant investors and strategic transparency. (unknown, CEPR Discussion paper series, no 2733). London: Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  • E.C. Perotti & S. Gelfer (2001). Red barons or robber barons? : governance and investment in Russian financial-industrial groups. European Economic Review, 45 (9), 1601-1617. doi: 10.1016/S0014-2921(00)00097-0
  • E.C. Perotti & P. H. van Oijen (2001). Privatization, political risk and stock market development in emerging economies. Journal of international Money and Finance, 20 (1), 43-69. doi: 10.1016/S0261-5606(00)00032-2

2000

  • O.V. Carare, C.A.M.F. Claessens & E.C. Perotti (2000). Can Governments Maintain Hard Budget Contraints? Bank Lending and Financial Isolation in Romania. William Davidson Institute working paper, wp 241.
  • E.C. Perotti & S. Gelfer (2000). Investment Financing in Russian Financial-IndustrialGroups. William Davidson Institute working paper, wp 242.
  • E.C. Perotti & P.H. van Oijen (2000). Privatization, Political Risk and Stock Market Development in Emerging Economies. William Davidson Institute working paper, wp 243.
  • E.C. Perotti & O.V. Carare (2000). The Evolution of Bank Credit Quality in Transition: Theory and Evidence from Romania. William Davidson Institute working paper, wp. 49.
  • E.C. Perotti, L. Laeven & P.H. van Oijen (2000). Confidence Building in Emerging Stock Markets. William Davidson Institute working paper, wp. 366.
  • E.C. Perotti, L. Laeven & P. van Oijen (2000). Confidence building in emerging stock markets. (unknown, William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series, no 366). Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Business School, William Davidson Institute.
  • E.C. Perotti & J. Suarez (2000). Pre-emptive policy for systemic banking crisis. : .
  • N. Kulatilaka & E.C. Perotti (2000). Time-to market capability as a Stackelberg growth option. : .
  • E.C. Perotti & E.-L. von Thadden (2000). Outside finance, dominant investors and strategic transparency. Amsterdam: .
  • O.V. Carare, C.A.M.F. Claessens & E.C. Perotti (2000). Can governments maintain hard budget contraints? : bank lending and financial isolaton in Romania. (unknown, William Davidson Institute Working Paper, no 241). Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Business School, William Davidson Institute.
  • F. Modigliani & E.C. Perotti (2000). Security versus bank finance : the importance of a proper enforcement of legal rules. (unknown, FEEM Working Paper, no 37.99). Milano: Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
  • E.C. Perotti & S. Rossetto (2000). Internet portals as portfolios of entry options. : .
  • E.C. Perotti & E.-L. von Thadden (2000). Outside finance, dominant investors and strategic transparency. (unknown, Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Dipartement d'Economitrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP), no 69). Lausanne: Universiti de Lausanne, Ecole des HEC, Dipartement d'Economitrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP).
  • E.C. Perotti & S. Rossetto (2000). Internet portals as portfolios of entry options. (unknown, Discussion paper, no TI 2000-105/2). Amsterdam: Tinbergen Institute.

1999

  • E.C. Perotti & P.H. van Oijen (1999). Privatization, political risk and stock market development. (unknown, CEPR Discussion paper series, no 2243). London: Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  • E.C. Perotti & S. Gelfer (1999). Red barons or robber barons? : governance and financing in Russian financial-industrial groups. : .
  • E.C. Perotti & P.H. van Oijen (1999). Privatization, political risk and stock market development in emerging economies. : .
  • E.C. Perotti & P.H. van Oijen (1999). Privatization, political risk and stock market development in emerging economies. (unknown, FEEM Research Paper Series, no 38.99). Milano: Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  • E.C. Perotti & E.-L. von Thadden (1999). Dominant investors and strategic transparency. (unknown, Working Paper, no 24/99). Milano: Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Note di Lavoro.
  • E.C. Perotti & H.T. Haanappel (1999). Strategische groeiopties in oligopolistische markten : investeren in onzekerheid: reele optietheorie en speltheorie. : .
  • F.E. Huibers & E.C. Perotti (1999). Performance of privatization stocks in emerging markets : the role of political risk. In M. Hirschey, K. John & A..K. Makhija (Eds.), Privatization : financial perspectives (Advances in financial economics) (pp. 1-27). Stamford, Conn.:: JAI Press.
  • E.C. Perotti & P.H. van Oijen (1999). Privatization, political risk and stock market development in emerging economies. (unknown, William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series, no 243). Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Business School, William Davidson Institute.
  • J.A. Cherian & E.C. Perotti (1999). Option pricing and foreign investment under political risk. (unknown, CEPR Discussion paper series, no 2327). London: Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  • E.C. Perotti & P.H. van Oijen (1999). Privatization, political risk and stock market development in emerging economies. (unknown, Discussion paper, no TI 99-033/2). Amsterdam: Tinbergen Institute.
  • E.C. Perotti (1999). The role of financial groups in Russia's banking crisis. : .
  • J.A. Cherian & E.C. Perotti (1999). Option pricing and foreign investment under political risk. : .
  • E.C. Perotti & S. Gelfer (1999). Red barons or robber barons? : governance and financing in Russian FIGS. (unknown, CEPR Discussion paper series, no 2204). London: Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  • E.C. Perotti, L. Sun & L. Zou (1999). State-owned versus township and village enterprises in China. Comparative Economic Studies, 41 (2-3), 151-180.
  • J. A. Cherian & E.C. Perotti (1999). Option pricing and foreign investment under political risk. (unknown, Discussion paper. Financial and international markets, no TI 99-030/2). Amsterdam: Tinbergen Institute.

1998

  • E.C. Perotti & E. von Thadden (1998). Dominant Investors and Strategic Transparency. CEPR Discussion Paper Series, 1948.
  • E.C. Perotti, L. Sun & L. Zou (1998). State-Owned versus Township and Village Enterprises in China. UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research Working Papers, 150.
  • F. Modigliani, P.H. van Oijen & E.C. Perotti (1998). Security versus Bank finance: the Importance of a Proper Enforcement of Legal Rules. Discussion paper - Tinbergen Institute, 98-051/2.
  • E.C. Perotti & E. Von Thadden (1998). Dominant Investors and Strategic Transparency. Discussion paper - Tinbergen Institute, 98-052/2.
  • N. Kulatilaka & E.C. Perotti (1998). Strategic growth options. Transition - World Bank, 44 (8), 1021-1031.
  • B. Bias & E.C. Perotti (1998). Machiavellian Underpricing. CEPR Discussion Paper Series, 2014.
  • F. Huibers & E.C. Perotti (1998). The performance of privatization stocks in emerging markets : the role of political risk. : .
  • E.C. Perotti & E.-L. von Thadden (1998). Dominant investors and strategic transparency. (unknown, CEPR Discussion paper series, no 1948). London: Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  • F. Modigliani, E.C. Perotti & P.H. van Oijen (1998). Security versus bank finance : the importance of a proper enforcement of legal rules. (unknown, Discussion paper, no TI 98-051/2). Amsterdam: Tinbergen Institute.
  • E.C. Perotti (1998). Inertial credit and opportunistic arrears in transition. European Economic Review, 42 (9), 1703-1725. doi: 10.1016/S0014-2921(97)00099-8
  • E.C. Perotti & B. Biais (1998). Machiavellian underpricing. (unknown, CEPR Discussion papers, no 2014). : Centre for Economic Policy Research.
  • E.C. Perotti & S. Gelfer (1998). Investment financing in Russian financial-industrial groups. (unknown, Discussion paper, no TI 98-053/2). Amsterdam: Tinbergen Institute.
  • E.C. Perotti, L. Sun & L. Zou (1998). State-owned versus township and village enterprises in China. (unknown, WIDER Working papers, no no. 150). Helsinki: UNU World Institute for Development Economics Researh (UNU/WIDER).
  • B. Biais & E.C. Perotti (1998). Machiavellian underpricing. (unknown, Discussion paper, no TI 98-054/2). Amsterdam: Tinbergen Institute.
  • E.C. Perotti & E.-L. von Thadden (1998). Dominant investors and strategic transparency. (unknown, Discussion paper, no TI 98-052/2). Amsterdam: Tinbergen Institute.
  • E.C. Perotti & E. Cordfunke (1998). Do foreign cross-listings increase firm value? : evidence from announcement effects of Dutch firms. MAB : Maandblad voor accountancy en bedrijfseconomie, 72 (11), 570-578.

1997

  • B. Biais & E.C. Perotti (1997). Machiavellian underpricing. : .
  • E.C. Perotti, E. Cordfunke & M. Lynch (1997). Do foreign cross-listings increase firm value? : evidence from announcement effects of Dutch firms. : .
  • F. Modigliani & E.C. Perotti (1997). Protection of minority interest and the development of security markets. Managerial and Decision Economics, 18 (7-8), 519-528.
  • N. Kulatilaka & E.C. Perotti (1997). Strategic growth options. : .

1996

  • E.C. Perotti (1996). Inertial credit and arrears in transition. (unknown, Economic discussion paper, no 24). Warsaw: University of Warsaw, Faculty of Economic Sciences.
  • E.C. Perotti & O. Carare (1996). The evolution of bank credit quality in transition : theory and evidence from Romania. (unknown, William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series, no 49). Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Business School, William Davidson Institute.
  • E.C. Perotti & O. Carare (1996). The evolution of bank credit quality in transition : theory and evidence from Romania. : .
  • N. Kulatilaka & E.C. Perotti (1996). What is lost by waiting to invest? : a theory of strategic real options. (unknown, Discussion paper, no TI 96-29/2). Amsterdam: Tinbergen Institute.

1995

  • E.C. Perotti (1995). Inertial credit and arrears in transition. (unknown, Discussion paper, no TI 2-95-215). Amsterdam: Tinbergen Institute.
  • E.C. Perotti (1995). Eastern European financial systems. (extern rapport, IMF Staff Paper Series). Washington, DC, USA: International Monetary Fund.
  • N. Kulatilaka & E.C. Perotti (1995). What is lost by waiting to invest. The Journal of Finance, 50 (3), 990-991.
  • E.C. Perotti (1995). Credible privatization. The American Economic Review, 85 (4), 847-859.

1994

  • E.C. Perotti (1994). Corporate governance in mass privatization. In S. Estrin (Ed.), Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe. London: Longman.
  • E. Berglof & E.C. Perotti (1994). The governance structure of the Japanese financial keiretsu. : .
  • E.C. Perotti (1994). A taxonomy of post-socialist financial systems : decentralized enforcement and the creation of inside money. Economics of Transition, 2 (1), 71-81.
  • E. Berglof & E.C. Perotti (1994). The governance structure of the Japanese financial keiretsu. Journal of Financial Economics, 36 (2), 259-284. doi: 10.1016/0304-405X(94)90026-4

1993

  • E.C. Perotti (1993). Bank lending in transition economies. Journal of Banking & Finance, 17 (5), 1021-1032. doi: 10.1016/0378-4266(93)90069-P
  • E.C. Perotti (1993). Eastern European financial systems : the creation of inside money. : .
  • E.C. Perotti (1993). Bank lending in transition economies. : .
  • E.C. Perotti & S.E. Guney (1993). The structure of privatization plans. Financial Management : Journal of the Financial Management Association, 22 (1), 84-98.
  • E.C. Perotti & K.E. Spier (1993). Capital structure as a bargaining tool : the role of leverage in contract renegotiation. American Economic Review, 83 (5), 1131-1141.

1992

  • E.C. Perotti (1992). Cross-ownership as a hostage exchange to support collaboration. Managerial and Decision Economics, 13 (1), 45-54.
  • E.C. Perotti & S.E. Guney (1992). The structure of privatization plans. : .

2013

2012

2011

2010

2005

  • E.C. Perotti & P. Volpin (2005). Lobbying on Entry. (intern rapport, CEPR discussion paper, no 4519). onbekend: Afdeling Business Studies.

2000

  • E.C. Perotti (2000). Sustained Privatization Resolves Political Risk, Bolsters Development. Tinbergen Magazine, 2, 2-6.

1998

  • E.C. Perotti & E. Cordfunke (1998). Crosslisting and Shareholder Value Creation: Theory and Evidence from Dutch Foreign Listings. MAB, 72 (11), 570-578.

2015

2013

  • E. Perotti (2013). Political Economy of Finance. (Preprints, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers / DSF research papers, no TI 12-034/IV/DSF53). Amsterdam / Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute / Duisenberg school of finance.
  • J. Dow & E. Perotti (2013). Resistance to change. (Preprints). : Universiteit van Amsterdam.
  • G. Dari-Mattiacci, O. Gelderblom, J. Jonker & E. Perotti (2013). The Emergence of the Corporate Form. (Preprints, Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper, no 2013-02). Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam.
  • M. Bersem, E. Perotti & E.L. von Thadden (2013). The Political Economy of Capital Reallocation. (Preprints). : Universiteit van Amsterdam.

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

  • E. Feijen & E.C. Perotti (2005). The political economy of financial fragility. (intern rapport, CEPR discussion paper, no 5317). London: Center for Economic Policy Research.[go to publisher's site]
  • J.J.A.G. Driessen & E.C. Perotti (2005). Confidence Building on Euro Convergence: Theory and Evidence from Cross-Rate Options. (intern rapport). onbekend: Afdeling Business Studies.
  • E.C. Perotti (2005). State Ownership: A Residual Role? World Bank Policy Research. (intern rapport, Workingpaper, no 3407). onbekend: Afdeling Business Studies.
  • E.C. Perotti & E.L. von Thadden (2005). The political economy of corporate control and labor rents. (intern rapport, Tinbergen Institute discussion paper, no 2005-102/2). Amsterdam [etc.]: Tinbergen Institute.[go to publisher's site]
  • C.A.M.F. Claessens & E.C. Perotti (2005). The links between finance and inequality: channels and evidence. (intern rapport). onbekend: Afdeling Business Studies.
  • E.H.B. Feijen & E.C. Perotti (2005). The Political Economy of Financial Fragility. (intern rapport, Tinbergen Institute Discussion paper, no 115). Amsterdam: Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde.

2004

2003

2002

2000

1998

  • E.C. Perotti & S. Gelfer (1998). Investment financing in Russian financial-industrial groups. (Preprints, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, no TI 1998-053/2). Amsterdam / Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute.
  • B. Bias & E.C. Perotti (1998). Machiavellian underpricing. (Preprints, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, no TI 1998-054/2). Amsterdam / Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute.

1995

2014

  • G. Dari-Mattiacci, O. Gelderblom, J. Jonker & E.C. Perotti (). The Emergence of the Corporate Form. Gernzensee, CEPR Summer Symposium in Economic Theory.
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