Photographer: FEB

prof. dr. T.J.S. (Theo) Offerman


  • Faculty of Economics and Business
    Section Microeconomics
  • Visiting address
    REC E
    Roetersstraat 11  Amsterdam
    Room number: 7.28
  • Postal address:
    Postbus  15867
    1001 NJ  Amsterdam
  • T.J.S.Offerman@uva.nl
    T: 0205254294
    T: 0205254252

Background and interests

My current position is professor of Behavioral Game Theory at the University of Amsterdam (since 2005). My academic interests include the fields of Behavioral Economics, Experimental Economics and Game Theory. Recently, my research has focused on topics like auctions, positive and negative reciprocity, public goods, strategic communication (cheap talk and signaling) and discrimination. I am a fellow of the Tinbergen Institute and a CESS research fellow.

Research group

Website of CREED

Curriculum Vitae 

2017

  • Kopányi-Peuker, A., Offerman, T., & Sloof, R. (2017). Fostering cooperation through the enhancement of own vulnerability. Games and Economic Behavior, 101, 273-290. DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.001 [details]

2016

  • Offerman, T., & Palley, A. B. (2016). Lossed in translation: an off-the-shelf method to recover probablistic beliefs from loss-averse agents. Experimental Economics, 19(1), 1-30. DOI: 10.1007/s10683-015-9429-0 [details] [PDF]
  • Zou, L., Hu, X., & Offerman, T. J. S. (2016). How risk sharing may enhance efficiency of English auctions. Economic Journal. DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12439 [details]
  • Nosenzo, D., Offerman, T., Sefton, M., & van der Veen, A. (2016). Discretionary sanctions and rewards in the repeated inspection game. Management Science, 62(2), 502-517. DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2014.2124 [details / files]

2015

  • Offerman, T., & van der Veen, A. (2015). How to subsidize contributions to public goods: Does the frog jump out of the boiling water? European Economic Review, 74, 96-108. DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2014.11.007 [details]
  • de Groot Ruiz, A., Offerman, T., & Onderstal, S. (2015). Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games. Games and Economic Behavior, 91, 14-25. DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.03.011 [details]
  • de Haan, T., Offerman, T., & Sloof, R. (2015). Discrimination in the labour market: the curse of competition between workers. Economic Journal. DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12352 [details]
  • de Haan, T., Offerman, T., & Sloof, R. (2015). Money talks? An experimental investigation of cheap talk and burned money. International Economic Review, 56(4), 1385-1426. DOI: 10.1111/iere.12141 [details]

2014

  • de Groot Ruiz, A., Offerman, T., & Onderstal, S. (2014). For those about to talk we salute you: an experimental study of credible deviations and ACDC. Experimental Economics, 17(2), 173-199. DOI: 10.1007/s10683-013-9362-z [details]
  • Nosenzo, D., Offerman, T., Sefton, M., & van der Veen, A. (2014). Encouraging compliance: bonuses versus fines in inspection games. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 30(3), 623-648. DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewt001 [details]

2013

  • Goeree, J. K., Offerman, T., & Sloof, R. (2013). Demand reduction and preemptive bidding in multi-unit license auctions. Experimental Economics, 16(1), 52-87. DOI: 10.1007/s10683-012-9338-4 [details] [PDF]

2011

  • Hu, A., Offerman, T., & Onderstal, S. (2011). Fighting collusion in auctions: an experimental investigation. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 29(1), 84-96. DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2009.06.003 [details]
  • Hu, A., Offerman, T., & Zou, L. (2011). Premium auctions and risk preferences. Journal of Economic Theory, 146(6), 2420-2439. DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2011.10.005 [details]
  • de Haan, T., Offerman, T., & Sloof, R. (2011). Noisy signaling: theory and experiment. Games and Economic Behavior, 73(2), 402-428. DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.04.006 [details]

2009

  • Offerman, T., & Schotter, A. (2009). Imitation and luck: an experimental study on social sampling. Games and Economic Behavior, 65(2), 461-502. DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.03.004 [details]
  • Offerman, T., & Onderstal, S. (2009). Making uncompetitive auctions competitive: a survey of experiments. In J. Hinloopen, & H-T. Normann (Eds.), Experiments and competition policy. (pp. 231-266). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [details]
  • Offerman, T., Sonnemans, J., van de Kuilen, G., & Wakker, P. P. (2009). A truth serum for non-Bayesians : correcting proper scoring rules for risk attitudes. The Review of Economic Studies, 76(4), 1461-1489. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00557.x [details] [PDF]

2008

  • Schram, A., Offerman, T., & Sonnemans, J. (2008). Explaining the comparative statistics in step-level public good games. In C. R. Plott, & V. L. Smith (Eds.), Handbook of experimental economics results. - Vol. 1. (pp. 817-824). Amsterdam: North-Holland. [details]
  • Eliaz, K., Offerman, T., & Schotter, A. (2008). Creating competition out of thin air: an experimental study of right-to-choose auctions. Games and Economic Behavior, 62(2), 383-416. DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.05.004 [details]

2006

  • Goeree, J. K., Offerman, T. J. S., & Schram, A. J. H. C. (2006). Using first-price auctions to sell heterogeneous licenses. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 24(3), 555-581. DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2005.07.011 [details]
  • Offerman, T. J. S., & Potters, J. J. M. (2006). Does auctioning of entry licenses induce collusion? An experimental study. The Review of Economic Studies, 73(3), 769-791. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2006.00395.x [details]

2004

2003

2002

  • Goeree, J. K., & Offerman, T. J. S. (2002). Efficiency in Auctions with Private and Common Values: An Experimental Study. The American Economic Review, 92(3), 625-643. DOI: 10.1257/00028280260136435 [details]
  • Offerman, T. J. S. (2002). Hurting Hurts More Than Helping Helps. European Economic Review, 46, 1423-1437. DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00176-3 [details]
  • Offerman, T. J. S., Potters, J., & Sonnemans, J. H. (2002). Imitation and Belief Learning in an Oligopoly Experiment. The Review of Economic Studies, 96, 973-997. [details]
  • Cox, J., Offerman, T. J. S., Olson, M., & Schram, A. J. H. C. (2002). Competition For vs On the Rails: A Laboratory Experiment. International Economic Review, 43, 709-736. DOI: 10.1111/1468-2354.t01-1-00032 [details]
  • Guth, W., Offerman, T. J. S., Potters, J., Strobel, M., & Verbon, H. A. A. (2002). Are Family Transfers Crowded Out by Public Transfers? The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 104(4), 587-604. DOI: 10.1111/1467-9442.00303 [details]

2001

  • Offerman, T. J. S., Potters, J., & Verbon, H. A. A. (2001). Cooperation in an Overlapping Generations Experiment. Games and Economic Behavior, 36, 264-275. DOI: 10.1006/game.2000.0816 [details]
  • Offerman, T. J. S., Sonnemans, J. H., & Schram, A. J. H. C. (2001). Expectation Formation in Step-Level Public Good Games. Economic Inquiry, 39(2), 250-269. DOI: 10.1093/ei/39.2.250 [details]

1999

  • Sonnemans, J. H., Schram, A. J. H. C., & Offerman, T. J. S. (1999). Strategic Behavior in Public Good Games: When Partners Really Become Strangers. Economics Letters, (62), 35-41. DOI: 10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00203-1 [details]

1998

  • Offerman, T. J. S., & Sonnemans, J. H. (1998). Learning by experience and learning by imitating successful others. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 34(4), 559-575. DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(97)00109-1 [details]
  • Offerman, T. J. S., Schram, A. J. H. C., & Sonnemans, J. H. (1998). Quantal response models in step-level public good games. European Journal of Political Economy, 14(1), 89-100. DOI: 10.1016/S0176-2680(97)00044-X [details]
  • Sonnemans, J. H., Schram, A. J. H. C., & Offerman, T. J. S. (1998). Public good provision and public bad prevention: the effect of framing. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 34, 143-161. DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(97)00042-5 [details]

1997

  • Offerman, T. J. S. (1997). Beliefs and Decision Rules in Public Good Games - Theory and Experiments. Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer. [details]

1996

  • Offerman, T. J. S., Schram, A. J. H. C., & Sonnemans, J. H. (1996). Value orientations, expectations and voluntary contributions in public goods. Economic Journal, 106, 817-845. DOI: 10.2307/2235360 [details]

2006

  • Offerman, T. J. S. (2006). Economisch Design. Tijdschrift voor Politieke Ekonomie, 27(4), 22-39. [details]

2005

  • Offerman, T. J. S. (2005). Optimale Veilingen in de Praktijk. In KNAW Yearbook 2005. KNAW. [details]

2001

  • Offerman, T. J. S., & Sonnemans, J. H. (2001). Is the Quadratic Scoring Rule Behaviorally Incentive Compatible? CREED Working Paper[details]

2000

  • Offerman, T., & Sonnemans, J. (2000). What is causing overreaction? An experimental investigation of recency and the hot hand effect. Unknown Publisher. [details] [PDF]

1999

  • Goeree, J. K., & Offerman, T. J. S. (1999). Competetive bidding in auctions with private and common values. CREED Working Paper[details]
  • Offerman, T. J. S., & Potters, J. J. M. (1999). Does Auctioning of Entry Licences Affect Market Prices? An Experimental Study. CREED Working Paper[details]

1998

  • Offerman, T. J. S. (1998). Hurting Hurts More Than Helping Helps: The Role of the Self-Serving Bias. Discussion paper - Tinbergen Institute, 99-018/1[details]
  • Offerman, T. J. S., & Sonnemans, J. H. (1998). What's causing overreaction? An Experimental Investigation of Recency and the Hot Hand Effect. Working Paper[details]
  • Offerman, T. J. S., Potters, J. J. M., & Verbon, H. A. A. (1998). Cooperation in an Overlapping Generations Experiment. Discussion paper - Tinbergen Institute, 99-019/1[details]
  • Cox, J. C., Offerman, T. J. S., Olson, M., & Schram, A. J. H. C. (1998). Competition For vs On the the Rails: A Laboratory Experiment. Working Paper[details]
  • Guth, W., Offerman, T. J. S., Potters, J. J. M., Strobel, M., & Verbon, H. A. A. (1998). An Experimental Study of Inter- and Intragenerational Solidarity in a Model with Multiple Families. Working Paper[details]

1997

  • Offerman, T. J. S., & Sonnemans, J. H. (1997). What's causing overreaction? An Experimental Investigation of recency and the hot hand effect. Discussion Paper centER, 9736[details]
  • Offerman, T. J. S., Potters, J. J. M., & Sonnemans, J. H. (1997). Imitation and Belief Learning in an Oligopoly Experiment. Discussion paper - Tinbergen Institute, 97-116/1[details]
  • Offerman, T., Sonnemans, J., & Potters, J. (1997). Imitation and belief learning in an oligopoly experiment. (Tinbergen Institute discussion paper; No. 97-116/1). Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute. [details] [PDF]
  • Potters, J. J. M., Sonnemans, J. H., & Offerman, T. J. S. (1997). Imitation and Belief Learning in an Oligopoly Experiment. Discussion paper - Tinbergen Institute, 97-116/1[details]

1996

  • Offerman, T. J. S., Schram, A. J. H. C., & Sonnemans, J. H. (1996). Quantal response models in step-level public good games. (TI discussion paper; No. 96-20/1). Amsterdam: Tinbergen Institute. [details]
  • Offerman, T. J. S., Schram, A. J. H. C., & Sonnemans, J. H. (1996). Strategic behaviour in public good games. (TI discussion paper; No. 96-111/1). Amsterdam: Tinbergen Institute. [details]
  • Offerman, T. J. S., Sonnemans, J. H., & Schram, A. J. H. C. (1996). Belief learning in pubic goods games: sophisticated strategics versus naive bayesians. (TI discussion paper 95-132). onbekend: Afdeling Algemene Economie. [details]

1995

  • Offerman, T. J. S., Sonnemans, J. H., & Schram, A. J. H. C. (1995). Value orientations, expectations, and voluntary contributions in public goods. (TI discussion paper 95-008). onbekend: Afdeling Algemene Economie. [details]
  • Sonnemans, J. H., Schram, A. J. H. C., & Offerman, T. J. S. (1995). Public good provision and public bad prevention: the effect of framing. (TI discussion paper 95-009). onbekend: Afdeling Algemene Economie. [details]

2012

  • Offerman, T., Onderstal, S., & Poort, J. (2012). Advies: Veiling van vergunningen 800, 900, 1800 MHz: antwoord op vragen Ministerie van Economische Zaken, Landbouw en Innovatie, DG Energie Telecom en Markten. Amsterdam: Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Research in Experimental Economics and Political Decision Making [etc.]. [details]

2017

  • He, S. (2017). Cooperation, coordination and competition: Theory and experiments [details] [PDF]

2015

  • Kopányi-Peuker, A. G. (2015). Endogeneity matters: Essays on cooperation and coordination Tinbergen Institute: Amsterdam [details / files]
  • van Leeuwen, B. (2015). Cooperation, networks and emotions: Three essays in behavioral economics Amsterdam: Tinbergen Institute [details] [PDF]

2012

2010

1996

  • Offerman, T. J. S. (1996). Beliefs and decision rules in public good games Amsterdam: UvA [details]

2015

  • He, S., Offerman, T., & van de Ven, J. (2015). The sources of the communication gap. Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam. [details]
  • Hu, X., Offerman, T., & Zou, L. (2015). How Risk Sharing May Enhance Efficiency in English Auctions[details]
  • Kopányi-Peuker, A., Offerman, T., & Sloof, R. (2015). Team production benefits from a permanent fear of exclusion. (CREED working paper). Amsterdam: Center for Research in Experimental Economics and Political Decsion Making, Universiteit van Amsterdam. [details] [PDF]
  • Kopányi-Peuker, A., Offerman, T., & Sloof, R. (2015). Team production benefits from a permanent fear of exclusion. (Tinbergen Institute discussion paper; No. TI 2015-067/VII). Amsterdam: Tinbergen Institute. [details] [PDF]
  • de Groot Ruiz, A., Offerman, T., & Onderstal, S. (2015). Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games. (Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper; No. TI 2015-012/VII). Amsterdam/Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute. [details]
  • van Leeuwen, B., Offerman, T., & Schram, A. (2015). Competition for status creates superstars: an experiment on public good provision and network formation. Toulouse/Amsterdam: IAST, Toulouse School of Economics/CREED, University of Amsterdam. [details]

2014

  • van Leeuwen, B., Noussair, C. N., Offerman, T., Suetens, S., van Veelen, M., & van de Ven, J. (2014). Predictably angry: facial cues provide a credible signal of destructive behavior. Toulouse: Institute for Advanced Study. [details]

2013

  • Hu, A., Offerman, T. J. S., & Zou, L. (2013). How Risk Sharing May Enhance Efficiency in English Auctions. University of Amsterdam. [details]
  • Kopányi-Peuker, A. G., Offerman, T. J. S., & Sloof, R. (2013). Fostering Cooperation Through the Enhancement of Own Vulnerability. University of Amsterdam. [details]
  • Kopányi-Peuker, A., Offerman, T., & Sloof, R. (2013). Fostering cooperation through the enhancement of own vulnerability. Amsterdam: CREED, University of Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute. [details] [PDF]
  • Offerman, T., & Palley, A. (2013). Lossed in Translation: An Off-the-Shelf Method to Recover Probabilistic Beliefs from Loss-Averse Agents. (CREED Working Papers). Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam. [details]
  • Offerman, T., & van der Veen, A. (2013). How to Subsidize Contributions to Public Goods: Does the Frog Jump Out of the Boiling Water? (CREED Working Papers). University of Amsterdam. [details]
  • de Groot Ruiz, A. W., Offerman, T. J. S., & Onderstal, A. M. (2013). Equilibrium Selection in Cheap Talk Games: ACDC Rocks When Other Criteria Remain Silent. University of Amsterdam. [details]
  • de Groot Ruiz, A. W., Offerman, T. J. S., & Onderstal, A. M. (2013). Power and the Privilege of Clarity: An Analysis of Bargaining Power and Information Transmission. University of Amsterdam. [details]
  • de Haan, T., Offerman, T. J. S., & Sloof, R. (2013). Discrimination in the Labor Market: the Curse of Competition between Workers. University of Amsterdam. [details]
  • de Haan, T., Offerman, T. J. S., & Sloof, R. (2013). Money Talks? An Experimental Investigation of Cheap Talk and Burned Money. University of Amsterdam. [details]
  • van Leeuwen, B., Offerman, T., & Schram, A. (2013). Superstars need social benefits: an experiment on network formation. (Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper; No. TI 2013-112/I). Tinbergen Institute. [details] [PDF]
  • Nosenzo, D., Offerman, T. J. S., Sefton, M., & van der Veen, A. (2013). Discretionary Sanctions and Rewards in the Repeated Inspection Game. University of Amsterdam. [details]

2012

  • Hu, A., Offerman, T., & Zou, L. (2012). How risk sharing may enhance efficiency in English auctions. (CREED Working Papers). Amsterdam: Universiteit van Amsterdam. [details]
  • Kopányi-Peuker, A., Offerman, T., & Sloof, R. (2012). Fostering cooperation through the enhancement of own vulnerability. (CREED Working Paper). Amsterdam: Center for Research in Experimental Economics and Political Decision Making, Universiteit van Amsterdam. [details]
  • Kopányi-Peuker, A., Offerman, T., & Sloof, R. (2012). Fostering cooperation through the enhancement of own vulnerability. (Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper; No. TI 2012-132/1). Amsterdam: Tinbergen Institute. [details]
  • de Groot Ruiz, A., Offerman, T., & Onderstal, S. (2012). An experimental study of credible deviations and ACDC. (CREED Working Papers). Amsterdam: Universiteit van Amsterdam. [details]
  • de Groot Ruiz, A., Offerman, T., & Onderstal, S. (2012). Equilibrium selection in cheap talk games: ACDC rocks when other criteria remain silent. (CREED Working Papers). Amsterdam: Universiteit van Amsterdam. [details]
  • de Groot Ruiz, A., Offerman, T., & Onderstal, S. (2012). Power and the privilege of clarity: an analysis of bargaining power and information transmission. (CREED Working Papers). Amsterdam: Universiteit van Amsterdam. [details] [PDF]
  • de Haan, T., Offerman, T., & Sloof, R. (2012). Discrimination in the labor market: the curse of competition between workers. (CREED Working Papers). Amsterdam: Universiteit van Amsterdam. [details]
  • de Haan, T., Offerman, T., & Sloof, R. (2012). Money talks? An experimental investigation of cheap talk and burned money. (CREED Working papers). Amsterdam: Universiteit van Amsterdam. [details] [PDF]
  • Nosenzo, D., Offerman, T. J. S., Sefton, M., & van der Veen, A. (2012). Discretionary sanctions and rewards in the repeated inspection game. (CREED Working Papers). Amsterdam: Universiteit van Amsterdam. [details]
  • Nosenzo, D., Offerman, T., Sefton, M., & van der Veen, A. (2012). Encouraging compliance: bonuses versus fines in inspection games. (CREED Working Papers). Amsterdam: Universiteit van Amsterdam. [details]

2011

  • de Groot Ruiz, A., Offerman, T., & Onderstal, S. (2011). An experimental study of credible deviations and ACDC. (Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper; No. TI 2011-153/1). Amsterdam / Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institue. [details]
  • de Groot Ruiz, A., Offerman, T., & Onderstal, S. (2011). Equilibrium selection in cheap talk games: ACDC rocks when other criteria remain silent. (Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper; Vol. TI 2011-037/1). Amsterdam / Rotterdan: Tinbergen Institute. [details]
  • de Groot Ruiz, A., Offerman, T., & Onderstal, S. (2011). Power and the privilege of clarity: an analysis of bargaining power and information transmission. (Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper; No. TI 2011-055/1). Amsterdam / Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute. [details]
  • de Haan, T., Offerman, T., & Sloof, R. (2011). Discrimination in the labor market: the curse of competition between workers. (Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper; No. TI2011-174/1). Amsterdam/Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute. [details]
  • de Haan, T., Offerman, T., & Sloof, R. (2011). Money talks? An experimental investigation of cheap talk and burned money. (Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper; No. TI2011-069/1). Amsterdam/Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute. [details]
  • de Haan, T., Offerman, T., & Sloof, R. (2011). Money talks? An experimental investigation of cheap talk and burned money. Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam, School of Economics. [details] [PDF]
  • Nosenzo, D., Offerman, T. J. S., Sefton, M., & van der Veen, A. (2011). Encouraging compliance: bonuses verses fines. Amsterdam: Universiteit van Amsterdam. [details]

2010

  • Goeree, J. K., Offerman, T. J. S., & Sloof, R. (2010). Demand Reduction and Preemptive Bidding in License Auctions. Universiteit van Amsterdam. [details]
  • Hu, X., Offerman, T. J. S., & Zou, L. (2010). Premium Auctions and Risk Preferences. Universiteit van Amsterdam. [details]
  • Offerman, T. J. S., & van der Veen, A. (2010). How to subsidize contributions to public goods - Does the frog jump out of the boiling water? Universiteit van Amsterdam. [details]
  • de Groot Ruiz, A., Offerman, T., & Onderstal, S. (2010). Equilibrium selection in cheap talk games: ACDC rocks when other criteria remain silent. (CREED working paper). Amsterdam: Center for Research in Experimental Economics and Political Decision making. [details]
  • de Haan, T., Offerman, T. J. S., & Sloof, R. (2010). Noisy Signaling: Theory and Experiment. Universiteit van Amsterdam. [details]
  • Nosenzo, D., Offerman, T. J. S., Sefton, M., & van der Veen, A. (2010). Inducing Good Behavior: Bonuses versus Fines in Inspection Games. Universiteit van Amsterdam. [details]

2009

  • Goeree, J. K., Offerman, T., & Sloof, R. (2009). Demand reduction and preemptive bidding in multi-unit license auctions. (Working Paper Series; No. 430). Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam. [details] [PDF]
  • Offerman, T., & van der Veen, A. (2009). How to subsidize contributions to public goods: Does the frog jump out of the boiling water? Amsterdam: Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde. [details]
  • de Haan, T., Offerman, T., & Sloof, R. (2009). Noisy signaling: theory and experiment. Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam. [details]
  • Fong, Y., Huang, C-Y., & Offerman, T. (2009). Guilt driven reciprocity in a psychological signaling game. Amsterdam: Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde. [details]
  • Hu, A., Offerman, T., & Onderstal, S. (2009). Fighting collusion in auctions: an experimental investigation. onbekend: Afdeling Algemene Economie. [details]
  • Hu, A., Offerman, T., & Zou, L. (2009). A theory of premium auctions. Amsterdam: Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde. [details]

2008

  • Goeree, J. K., Offerman, T., & Sloof, R. (2008). Demand reduction and preemptive bidding in multi-unit license auctions. Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam. [details]
  • Offerman, T., & Schotter, A. (2008). Imitation and luck: an experimental study on social sampling. Amsterdam: Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde. [details]

2007

  • Offerman, T., & Schotter, A. (2007). Imitation and luck: an experimental study on social sampling. (C.E.S.S. working paper series; No. 0020). Center for Experimental Social Science: New York. [details]
  • Offerman, T., Sonnemans, J., van de Kuilen, G., & Wakker, P. P. (2007). A truth-serum for non-Bayesians : correcting proper scoring rules for risk attitudes. Amsterdam: Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde. [details]
  • de Haan, T., Offerman, T. J. S., & Sloof, R. (2007). What is the informational impact of randomness in signaling costs? Theory and experiment. Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam. [details]
  • Fong, Y., Huang, C-Y., & Offerman, T. J. S. (2007). Guilt driven reciprocity in a psychological signaling game. (Discussion Paper, University of Amsterdam). Amsterdam: Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde. [details]
  • Fong, Y., Huang, C-Y., & Offerman, T. (2007). Guilt driven reciprocity in a psychological signaling game. (Working Paper University of Amsterdam). Amsterdam: Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde. [details]
  • Hu, A., Offerman, T., & Onderstal, S. (2007). Fighting collusion in auctions: an experimental investigation. (Working Paper University of Amsterdam). Amsterdam: Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde. [details]

2006

  • Goeree, J. K., Offerman, T. J. S., & Sloof, R. (2006). Demand Reduction and Preemptive Bidding in License Auctions. Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam. [details]
  • Offerman, T. J. S., & Schotter, A. (2006). Sampling for Information or Sampling for Imitation: An Experiment on Social Learning with Information on Ranks. (Working Paper). Amsterdam: Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde. [details]
  • Offerman, T. J. S., & Onderstal, S. (2006). Making Uncompetitive Auctions Computitive: A Survey of Experiments. (Working Paper). Amsterdam: Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde. [details]
  • van de Kuilen, G., Offerman, T. J. S., Sonnemans, J. H., & Wakker, P. P. (2006). Correcting Proper Scoring Rules for Nonlinear Risk Attitudes. (Working Paper). Amsterdam: Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde. [details]
  • Eliaz, K., Offerman, T. J. S., & Schotter, A. (2006). Creating competition Out of Tin Air: Market Thickening and right-To-Choose Auctions. (New York University Working Paper). Amsterdam: Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde. [details]
  • Fong, Y., Huang, C., & Offerman, T. J. S. (2006). Guilt Driven Reciprocity. (UvA Working Paper). Amsterdam: Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde. [details]

2005

  • Offerman, T. J. S., & Onderstal, A. M. (2005). Making Uncompetitive Auctions Competitive: A Survey of Experiments. Amsterdam: Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde. [details]

2001

  • Goeree, J. K., & Offerman, T. J. S. (2001). Making Uncompetitive Auctions Competitive: An Experimental Studie. CREED Working Paper. [details]

2000

  • Goeree, J. K., & Offerman, T. J. S. (2000). Efficiency in auctions with private and common values: An experimental study. (Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper; No. TI 2000-045/1). Amsterdam / Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute. [details]
  • Goeree, J. K., & Offerman, T. J. S. (2000). News and Winner's Curses in Second-Price Auctions: An Experimental Study. CREED Working Paper. [details]
This list of publications is extracted from the UvA-Current Research Information System. Questions? Ask the library or the Pure staff of your faculty / institute. Log in to Pure to edit your publications.
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