

## **Basic Motives in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking: Actor Types and Examples from the Peloponnesian War**

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### **Abstract**

One of the most important developments in the study of international relations and foreign policy over the last twenty-five years has been the growing emphasis granted to the role played in decisionmaking by actors' perceptions of their situations as well as by their motives and goals. As important as these efforts are, they have been eschewed by many on the grounds that the theories they draw on lack the parsimony required to conduct empirical research. More recently, however, we are beginning to develop theoretically informed yet manageable classifications for many of these psychological factors and to explicitly link them to concrete types of behavior in such a way that the resulting hypotheses become more amenable to empirical testing.

The authors of this study have developed a new approach to the study of the role of actors' motivation in foreign policymaking. Our framework is based on three basic motivational categories associated with the goals of power, achievement, and affiliation, respectively. It establishes propositions concerning the range of basic perceptual orientations which are associated with each of these motive categories, as well as concerning analogous ranges of general goals and preferred policy strategies. This study summarizes this framework and develops, based on the three motivational dimensions suggested, a classification system comprised of eight distinct types of foreign policymaking orientation. It then proceeds to illustrate these types in some detail by examining the policy positions held by crucial decision makers during the Peloponnesian War, as recounted by Thucydides. It is shown that the distinctions suggested by our framework can structure our understanding of the systematic role played by basic motives in foreign policy choice.

### **1. The Role of Basic Motives in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking**

The study of the roles played by so-called psychological factors in the conduct of international relations and in foreign policy choice is severely disadvantaged by the sheer number of relevant variables and the complexity of their interaction. For example, it is difficult to clearly distinguish actors' motives from their goals, or their goals from their strategic choices. It is even more difficult to assess the impact of preferences on choice independently from the impact of perceptions. However, a knowledge of the challenges involved should not lead us to neglect the roles of such obviously crucial factors in decisionmaking as the basic stable needs and preferences, or motives, of the relevant actors. It should instead inspire us to develop approaches to their study which aim to balance the methodological requirements of parsimony

and operationalizability with the task of achieving empirical plausibility.<sup>2</sup> The approach outlined and illustrated here is intended to make a contribution to this end.<sup>3</sup>

It has been common for psychological as well as political psychological approaches to the study of motivation to classify the range of general behavioral motives into three categories. In the well-known terminology employed by David McClelland, these three basic motivational categories are comprised of power motives, achievement motives, and affiliation motives, respectively.<sup>4</sup> A survey of the major schools of international relations and foreign policy theory reveals that each tends to emphasize one of these motive complexes at the expense of the others. The paradigm of realism, including its neorealist variant, emphasizes the motive of fear and the corresponding goal of security through power; liberal and neoliberal theory emphasizes the achievement motive and the corresponding goal of prosperity through the pursuit of self-interest; and sociological institutionalist and constructivist approaches emphasize affiliative motivation and the corresponding goal of community through adaptation and social recognition.

Elsewhere we have developed a framework for the study of the role of motivation in foreign policy decisionmaking which takes into account all three basic motivational categories.<sup>5</sup> We will refer to them here as fear, interest, and recognition and to the associated goals as security, prosperity, and community. The central theoretical contention on which this framework is based is that differences in actors' motivational dispositions form one primary dimension of variance for each of the three motives. This dimension can be described in terms of polar differences (1) in actors' perceptual dispositions, (2) in their choice of general goals, and (3) in their choice of general strategies to achieve their goals. In other words, we believe that the

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<sup>2</sup> For example, Margaret Hermann and Thomas Preston show how motivation affects perception and decision-making style. See their "Presidents, Advisors, and Foreign Policy: the Effect of Leadership Style on Executive Arrangements," *Political Psychology* 15/1, 1994, and Margaret Hermann, Thomas Preston, Baghat Korany, and Timothy Shaw, "Who Leads Matters: The Effects of Powerful Individuals," *International Studies Review* 3/2, 2001. Others show how cognitive and situational factors interact. See Richard Herrmann, Philip Tetlock, and Penny Visser, "Mass Public Decisions to Go to War: A Cognitive-Interactionist Framework," *American Political Science Review* 93, 1999.

<sup>3</sup> For a fuller treatment of our approach see \_\_\_\_, "The Impact of Basic Motivation on Foreign Policy Opinions Concerning the Use of Force: A Three-Dimensional Framework," in Philip Everts and Pierangelo Isernia (eds.), *When the Going Gets Tough: Democracy, Public Opinion and the International Use of Force* (London: Routledge, 2000) and \_\_\_\_, "Chiefly for Fear, Next for Honour, and Lastly for Profit: An Analysis of Foreign Policy Motivation in the Peloponnesian War," *Review of International Studies* 27/1, January 2001, pp. 69-90.

<sup>4</sup> See, for example, David McClelland, *Human Motivation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); David Winter, "Power, Affiliation, and War: Three Tests of a Motivational Model," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 65/3, 1993, pp. 532-545; and Bill Peterson et al., "Laboratory Tests of a Motivational-Perceptual Model of Conflict Escalation," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 38/4, 1994, pp. 719-748.

<sup>5</sup> See \_\_\_\_, "The Impact of Basic Motivation" and "Chiefly for Fear, Next for Honour, and Lastly for Profit."

variance associated with each of the three motives can be usefully conceptualized as arranged along one single dimension, a continuum which represents the entire range of dispositions decision makers bring to bear on the issues affected by the motive in question. Moreover, each of the ensuing three dimensions of foreign policy orientations is associated with analogous ranges of preferred ends and strategic means. We will take a brief look at each motive complex in turn.<sup>6</sup>

The motive of fear compels human beings to seek security in the form of protection from and advantage in conflicts with others and ensures immediate physical survival. The most important perceptual factor with respect to the motive of fear is the level of competitiveness of a given situation. Variance on this dimension thus captures actors' perceptions of relevant conditions as ranging from highly competitive to highly cooperative in nature. The positions foreign policy actors take towards possible security threats depend on these perceptual dispositions. Specifically, it is hypothesized that the more competitive an actor judges the relevant situation to be, the more serious the threat which will be perceived.

The foreign policy ends individuals hold with respect to the motive of fear reflect preferences analogous to this competitive-cooperative dimension. The most important factor in actors' choice of general goals with respect to the motive of fear is whether an actor seeks domination of or accommodation with potentially threatening others. It is hypothesized that the more competitive an actor perceives a potentially threatening situation to be, the more likely that actor is to seek superior relative power, domination at the extreme, as its foreign policy end. Vice versa, the more cooperative an actor perceives a potentially threatening situation to be, the more likely that actor is to seek mutual accommodation as its foreign policy end.

An actor's choice of security goals is related to its preferences for the strategic means used to obtain security. The most important strategic factor with respect to the motive of fear is whether an actor is inclined to employ coercive or noncoercive means. It is hypothesized that if a foreign policy actor strives for domination of others in order to obtain security, that actor will be more prepared to use or threaten force or other forms of pressure to reach its goal, that is to adopt coercive policies. Vice versa, an actor which seeks to ensure security through accommodation is more likely to prefer noncoercive methods, such as the promise of rewards or appeal to common norms, of dealing with security issues.

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<sup>6</sup> Once again, a full elaboration of our framework can be found in our earlier publications mentioned above.

Whereas fear arises from a perception of threats, the motive of interest arises from a perception of opportunities and of the net benefits associated with their pursuit. Whereas fear leads to concerns for security, opportunities for advancement (or the lack of such opportunities) require an actor to make choices about how best to provide for its prosperity. Foreign policy actors' responses to opportunities for the actualization of their interests depend on their perceptual dispositions concerning their relative strength. Variance on this dimension thus reflects the actor's perception of its status and capabilities in relation to other relevant actors.

Such perceptual dispositions are related to actors' prosperity goals. The most important factor in actors' choice of goals with respect to the motive of interest is whether an actor wants to interact with others or whether it wants to isolate itself from them. It is hypothesized that if an actor perceives itself as superior to relevant others in a material and a cultural sense, the actor will be more likely to seek interaction and to favor a foreign policy of interdependence. Vice versa, if an actor perceives itself as inferior in capabilities to relevant others, it will be more hesitant to interact and more likely to pursue a foreign policy of isolation.

The socio-economic goals of interdependence on the one hand and isolation on the other also affect the foreign policy means preferred by foreign policy actors. The most important strategic factor with respect to the motive of interest is whether an actor seeks to become actively involved or to adopt a low profile in the relevant context. It is hypothesized that an actor who expects not to be able to successfully compete in its environment and thus pursues the goal of isolation will be more likely to employ protectionist policies, or an anti-involvement strategy. Vice versa, an actor who expects to profit from exchanges with others, and thus favors interdependence, will be more likely to pursue a pro-involvement strategy in the relevant environment.

The motive of recognition is conceptualized to capture an actor's need to identify with and be accepted by larger communities, which can provide more protection and comfort than the actor would be able to secure for itself. In order to be part of such a community, an actor needs to accept and internalize, at least to some extent, that community's norms and rules of behavior. The most important perceptual factor with respect to the motive of recognition is whether a given actor perceives its relevant community to be more exclusive or more inclusive. Variance on this dimension thus reflects differences in actors' perceptions of the character and degree of openness of their own community.

This exclusive-inclusive dimension also defines actors' foreign policy ends. The most important factor in actors' choice of goals with respect to the motive of recognition is whether an actor seeks to be independent of others or to be united with them. It is hypothesized that foreign policy actors who perceive more exclusive identities will be more likely to strive for freedom and independence. Vice versa, those actors who perceive more inclusive identities will be more likely to establish ties with relevant others and to seek integration (including an element of equality).

Once again, the preferred general foreign policy goal helps us determine an actor's preferred strategic means. The most important strategic factor with respect to the motive of recognition is whether an actor prefers to act unilaterally or multilaterally. It is hypothesized that foreign policy actors who place a high value on their freedom and independence tend to act in a unilateral manner. Vice versa, foreign policy actors who stress the values of equality and integration prefer to act on a multilateral basis.

Since basic motivation influences the perceptions of individuals, their goal preferences, and their choice of strategic means, it provides some coherence to foreign policymaking. Of course, other factors such as external constraints and the actions of other parties have to be taken into account in the explanation and prediction of individual decisions. However, a knowledge of patterns of basic motivation is also helpful in identifying when and how these other factors need to be considered, and what impact they are likely to have.

## **2. Types of Actors**

We contend that all three of the motivational dimensions introduced above need to be taken into account in the explanation of any foreign policy decision, regardless of the issue at hand. Thus, we suggest that a knowledge of actors' dispositions with respect to all three basic motives is necessary to explain and predict foreign policy behavior. Given that each of our dimensions constitutes a continuum, there exists an infinite variety of possible combinations of motivational dispositions, reflecting the real-world variety of decisionmaker profiles. However, by establishing the possible combinations of extreme positions on the three motivational dimensions, assuming that these three dimensions are independent of one another, we can derive eight ideal types of actors, which can be used to illustrate our framework and to establish reference points for the approximate prediction of real-world foreign policy choices.

Each ideal type represents a unique combination of polar positions on each of our three dimensions. We can visualize these ideal foreign policymaker types as the eight corners of a standard cube, with the corner positions serving as reference points for the actual foreign policy orientations closest to them. Thus, if we have a basic understanding of each ideal type, we can more easily explain the real foreign policy choices made in its motivational “neighborhood.”

Although the cube image is helpful for understanding how we derive the eight ideal types, it is not useful for displaying the foreign policy orientations associated with them. In consequence, we will use an x-y-z matrix to display the foreign policy orientations characteristic of the eight ideal types.<sup>7</sup> These eight foreign policy orientations are shown in Figure 1. It does not matter whether we categorize actors with reference to their perceptual orientations, general goals, or preferred behavioral strategies, since we have posited that variation with respect to these different aspects of motivational disposition is captured by a single underlying dimension for each of the three motivational categories. Labeled, as is most common in foreign policy discourse, in terms of their preferred strategies, in this figure one letter refers to each dimension: M to the multilateral--unilateral dimension; C to the coercive--noncoercive dimension, and I to the pro-involvement--anti-involvement dimension. The letters M, C, and I (without being underlined) represent one pole on a dimension; the opposite pole is represented by M, C, and I, respectively. For example, MCI represents a foreign policy orientation that is multilateral, coercive, and pro-involvement, whereas MCI represents a foreign policy orientation that is unilateral, noncoercive, and anti-involvement.

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<sup>7</sup> These three dimensions are arranged so that multilateral foreign policy orientations appear on the left and unilateral orientations on the right. Because the x-y-z matrix is perceived as a cube opened-up to the left, like a book, the coercive foreign policy orientations are shown in the outside cells whereas the noncoercive cells are shown in the inside cells. Pro-involvement cells are at the top; anti-involvement cells are at the bottom.

**Figure 1: X-Y-Z Matrix Showing Eight Types of Foreign Policy Orientation**

	Multilateral		Unilateral	
	Coercive	Noncoercive	Noncoercive	Coercive
Pro-involvement	MCI	<u>MCI</u>	<u>MCI</u>	<u>MCI</u>
Anti-involvement	<u>MCI</u>	<u>MCI</u>	<u>MCI</u>	<u>MCI</u>

In the following, we will demonstrate how the use of this classificatory scheme can help to structure our understanding of the role played by actors' basic motivation in foreign policy choice. The expectation created by our theory is that, independent of the specific context and issue, an estimation of actors' perceptual orientations, general goals, or preferred strategies with respect to the three basic motives, which allows us to classify them as one of the above types, can help us to explain their policy choices.<sup>8</sup> It may also, wherever motivational dispositions remain stable, help us to predict their future decisions. In order to put these expectations to the test, however, it is necessary to develop criteria for the measurement or estimation of the relevant dispositions.

Along the coercive-noncoercive dimension, lessening degrees of coerciveness are characterized by (+4) the rejection of diplomacy as a legitimate or realistic means of conducting international affairs, (+3) the purposive use of military force to achieve objectives at odds with those of opponents, (+2) the prioritization of military assets and preparedness, and, finally, (+1) the preparation for and threat of the use of force to achieve policy goals.<sup>9</sup> Continuing along our dimension, increasing degrees of noncoerciveness are characterized by (-1) the prioritization of

<sup>8</sup> Statistical evidence for our theory is presented in \_\_\_\_, "The Impact of Basic Motivation."

<sup>9</sup> This numbering system indicates only order, not value. For purposes of quantitative analysis, our tools for assessment of orientation will need to be substantially refined.

ending or avoiding military conflicts, and, finally, (-2) a reliance on diplomacy instead of the preparation for or threat of military conflict and other forms of contests of power to achieve policy objectives.

An ideal-typical coercive policymaker would strongly prioritize the protection and maintenance of military assets, view diplomatic efforts with skepticism, be always prepared to threaten force to achieve his or her objectives, and be prepared to use force when success seems probable. In general, he or she would be willing to use military means and other forms of coercive pressure to further the national interest, even when not threatened. An ideal-typical noncoercive policymaker, on the other hand, would prefer even prolonged and costly negotiations to the threat of the use of force and avoid military conflict unless faced with the necessity of self-defense. During most of history, he or she would be an anti-imperialist and, during times of war, an advocate of making concessions with respect to the national interest in order to end the confrontation.

Along the pro-involvement--anti-involvement dimension, lessening degrees of pro-involvement orientation are characterized by (+2) the pursuit of increased activity and influence abroad for its own sake, and (+1) the engagement in and pursuit of activities abroad for specific purposes. Increasing anti-involvement orientation is characterized by (-1) only defensively motivated involvement abroad, (-2) a low international profile, and, finally, (-3) isolationism.

An ideal typical pro-involvement actor would strongly favor an active engagement abroad and the expansion of his or her nation's sphere of influence. In the context of war, this would mean military ventures and conquest. In peacetime, it would mean the expansion of economic or the pursuit of cultural or religious influence. An ideal-typical anti-involvement actor would be cautious and fearful of over-extension and generally disinclined towards engagement abroad. He or she would want to "lie low" and concentrate on domestic matters. When becoming active internationally, he or she would do so only defensively or as a necessary precautionary measure. It is clear that in order to qualify as an imperialist, an actor would have to be pro-involvement. However, he or she does not have to be coercively oriented - not all imperialism involves the use of force - nor a unilateralist, even though, historically speaking, that would be likely.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> The "classic" imperialist is an MCI type. It is illustrated by Lysander, Cleon, or Brasidas.

Along the multilateral-unilateral dimension, lessening degrees of multilateralism are characterized by (+3) the multilateral pursuit of collective goals, (+2) a search for collective arrangements, and (+1) a disinclination towards acting without allies or being internationally isolated. Continuing along our dimension, increasing unilateralism is characterized by (-1) a consistent prioritization of national interest and emphasis on national pride and (-2) an insistence on acting alone in external affairs.

An ideal-typical multilateralist would pursue regional security arrangements or alliances and favor collective action. In our historical context, he would be of the Panhellenic persuasion.<sup>11</sup> He would also on principle respect treaties with other cities, which the unilateralist would break if he believed it in his state's interest to do so. An ideal-typical unilateralist would identify strongly with his or her own nation and be motivated to further that nation's particular interests and status in the world.

The positions sketched above allow us to identify, for purposes of further illustration, well-known foreign policy concepts which fit these eight general foreign policy orientations. Collective security is an example of an MCI orientation; international law of an MCI orientation; free trade of an MCI orientation; pre-emptive strikes of an MCI orientation; mutual self-defense of an MCI orientation; civilian defense of an MCI orientation; isolationism of an MCI orientation; and homeland defense of an MCI orientation. These foreign policy concepts are classified in Figure 2.

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<sup>11</sup> It should be noted that the idea of Hellas was a fairly new and fragile one at the time, while ethnic and cultural rivalries had deep roots. In the complex inter-city system of 5th century BC Greece, the emphasis is usually on the independence of the city states, which compete and cooperate in a field of tension between loyalty to the polis on the one hand and Panhellenist sentiment on the other.

**Figure 2: X-Y-Z Matrix Showing Examples of Foreign Policy Orientation**

	Multilateral		Unilateral	
	Coercive	Noncoercive	Noncoercive	Coercive
Pro-involvement	Collective Security	International Law	Free Trade	Pre-emptive Strike
Anti-involvement	Mutual Self-defense	Civilian Defense	Isolationism	Homeland Defense

In a next step, which is beyond the scope of this article, the criteria for classification sketched above should be more thoroughly developed, making possible their operationalization and the testing of propositions derived from our framework. The main problem involved in operationalizing these rather abstract criteria designed to capture variation in basic motivation has to do with the context-sensitivity of measurement indicators. While it is possible to perceive of basic motivational dimensions as universally plausible constructs, the same is hardly true for our interpretations of actual decisions or behavior across widely divergent contexts. Constraints imposed by the time, place, and decisionmaking environment allow for varying strategies and means of expressing underlying motivation. For example, our coercive-noncoercive dimension is truncated by the context of the Peloponnesian War, as genuine noncoerciveness became practically unfeasible once the war had begun. As dimensions are thus compressed by external constraints, ever slighter differences in behavior become important for purposes of psychological classification.

The following section will bring to light some of the issues which are likely to prove relevant for the development of more specific criteria for the measurement of basic motivation. Primarily, however, its purpose is to "introduce" our eight ideal types of foreign policy orientation and to provide an illustration of how our classificatory scheme can be employed as a heuristic device in the study of foreign policy decisionmaking. To these ends we present

portrayals of eight figures of exalted importance in the Peloponnesian War, as recounted by Thucydides.<sup>12</sup> The *History of the Peloponnesian War* is still widely studied by both historians and political scientists concerned with international relations, the causes of war, and the conduct of foreign policy. Thucydides' quest for historical accuracy and his interest in the psychological causes of political decisions make his work an extraordinarily valuable source of historical data on the relationship between actors' motivational dispositions and their political intentions and behavior.

The bases for our classification of the individual actors in the *History* will be developed discursively, a method useful for demonstrating the challenges involved in the scientific study of psychological factors in political decisionmaking. One advantage of using classical figures for the purpose of illustrating these orientations is that many of the personalities presented here are famous (or infamous), and therefore our classifications are more likely to meet with informed disagreement. We also possess sufficient relevant data concerning their motives and decisions, provided by the *History* as well as a wealth of thorough and competitive scholarly analysis by means of which we may gauge the plausibility of our own interpretations. Moreover, the use of the Peloponnesian War as the historical context, the stage on which to present our characters, simplifies the task of introducing the relevant contextual factors.<sup>13</sup>

While we have established our theoretical types on the basis of motivational predisposition, we are now faced with the necessity of classifying historical individuals on the basis of their statements and behavior. Clearly, we can expect the historical evidence to be less categorical than our theoretical expectations. It must be emphasized that the individuals presented possess complex personalities, clearly do not always argue or behave in the same way, and sometimes even change basic motivational dispositions in response to dramatic experiences

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<sup>12</sup> For an overview of Thucydides' *History* see Frank Adcock, *Thucydides and His History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963); Paul Woodruff, *Thucydides on Justice, Power, and Human Nature* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993); or John Finley, *Thucydides* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1963). For a more detailed treatment, see Robert Connor, *Thucydides* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984) or Clifford Orwin, *The Humanity of Thucydides* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994). Elsewhere, we have examined the role of basic foreign policy motives in the same conflict, not with respect to specific figures (types) but with respect to important policies. See "Chiefly for Fear, Next for Honour, and Lastly for Profit."

<sup>13</sup> The reason we use historical figures at all, as opposed to invented, imaginary personages, is that we can employ history as a narrative context and use known positions and actions to show how real decisionmakers may be characterized and their motives understood. The Peloponnesian War is an ideal context for our purposes. While long past, it still arouses extraordinary interest among students of politics. The insights of Thucydides appear of timeless value. Moreover, compared with recent major conflicts, its interpretation is less complicated by contesting ideologies and, as a "chapter" of history, it is more easily distinguished from other contexts.

or personal development. It is, for example, as Donald Kagan has pointed out, "well to remember that the Pericles of the 450s is not the same man who dominated Athens after the ostracism of Thucydides, son of Melesias, in 443."<sup>14</sup> We have selected particular episodes in the lives of our historical individuals to illustrate our types, and we classify them only with respect to particular policies.<sup>15</sup> One could argue that our choice of classical figures to illustrate general foreign policy orientations should be guided by the notion that each of the personalities chosen can represent a pure type. The problem is that there are no perfectly clear examples of ideal types. Cleon as a rather clear MCI type is perhaps an exception in this respect. With some of the other figures, such as Thucydides, son of Melesias, about whom we have little information, we take some liberty of interpretation which, as we acknowledge, may be discomforting to historians.

It may be argued that our "historical figures" are merely artificial constructs designed to illustrate our foreign policy orientations. However, we believe that our orientations are not only brought to life by being cast the way they are, but that they also serve to bring to life the individuals whose choices we would ultimately wish to be able to explain. Even though our categorizations will remain debatable, as, naturally, different commentators suggest different interpretations of the actors' statements and behavior, we try to do our actors justice by presenting plausible categorizations and backing them up with evidence. In order to capture our foreign policy orientations, we combine information on the relevant individuals' actions, goals, and strategies in situational analysis, or historical context. Our illustrations are thus designed to be not only as dramatic but also as believable as possible.<sup>16</sup>

### **3. Illustrations from the Peloponnesian War**

The actors we will encounter operate in the following historical context: After having fought side by side to successfully thwart the second Persian invasion of 480 BC, Athens and Sparta emerge as rivals for hegemony in Greece. Sparta possesses the strongest land army of all Greek cities and is the leader of the Peloponnesian, or Lacedaemonian, League, an alliance of independent states which encompasses most of the major land powers of the Peloponnese and central Greece, as well as the sea power Corinth. Between 460 and 446, the Athens-led Delian

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<sup>14</sup> Donald Kagan, *The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1969), p. 68.

<sup>15</sup> Our study of commentaries on Thucydides' text has focused on the relevant historical situations.

<sup>16</sup> It is clear that otherwise the doubt cast on our historical knowledge by the artificiality of our categorizations would detract from the persuasiveness of our framework.

League, which includes most island and coastal states around the northern and eastern shores of the Aegean Sea, grows steadily in power and is transformed by Athens into an empire.<sup>17</sup> As the Athenian empire grows and Athens emerges as the strongest naval power in Greece, clashes of interest with Sparta and its allies become more frequent. Fighting erupts between the two alliances, and, in 446, Athens is pushed to give up most of her new gains in territory under the Thirty Years' peace treaty.<sup>18</sup>

Continued hostility between the two cities reaches critical levels again only thirteen years later. In a passage which is often referred to as the "Athenian thesis," an Athenian delegation visiting Sparta in 432 defends the imperialist ambitions of Athens by claiming that they have been "forced to advance [their] dominion to what it is, out of the nature of the thing itself; as chiefly for fear, next for honour, and lastly for profit."<sup>19</sup> They explain further: "...Though overcome by three the greatest things [sic], honour, fear, and profit, we have both accepted the dominion delivered us and refuse again to surrender it, we have therein done nothing to be wondered at nor beside the manner of men."<sup>20</sup>

The term used by the Athenians for the concept of fear, *deos*, indicates a lasting state of alarm as opposed to a sudden fright. It can also mean the possession of a reason to fear or of a means to inspire fear in others, thus pointing to perceived requirements of preparation for the possibility of conflict (*paraskeue*).<sup>21</sup> While the exact meaning of the term, as it is used by the Athenians, is, of course, debatable today, one can safely say this much: Thucydides has the Athenians acknowledge that fear is one of the main psychological driving forces in relations among states. States try to protect themselves from others. They also try to inspire fear in others, so as to deter them from attacking. Thucydides states clearly that the true cause of the Peloponnesian War consisted in Athenian imperialism paired with Spartan fear: "And the truest

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<sup>17</sup> The year 454 marks a significant step in the consolidation of the empire, as Athens moves the treasury of the Delian League from Delos to Athens.

<sup>18</sup> This first period of open hostility between Athens and Sparta is sometimes referred to as the First Peloponnesian War. We are here concerned with the Second Peloponnesian War, which lasts from 431 to 404 BC.

<sup>19</sup> Thucydides (Thuc.) I.75. Translation: *Hobbes's Thucydides*, ed. Richard Schlatter (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1975), p. 70.

<sup>20</sup> Thuc. I.76. *Hobbes's Thucydides*, p. 70.

<sup>21</sup> Gregory Crane (ed.), *The Perseus Project*, <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu>, accessed June 1999. In a study of the concept of "preparedness" (*paraskeue*) in the *History*, June Allison finds that Thucydides uses the word 104 times, compared to the eleven times it appears in the combined works of his contemporaries. She shows that an understanding of the role of *paraskeue*, which includes the dynamic elements of gaining, actualizing and demonstrating power, plays an important role in Thucydides' explanations for the war. See her *Power and Preparedness in Thucydides* (Baltimore, NM: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989).

quarrel, though least in speech, I conceive to be the growth of the Athenian power; which putting the Lacedaemonians into fear necessitated the war."<sup>22</sup>

The next important motive operating in relations among states, according to the Athenians, is the desire for "profit." The term used by Thucydides, *ophelia*, can mean profit or material advantage as well as a source of gains, especially of gains made in war.<sup>23</sup> However, and especially in Thucydidean usage, it also refers to material aid or support in war,<sup>24</sup> meaning that the Athenians may have tried to indicate that they were not just greedy for riches but that they were trying to gather allies so as to make themselves more secure. This interpretation makes sense, given the fact that the purpose of the Athenian speech was to excuse Athenian expansionism in the eyes of her rivals. Clearly, defensive motivation must have been considered less objectionable than offensive motives for imperialistic policies. According to Lisa Kallet-Marx, moreover, financial surplus, *periousia chrematon*, was at the time perceived as the key to the successful maintenance of a naval empire.<sup>25</sup> The rational use (expenditure) of such a surplus would strengthen and secure Athens.<sup>26</sup> Once again, it is possible to establish an interpretive minimum consensus: The Athenians acknowledge the role played in interstate relations by the realization that security has an economic component. States need a minimum of resources simply to survive. Moreover, a quest for greater security inspires the search for material advantage, since such an advantage is a component of superior power.

The third motive acknowledged by the Athenians defies straightforward translation. The term used for "honor," *time*, clearly has normative as well as material connotations.<sup>27</sup> The normative aspect of *time* refers to the ethical character of an actor (*euethes*). According to Mary Francis Williams, ethical behavior in ancient Greece emphasizes "honor, alliances, treaties, arbitration, just dealing, fair judgments, moderation, and to some extent, self-control."<sup>28</sup> "Only

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<sup>22</sup> Thuc. I.23. *Hobbes's Thucydides*, p. 42. The term translated here as "fear" is not *deos* but *phobos*, which may also be translated as "panic," or "acute fear." See Crane (ed.), *The Perseus Project*.

<sup>23</sup> The various semantic connotations of the concept of *ophelia* add up to an idea surprisingly similar to the modern concept of rational self-interest.

<sup>24</sup> Crane (ed.), *The Perseus Project*.

<sup>25</sup> Lisa Kallet-Marx, *Money, Expense, and Naval Power in Thucydides' 1-5.24* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 12.

<sup>26</sup> At least according to Thucydides, who believed that a passion for possession and display of wealth for its own sake would instead have a corrosive effect on the empire. See Lisa Kallet, *Money and the Corrosion of Power in Thucydides: The Sicilian Expedition and Its Aftermath* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).

<sup>27</sup> Crane (ed.), *The Perseus Project*.

<sup>28</sup> Mary Frances Williams, *Ethics in Thucydides: The Ancient Simplicity* (New York: University Press of America, 1998), p. 88.

*euethes* can restrain violence”, and our historical actors are “judged in terms of the prudence they exercise in pursuing values, such as respect for the law.”<sup>29</sup> Linking normative with material aspects, however, *time* also refers to public esteem or elevated official position acquired through contribution to the success and glory of the community. For a leader of the Athenian people in their imperialist heyday, when communal glory was clearly identified with the city's position of hegemonic sovereignty (*arche*), giving up the pursuit of hegemony clearly would have been a “dishonorable” thing to do. The double meaning of the word suggests a lack of clear semantic separation of the abstract concept of honor (as bestowed upon an individual or group) from its material rewards. Moreover, there is an inherent tension within the concept, as *time* might lead actors to pursue moderation (*euethes*) as well as expansionism in search for recognition.

Interestingly, the three motives of the Athenian thesis are analogous to the three basic motivational categories of fear, interest, and recognition on which our theory is based.<sup>30</sup> This may serve as an initial indication that these three motives, at least according to Thucydides, are of crucial relevance in the context of Athenian foreign policy making. If it is true that to act based on such motives is “nothing to be wondered at nor beside the manner of men,”<sup>31</sup> we may assume the motives themselves to be universal. This does not mean, however, that decisionmakers are always and everywhere identically motivated. Instead, we hold that the same basic motives operate differently in different individuals, depending on their perceptual, preferential, and strategic dispositions, that is, on their positions on the three motivational dimensions introduced above.

In the following pages, we will introduce eight historical actors, each of whom, in his specific circumstances, illustrates one of our eight foreign policy orientations. Because Thucydides uses antitheses so effectively in the *History*, we can group these actors into four pairs with diametrically opposed positions on all three motivational dimensions. Each of these pairs of decisionmakers operates within one of four different phases of the conflict. Our choice of actors is designed to allow us to examine foreign policy decisionmaking across specific decisionmaking

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<sup>29</sup> Williams, *Ethics in Thucydides*, pp. 158, 198.

<sup>30</sup> Thomas Hobbes adopts the same motive categories as crucial elements in his own political theory. See his *Leviathan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). The reasoning of the Athenians, resurrected in his works, became the foundation of the realist paradigm of international relations theory. See, for example, Laurie Johnson, *Thucydides, Hobbes, and the Interpretation of Realism* (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1993).

<sup>31</sup> Thuc. I.76. *Hobbes's Thucydides*, p. 70.

contexts within the relevant historical period as well as to employ sharply contrasting positions to clarify our conceptual categories.

### **Phase 1: Before the Second Peloponnesian War: Pericles and Thucydides in Athens**

In the following passage we will contrast the positions of Pericles and Thucydides, son of Melesias, both politicians in Athens in 433.<sup>32</sup> Pericles is the foremost leader of democratic Athens. Thucydides, son of Melesias, is the leader of the Athenian oligarchs and his arch-rival. Not much is known about Thucydides at this point in time, as he has just returned home after a period of ostracism imposed ten years earlier.<sup>33</sup> However, we might gain a clearer understanding of his views by taking a quick glance at the period immediately before his exile, when the rivalry between Thucydides and Pericles was at its height, and considering their positions vis-à-vis the colony of Thurii.<sup>34</sup> The Greek city of Thurii was founded in 443 in Lucania in southern Italy near the site of the ancient city of Sybaris, which had been destroyed over 60 years earlier. It was built by the remaining Sybarites together with colonists from all parts of Greece, but especially from Athens. The Greeks soon expelled the remaining Italians, and the city grew to become one of the most important Greek centers in southern Italy. According to the historian Henry Wade-Gery, Pericles was not elected general in 444 and thus the planning of the expedition to found Thurii fell to his rival Thucydides.<sup>35</sup> Wade-Gery argues that it was Thucydides who invited the Peloponnesians to share in the colony and attempted to set it on a Panhellenic path. However, he was then ostracized and the result of his removal from office was a return to Athenian domination in Thurii. With the return to power of Pericles, Athens turned its back on peaceful Panhellenism and resumed its imperial ambitions.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> This Thucydides is not the author of the *History*.

<sup>33</sup> See David Cartwright, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), p. 119.

<sup>34</sup> Thucydides' *History* does not cover the issue of Thurii. For information see, for example, Donald Kagan, *Pericles of Athens and the Birth of Democracy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), pp. 125-132.

<sup>35</sup> Henry Wade-Gery, *Essays in Greek History* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958).

<sup>36</sup> See also Kagan, *The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War*, esp. pp. 159 and 168-169, and Arnold Gomme et al., *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1945), pp. 385-7. Gomme questions Wade-Gery's emphasis on the fact that Pericles was not elected general in 444, arguing that such temporary loss of office was neither uncommon nor very significant. Kagan agrees with Gomme concerning the significance of the generalship. He argues that Pericles himself pursued Panhellenic policies, but that he pursued them largely to counter Thucydides' criticisms and to appease Thucydides' followers. Kagan thus indirectly supports the idea of Thucydides' Panhellenist outlook.

Ten years later, in 433, the issue of contention between the two politicians is a potential Athenian alliance with Corcyra. Corcyra is a city-state on the island of Corfu and a strategically important colony of Corinth, which itself is a prominent member of the Peloponnesian League. After Athens and Corinth, Corcyra is at the time the third leading naval power in Greece. The Corcyreans and the Corinthians have become embroiled in a conflict over the control of an even smaller colony, Epidamnus, which has ties with both Corinth and Corcyra. Surprisingly, Corcyra has won the first naval engagement with Corinth, and Corinth is now preparing a counterattack on Corcyra with a much larger force. In anticipation of the coming struggle, Corcyra seeks the help of Athens.<sup>37</sup>

The Corcyreans, who are neutrals under the Thirty Years' Peace agreement, argue that Athens should not risk losing the support of their navy, the third largest in Greece, at a time when it can reasonably expect to become involved in a war with both Sparta and Corinth. Instead, Athens should come to the aid of Corcyra now in order to ensure that Corcyra will, in turn, be inclined to help the Athenians in the future. An alliance with the powerful Corcyra would offer Athens new opportunities and having the Corcyrean navy on her side would improve the Athenian position in an eventual conflict with Corinth. In essence, the Corcyreans appeal to Athenian self-interest by arguing that Athens would be better off making new friends than keeping old ones, if her new friends can be more useful for her, and by pointing out the advantages of the proposed alliance.

The Corinthians, who are still legally "friends" of Athens according to the treaty, do not question the facts as presented by the Corcyreans. However, they argue that if the Athenians want to remain on good terms with Corinth, Athens must not ally itself with Corinth's enemies, the Corcyreans. The Corinthians know that Athenian public opinion is polarized into factions led by Thucydides and Cleon, respectively. Thucydides and the oligarchs oppose the alliance with Corcyra whereas the young Cleon and his supporters want a full offensive alliance.<sup>38</sup> The Corinthians attempt to sway Athens in their favor by pointing out that they should be "friends" because that is the way things have been and that is what is written in the treaty. Their ethical

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<sup>37</sup> For the debate over the Corcyrean Alliance see Thuc. I.32-44.

<sup>38</sup> Cleon, who will replace Pericles as the leader of the war party in Athens, is an MCI actor, unilateralist, coercive, and pro-involvement. He favors an active imperialist policy. He is a unilateralist, because he identifies strongly and exclusively with Athens. He is a coercive actor, because he is always likely to use or threaten force. He is pro-involvement, because he consistently wants to extend war into others' territory. (An example is the Pylos

arguments find support with Thucydides and his followers who want to avoid war by appeasing Corinth. In order to garner additional support, they further contend that Athens owes them a favor, since they did not intervene in favor of one of Athens' subject cities, when it revolted against Athens. The Corinthian argument implies that Athens and Corinth can remain on friendly terms only if both states abide by the principle of noninterference established and the alliance structures prescribed by the present treaty.

At the end of a first day of debate, the Athenian assembly is evenly divided on the issue. If war could be avoided, Athens should try not to alienate Corinth. However, if war was inevitable, then it would not be wise to allow Corinth to destroy the Corcyrean fleet. At this point, Pericles steps in with a compromise proposal: a defensive alliance. A defensive alliance with Corcyra would be primarily justified through Athens' need for military security: The Athenians feel that they cannot afford to watch Corcyra lose its navy without weakening their own strategic position too much. On the other hand, stopping short of a full alliance would prove restraint and respect for Athenian treaty obligations as well as the arguments of Corinth. In essence, Pericles proposes that the Athenians try to gain a friend without making an enemy.

On the second day of debate, the Athenians accept the advice of Pericles. Corinth is not appeased.

**Figure 3, The Foreign Policy Orientations of Thucydides and Pericles**

	Multilateral		Unilateral	
	Coercive	Noncoercive	Noncoercive	Coercive
Pro-involvement		<b>Thucydides (Son of Melesias)</b>		
Anti-involvement				<b>Pericles</b>

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campaign.) Cleon's MCI counterpart in Sparta is the general Brasidas. He strongly identifies with Sparta, extends the war into Thrace, and is also always willing to threaten and use force.

### **Pericles: an MCI Orientation: Unilateral, Coercive, Anti-Involvement**

Pericles may be generally characterized as a unilateralist because he consistently prioritizes furthering the glory of the city of Athens. As Francis Macdonald Cornford points out, for Pericles empire is synonymous with *time*, and being ruled by Athens should be an honor to anyone.<sup>39</sup> The underlying patriotism is most eloquently expressed in the famous Funeral Oration.<sup>40</sup> In his choice of a defensive alliance with Corcyra, Pericles favors a unique position which only benefits his city. Moreover, his general defense strategy is a quintessentially unilateralist one. In the words of Sara Monoson and Michael Loriaux, it "tries to free... [Athens] from the need to cultivate 'normal' relations with other Greek cities" by making it "invulnerable to external assault."<sup>41</sup>

Pericles may be characterized as a coercive policymaker because he rejects concessions to important members of the Peloponnesian League, risking war in 433.<sup>42</sup> His decision to reject Corinth's entreaties to stay out of the quarrel and to involve Athens with Corcyra indicates that he believes war to be likely, and his further course of action will confirm such suspicions. As complaints against Athens mount, he rejects negotiations with the Peloponnesian League and instead presents the impending war as inevitable, stubbornly resisting pressures to revoke the Megarian Decree, which the Peloponnesians clearly find intolerable.<sup>43</sup> Speculation about why Pericles plunged the city into war began as he was himself still deliberating and have continued to this day. As Cornford points out, Thucydides seems motivated in his *History* to refute the various rumors spread by Pericles' enemies which accuse Pericles of having had personal motives or grudges which interfered with the best interests of the city. However, Thucydides himself appears unable to uncover Pericles' true rationale, and some have suggested with

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<sup>39</sup> Francis Cornford, *Thucydides Mythistoricus* (London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1965).

<sup>40</sup> During the first winter of the war, Athens holds a public funeral for its fallen soldiers, as is traditional. The speech which Pericles gives on this occasion is famous for its eloquent defense of Athenian values and praise of Athenian accomplishments. See Thuc. II.35-46. See E. M. Harris, "Pericles' Praise of Athenian Democracy in Thucydides 2.37.1," *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 94, 1992, pp. 157-167. See also Donald Nielson, "Pericles and the Plague: Civil Religion, Anomie, and Injustice in Thucydides," *Sociology of Religion* 57/4, Winter 1996, pp. 397-407, on Pericles' defense of social values and its contrast to the reality of the time.

<sup>41</sup> Sara Monoson and Michael Loriaux, "The Illusion of Power and the Disruption of Moral Norms: Thucydides Critique of Periclean Policy," *American Political Science Review* 92/2, June 1998, p. 292.

<sup>42</sup> See Pericles' war speech, Thuc. I.140-146, and his last speech, Thuc. II.59-64.

<sup>43</sup> With the Megarian Decree the Athenians had barred Megara, a city located between Athens and Corinth and a member of the Peloponnesian League, from commerce with Athens.

Cornford that it was bowing to one or more sections of his constituency which led Pericles to adopt a no compromise policy on Megara at such a high risk.<sup>44</sup>

As a commander, Pericles prioritizes the protection of Athens' walls and her fleet, and he consistently works to keep up Athenian morale to continue the military struggle. According to Kagan, few Athenians would agree before the outbreak of the war that Athens should give way on all the demands brought against her by the Peloponnesians.<sup>45</sup> He writes that

almost none would be willing to accept the final demand of Sparta, which they correctly interpreted as a demand to give up their empire. Many, however, might be persuaded that a concession at Megara would avoid war, and that Megara was a mere trifle not worth the trouble.<sup>46</sup>

For Pericles, on the other hand, there clearly is no room at all for negotiation or concessions. In his view, the options menu has already been drawn up by the Spartans, and Athens now faces a clear choice between fighting to preserve the Athenian empire or sacrificing Athenian hegemony.<sup>47</sup>

While a unilateralist and coercive policymaker, Pericles may be characterized as anti--involvement in 433 because he believes that Athens should at least put on hold its pursuit of glory and riches and avoid overextension at this time of acute conflict. He does not want to take advantage of the opportunities which a full alliance with Corcyra might have to offer. Instead, he favors the least possible commitment. It is likely that before the conflict with the Peloponnesian League became acute, Pericles had a pro-involvement MCI orientation.<sup>48</sup> He has generally been, in the words of Monoson and Loriaux, "uncritically devoted to the possession of empire for the sake of Athenian glory and for the material luxuries it provides."<sup>49</sup> However, under the specific

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<sup>44</sup> As Cornford points out, Thucydides says less than he might have about Pericles' positions vis-à-vis Corcyra and Megara, leaving the reader somewhat at a loss concerning Pericles' motives for leading Athens into war. See Cornford, *Thucydides Mythistoricus*, esp. ch. 4.

<sup>45</sup> This would have meant to yield at Potidaea and Aegina as well as Megara and with respect to Corcyra. Potidaea is a Corinthian colony which has been part of the Athenian empire but, supported by Corinth, has rebelled against Athens. It is under siege by the Athenians. Aegina is an island close to Athens which rebelled in 457 and has since been brought under firm Athenian control. It is complaining of violation of its autonomy, as guaranteed by the treaty. See Kagan, *The Outbreak*.

<sup>46</sup> Kagan, *The Outbreak*, p. 331.

<sup>47</sup> Kagan, *The Outbreak*.

<sup>48</sup> This is, however, again perhaps not true with respect to western expansion. See the passages on his expedition, which is generally dated to 454, and on the five years' truce of 451 (Thuc. I.112).

<sup>49</sup> Monoson and Loriaux, "The Illusion of Power," p. 286. Plato criticizes Pericles for his populist imperialism in the *Gorgias*, 515. On Pericles' imperialism see also Walter Nicolai, "Thucydides and die Perikleische Machtpolitik," *Hermes: Zeitschrift fuer Klassische Philologie* 124/3, 1996, pp. 264-281.

circumstances of this dangerous hegemonic showdown, his position has shifted. Closer to an anti-involvement position, Pericles now concentrates on protecting the Athenian empire in its present form. Once again, the latter stance and the corresponding policies are eloquently defended in his public speeches.

In the Funeral Oration Pericles recognizes that "energy and restlessness are essential characteristics of the Athenian way of life and the basis of Athenian imperialism."<sup>50</sup> He sharply criticizes individual political apathy.<sup>51</sup> However, he also sees that "the possession of power and the need to exercise and expand it (and to be seen to be doing so) impose an increasing strain on Athens. Power is a trap."<sup>52</sup> It is this crucial insight which imbues Pericles with the quality of a non-expansionist moderate towards the end of his career.<sup>53</sup>

During the first years of the war, Pericles believes it his responsibility to make the Athenians adopt and hold to the one military strategy that he believes can bring victory.<sup>54</sup> This strategy, which confirms his defensive anti-involvement stance, is to avoid confronting Spartan forces on land, since thanks to Athens' powerful fleet and the protection of her access to her port, Piraeus, by the Long Walls, he expects the city to be able to import necessities by sea.<sup>55</sup> As Donald Kagan points out,

the latter part of Pericles' [war] speech gives us a clear idea of the strategy he planned and no less clearly reveals the nature of his war aims. Pericles intended to fight a limited, strictly defensive war ... . On no account should the Athenians abandon their strictly defensive purpose and try to take advantage of opportunities to extend their empire.<sup>56</sup>

While, as David Cartwright explains, wars between Peloponnesian states were generally "short affairs" because of their poverty,<sup>57</sup> this "would be a war of attrition and would not be short."<sup>58</sup> After a while, though, Pericles hoped, "the enemy would be compelled to see the hopelessness of his situation and feel the economic pinch of waging a fruitless war," and would

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<sup>50</sup> Cartwright, *A Historical Commentary*, p. 42, (Thuc. II.41).

<sup>51</sup> Cartwright, *A Historical Commentary*, p. 42, (Thuc. II.40 and 63).

<sup>52</sup> Cartwright, *A Historical Commentary*, p. 42, (Thuc. I.75nn. and VI.18n.).

<sup>53</sup> See John Finley, *Three Essays on Thucydides* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967).

<sup>54</sup> Kagan, *The Outbreak*.

<sup>55</sup> Cartwright, *A Historical Commentary*, p. 47. See Thuc. I.120 and II.38. For a more detailed explanation of the military strategy see I. G. Spence, "Perikles and the Defense of Attika During the Peloponnesian War," *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 110, 1990, pp. 91-109.

<sup>56</sup> Kagan, *The Outbreak*, pp. 334-335.

<sup>57</sup> Cartwright, *A Historical Commentary*, p. 20 (Thuc. I.141).

<sup>58</sup> Kagan, *The Outbreak*, p. 335.

withdraw.<sup>59</sup> As a consequence of his strategy, however, the farmlands of Attica, which surrounded the city, were repeatedly raided by the armies of the Peloponnesian League. The population of Attica fled into Athens, where the overcrowded conditions led to the outbreak of a disastrous plague, to which Pericles himself succumbed in 429. According to Kagan, Pericles was the only man who could have managed such an unpopular strategy, which was at the same time "his strength and his strategy's weakness."<sup>60</sup> As a democratic leader, Pericles was unusually influential, due to a reputation for incorruptibility, capability, and concern for the common good, as well as his excellent rhetorical skills.<sup>61</sup> In his absence, however, he should well have expected the more aggressive groups to gain control and to insist on a military confrontation outside the city walls, a break with his overall strategy which he believed would be a grave mistake.<sup>62</sup>

Pericles is clearly a complex figure, and judgments of his character and political orientation diverge widely. For example, Monoson and Loriaux have presented him as an aggressive imperialist and as pro-involvement independent of circumstance.<sup>63</sup> They claim that Pericles in 433 "calls for only momentary restraint in adding to" the empire, for tactical reasons, and only while the crisis lasts.<sup>64</sup> He remains in their opinion always emotionally attached to an aggressive pursuit of grandeur. By contrast, Donald Kagan's works characterize Pericles as anti-imperialist, or at least as exceptionally moderate and rational in his pursuit of the city's interests.<sup>65</sup> According to Thucydides the historian as well, he clearly was one of the more responsible and moderate Athenian leaders. The two different interpretations may stem partly from Monoson and Loriaux's failure to distinguish sufficiently between unilateralism and an anti-involvement orientation. By pointing out Pericles' similarities with Cleon, who, like him, is a unilateralist and a coercive policymaker, they may overlook the crucial importance of the third, pro-involvement—anti-involvement, dimension. Kagan, on the other hand, helps to explain Pericles' stance of anti-involvement not only to distinguish him from Cleon but also to emphasize this increasingly crucial factor in his statesmanship.

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<sup>59</sup> Kagan, *The Outbreak*, p 335.

<sup>60</sup> Kagan, *The Outbreak*, p. 338.

<sup>61</sup> See Thucydides' judgment of Pericles, Thuc. II.65.

<sup>62</sup> Monoson and Loriaux have examined the socially corrosive effects of Periclean politics, shedding considerable doubt on his political skills. See their "The Illusion of Power."

<sup>63</sup> Monoson and Loriaux "The Illusion of Power."

<sup>64</sup> Monoson and Loriaux "The Illusion of Power," p. 286.

<sup>65</sup> See specially Kagan, *Pericles of Athens*.

### **Thucydides: an MCI Orientation: Multilateral, Noncoercive, Pro-Involvement**

Thucydides, son of Melesias, may be characterized as a multilateralist primarily based on his support for the Panhellenic colony of Thurii. Another indicator for Thucydides' multilateralism might be found in his accusations against Pericles for using the empire's treasury funds for domestic purposes, as opposed to its original purpose of defense against Persia. He here makes reference to "traditional religion and old-fashioned morality."<sup>66</sup> Such values are presumed to be above the partial interests of the city. They also appear to be rather out of fashion at the time, as Thucydides will lose his battle for political supremacy against Pericles and be banned from the city.

Thucydides may be characterized as a noncoercive policymaker because he is opposed to turning the Delian League into an empire by military means. The best evidence of Thucydides' noncoerciveness in the *History* appears in relation to the debate on Corcyra. As Kagan suggests, Thucydides opposes the alliance with Corcyra and likely resists the Megarian Decree as well.<sup>67</sup> As a multilateralist, he is hesitant to take any measures which would go against the Thirty Years' Peace treaty. Moreover, if it is necessary to appease Corinth in order to avoid war, he is willing to do so.

Thucydides may be generally characterized as pro-involvement because he supports the active political, economic, and cultural engagement of Athens in both east and west; the Thurii case is only one example. In the case of the Corcyrean alliance, Thucydides does not want the alliance. His faction accepts the Corinthian appeals to uphold the legal status quo. However, this does not mean that Thucydides and his followers do not want Athens to play an active role in the Greek world. Rather, the oligarchs are in this situation prepared to make concessions in order to be more generally acceptable to the Peloponnesians, so that they may pursue their other goals without incurring excessive risk.

### **Phase 2: The Beginning of the War: Archidamus and Sthenelaidas in Sparta**

In the following passage we will contrast the positions of Archidamus and Sthenelaidas in Sparta at the outset of the war. The issue is Sparta's involvement in the conflict between Athens and various members of the Peloponnesian League. The year is 432 and the outraged

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<sup>66</sup> Kagan, *Pericles of Athens*, p. 107.

<sup>67</sup> Kagan, *Pericles of Athens*, p. 219.

Corinthians have come to persuade Sparta to go to war with Athens.<sup>68</sup> Archidamus is one of the two Spartan kings and a conservative. He has led the peace party up to the beginning of the war and is known for his political caution and dedication to the Thirty Years' Peace. As the Spartans debate their response to the Corinthians, he takes up the Athenian argument that the perception of Athens as a threat is circumstantial rather than indicative of an exceptional situation which requires immediate military intervention.<sup>69</sup> Archidamus urges his fellow-citizens not to be ashamed of their deliberative and prudent character and not to let themselves be drawn into a war Corinth is trying to start to further its own particular interest. Instead, he proposes continued diplomatic negotiations alongside defensive preparations. His opponent is Sthenelaidas, a persuasive and manipulative Spartan ephor and the leader of the war party. Emphasizing the military threat posed by an expanding Athenian empire, Sthenelaidas contends that Athens must be stopped by a show of force immediately before it takes over the Peloponnese.

**Figure 4, The Foreign Policy Orientations of Archidamus and Sthenelaidas**

	Multilateral		Unilateral	
	Coercive	Noncoercive	Noncoercive	Coercive
Pro-involvement	<b>Sthenelaidas</b>			
Anti-involvement			<b>Archidamus</b>	

**Archidamus: an MCI Orientation: Unilateral, Noncoercive, Anti-Involvement**

Archidamus may be generally characterized as a unilateralist because he believes that Sparta should do what is in her own best interest. In order to defend this position, he asserts that

<sup>68</sup> Other members of the Peloponnesian League, for a variety of reasons, are supporting Corinth in its position. The Athenian delegation mentioned earlier defends the policies of Athens. See the Congress at Sparta, Thuc. I.68-88.

<sup>69</sup> The speech of Archidamus is reported in Thuc. I.80-85.

Sparta and her policies enjoy widespread support in Greece.<sup>70</sup> As a conservative, Archidamus does pay attention to how Sparta's actions will be received by fellow-Greeks. Especially his careful treatment of Plataea in 427 will betray a great respect for "Greek" tradition, which we might understand to be an indication of multilateralism.<sup>71</sup> However, the decision he takes when Plataea refuses to pledge neutrality reveals his priorities: His multilateralist considerations lose out over others, arguably the unilateral interests created by the fact of war with Athens.

Archidamus may be characterized as a noncoercive policymaker because he generally prefers to negotiate differences. While it is Archidamus who will lead the Peloponnesian army against Plataea in 429, he clearly offers the Plataeans good terms for surrender, trying to avoid a military confrontation. He has not been involved in any campaigns during the First Peloponnesian War and is a personal friend of Pericles.<sup>72</sup> As Cartwright explains, he has been "consistently against fighting," has "hoped to at least stall [the conflict] for two or three years," and remains "keen to avoid an outbreak of war."<sup>73</sup> He continues to work for peace even as it falls upon him to lead the first invasion of Attica.<sup>74</sup> Incidentally, as Cartwright also points out, Pericles must be "aware from Archidamus' eleventh-hour attempts at negotiation" that divisions exist in Spartan politics and that there is "still a strong anti-war faction in Sparta."<sup>75</sup> This makes his assertions that war is inevitable all the more difficult to understand.

Archidamus may be characterized as anti-involvement in 433 because he pursues a cautious policy of self-protection, emphasizing that Sparta needs to build up her own capabilities. As Cartwright points out, Archidamus remains "cautious until the very outbreak of war" and warns his hawkish fellows that their calculations are "subject to chance."<sup>76</sup> He also foreshadows the famous counsel of Diodotus, who would later argue that words (deliberation) should always complement action.<sup>77</sup> By comparison, other speakers are wont to contrast words

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<sup>70</sup> Cartwright, *A Historical Commentary*, p. 96 (Thuc. II.11).

<sup>71</sup> Plataea is a small city in Boeotia, which has distinguished itself by joining Athens and Sparta during the second Persian War and becoming the site of the decisive battle in which Greek allied troops led by Sparta defeated the Persian army in 479. When Plataea sides with Athens in the Second Peloponnesian War and refuses to give in to Spartan demands, it is eventually destroyed by an army led by Archidamus.

<sup>72</sup> See Kagan, *Pericles of Athens*, p. 77.

<sup>73</sup> Cartwright, *A Historical Commentary*, p. 9, p. 93 (Thuc. I.82), and p. 98 (Thuc. I.125n, II.18n).

<sup>74</sup> Cartwright, *A Historical Commentary*, p. 80, (Thuc. II.12,18).

<sup>75</sup> Cartwright, *A Historical Commentary*, p. 99.

<sup>76</sup> Cartwright, *A Historical Commentary*, p. 47 (Thuc. II.aa and II.12) and p. 188 (Thuc. I.84).

<sup>77</sup> Cartwright, *A Historical Commentary*, p. 144. Archidamus' point is made at Thuc. I.82,85. Diodotus is the Athenian speaker who will defend the lives of the Mytileneans in 428. See Thuc. III.42-48.

to deeds, attempting to prompt their audiences to action by casting an unfavorable light on deliberation and hesitancy.<sup>78</sup>

### **Sthenelaidas: an MCI Orientation: Multilateral, Coercive, Pro-Involvement**

Sthenelaidas may be characterized as a multilateralist in 433 because he argues for collective action against Athens in the Spartan Assembly. The main point in his short defense of war is Sparta's commitment to her allies: "... We will not disregard any injustice to our allies ... . Others may have plenty of money and ships and horses, but we have good allies and they should not be betrayed to the Athenians."<sup>79</sup> Sthenelaidas may be characterized as a coercive policymaker because he supports the use of force and is opposed to negotiations.

According to Kagan, Sthenelaidas is in "no real doubt about the outcome of the Spartan vote" at the Congress; by his arguments he wants "to make the size of the majority dramatically evident in case of a later shift in Spartan opinion."<sup>80</sup> The vote indeed reveals that a large majority of Spartans agrees with him and feels that the peace treaty has been broken by Athens, a judgment which they believe requires a response. As Kagan points out, "it is important to recognize that this was not yet a declaration of war, and much time would pass before any hostile action was taken."<sup>81</sup> The fact that it takes Sparta so long after the Congress both to call its allies together for a formal declaration of war and to send an army into the field suggests that the city remains divided on the issue.

Sthenelaidas may be characterized as pro-involvement because he wants to take the war to Attica. According to Kagan, Pericles is correct in his assessment of the likely consequences of an Athenian policy of appeasement. He writes: "Men like Sthenelaidas were not interested in the particular grievances of Megara, Potidaea, or Aegina. They were jealous of Athenian power, feared it, and wanted to destroy it."<sup>82</sup> The grievances of allies merely provide convenient justification.

In spite of Athenian efforts to rhetorically defend the conduct of their city, Sparta eventually decides to stifle Athenian ambitions by threatening renewed and all-out warfare.

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<sup>78</sup> Cartwright, *A Historical Commentary*, p. 24, (Thuc. I.86).

<sup>79</sup> Thuc. I.86. Quoted from Woodruff, *Thucydides on Justice*, pp. 28-29. However, Gomme notes that Sthenelaidas says nothing "about freeing Greece; only Peloponnesian interests concern Sparta." See his *A Historical Commentary*, vol. 1, p. 251.

<sup>80</sup> Kagan, *The Archidamean War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1974), p. 305.

<sup>81</sup> Kagan, *The Archidamean War*, p. 305

Following the advice of Pericles, Athens refuses to give in to Spartan demands. In the spring of 431, Thebes, an ally of Sparta, attacks Plataea, an ally of Athens, and the Second Peloponnesian War begins. Still following the advice of Pericles, Athens initially fights "a limited, strictly defensive war."<sup>83</sup> Once Pericles is dead, both sides engage in offensive maneuvers, but neither is able to gain a decisive advantage. The first phase of the war lasts ten years and culminates in the Peace of Nicias, which is overall favorable to Athens. However, as fundamental problems remain unresolved, this peace will not hold.

### **Phase 3: The Sicilian Expedition: Alcibiades in Athens and Hermocrates in Syracuse**

In the following passage we will contrast the positions of Alcibiades in Athens and Hermocrates in Syracuse. The year is 415. The issue is, in Athens, a planned military expedition to Sicily and, in Syracuse, the preparation for its arrival.<sup>84</sup> In 416 the Sicilian city of Egesta offers Athens money if she will aid her in a conflict with her immediate neighbor Selinus, which is backed by Syracuse, the largest city in Sicily. Athens is tempted to undertake the expedition on the pretext of helping Egesta, because the Athenians, blocked in the east by the Persian empire, have long had an interest in expanding their own sphere of influence to the west. An assembly is called in Athens at which Nicias and Alcibiades, the leading conservative and radical politician of the day, respectively, lead the debate.<sup>85</sup>

Nicias is the leader of the Athenian conservatives and moderates and the father of the peace treaty of 421 which bears his name.<sup>86</sup> Like Archidamus', his foreign policy orientation is MCI: unilateral, noncoercive, and anti-involvement. He opposes the expedition on the grounds that it is too dangerous, since Sparta and her allies are looking for an excuse to break the peace and attack Athens. The young aristocrat and notorious public figure Alcibiades, who grew up as Pericles' ward, is eager to lead the expedition himself. He dismisses Nicias' concerns, arguing that internal and external strife among the Sicilian cities offers a unique opportunity to expand

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<sup>82</sup> Kagan, *The Archidamean War*, p. 329.

<sup>83</sup> Kagan, *The Outbreak*, pp. 334-335.

<sup>84</sup> On the situation of both Athens and Sparta at this point in the war see Cornford, *Thucydides Mythistoricus*.

<sup>85</sup> For the debate on the Sicilian Expedition see Thuc. VI.9-23.

<sup>86</sup> Nicias is presented by Thucydides in a way which maximizes the contrast with Cleon. On Nicias' role in Athenian politics see also Borimir Jordan, "Witnesses in the Assembly: Thucydides 6.14 and Athenaion Politeia 2.17," *Classical Philology* 81, April 1986, pp. 133-135.

the Athenian empire. Indeed, Alcibiades claims that Athens must continue to expand the empire in order to protect herself from destruction through stasis.<sup>87</sup>

When the assembly, at the end of the first day, overwhelmingly votes in favor of the expedition, Nicias tries to make the Athenians reconsider by exaggerating the sacrifices Athens will have to make in order to see the policy succeed. Due to an earlier conflict, however, anti-Syracusan sentiment in Athens is high, and Nicias' plan fails when the assembly grants him all the material support he asks for.

The Athenians lose no time in sending out expeditionary forces, since they intend to surprise their enemies. They have not even reached their destination, however, when Alcibiades is called back to Athens to be put to trial for allegations of sacrilege. He would flee to Sparta and help the war effort against his own city, until returning to the Athenian side in 411.<sup>88</sup> Even prior to his departure, however, it has become clear that the additional support from Athens expected by the Athenian forces in Sicily is not forthcoming. It is now even more important for the Athenians that internal dissension within the democratic city of Syracuse will give them a decisive advantage. At this point, Thucydides allows us to assess this prospect by describing the climate of opinion within the city of Syracuse.<sup>89</sup>

Thucydides conveys a sense of the controversy in Syracuse over the preparation for the arrival of Athenian troops by reporting two of the speeches given in the assembly. The democratic leader, Athenagoras, denies the possibility of an attack by Athens and claims that the rumor of an Athenian expedition is being spread by oligarchs who want to regain power by appealing to the people's fears.<sup>90</sup> The other speaker is Hermocrates, son of Hermon, the man who dominated the Congress of Gela in 424, which had united the Sicilians in order to exclude

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<sup>87</sup> On Alcibiades imperialism see especially Steven Forde, *The Ambition to Rule: Alcibiades and the Politics of Imperialism in Thucydides* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989). Alcibiades gives a speech in Plato's fictional *Symposium*, which has had a large impact on his contemporary reputation.

<sup>88</sup> According to Thucydides, Alcibiades serves Athens well this time around. However, he is exiled in 406 after having played a part in the defeat at Notium. After the fall of Athens, he is assassinated in Phrygia by the enemies of Athenian democracy.

<sup>89</sup> For the debate at Syracuse see Thuc. VI.33-41.

<sup>90</sup> Thucydides draws parallels between Hermocrates and Pericles on the one hand, and Athenagoras and Cleon on the other. The first represent the virtuous democratic leader, while the latter in their unreasonable populism personify the dangers of democracy. See John Finley, *Three Essays*, essay 3. See also Edmund Bloedow, "The Speeches of Hermocrates and Athenagoras at Syracuse in 415 BC: Difficulties in Syracuse and in Thucydides," *Historia: Zeitschrift fuer Alte Geschichte* 45/2, 1996, pp. 141-158. On the contrast between Thucydides' treatments of Cleon and Pericles see also M. H. B. Marshall, "Cleon and Pericles: Sphacteria," *Greece & Rome* 31, April 1984, pp. 19-36.

Athens from the island. Hermocrates urges the Syracusans to take a number of measures to stop the Athenian forces before they can reach Sicily.<sup>91</sup>

**Figure 5, The Foreign Policy Orientations of Alcibiades and Hermocrates**

	Multilateral		Unilateral	
	Coercive	Noncoercive	Noncoercive	Coercive
Pro-involvement			<b>Alcibiades</b>	
Anti-involvement	<b>Hermocrates</b>			

**Alcibiades: an MCI Orientation: Unilateral, Noncoercive, Pro-Involvement**

Alcibiades may be characterized as a unilateralist because he appears to identify with one party at a time: first Athens, later Sparta, perhaps even Persia for a while, then Athens again. In essence he is, as Peter Pouncey has aptly entitled him, "a patriot for himself."<sup>92</sup> He may be characterized as a noncoercive policymaker, because, although he will prove later in the war to be an able general, his main hope in the conflict with the Peloponnesian League is to use diplomacy to win cities to Athens' side. At this point Alcibiades is inexperienced as a general, but confident of his diplomatic abilities. While he is clearly not the best example of a diplomat, lacks caution, and does not betray a love for peace, his foremost intent is to accomplish his ends by persuasion and tricks. He expects to win without a battle on the basis of his debating skills, audacity, and cunning. He may be characterized as pro-involvement basically because he consistently works to expand the power and influence of his city.

<sup>91</sup> See Thuc. VI. 33-34.

<sup>92</sup> Peter R. Pouncey, *The Necessities of War: A Study of Thucydides' Pessimism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), p. 105.

Alcibiades is not a clear case. In fact, he may be considered a truly puzzling personage, and it should be made clear that our view of him is unlikely to constitute the last word.<sup>93</sup> One disputed incident in his life concerns the treatment by Athens of the neutral Lacedaemonian colony of Melos, which, in 416, refused to surrender its independence to Athens.<sup>94</sup> It was destroyed with utmost brutality. Thucydides does not tell us who played on this occasion the instrumental part which Cleon played in the earlier massacre at another rebellious city, Mytilene.<sup>95</sup> According to Plutarch, however, it was Alcibiades. As Cornford explains, "the biographer tells how his public munificence, his illustrious birth, his eloquence, his bodily strength and beauty, disposed the Athenians to indulge his lawlessness and give it the mildest names -- of boyish frolic and ambition."<sup>96</sup> On a whim, he appears to have chosen a woman from among the Melian prisoners, and went so far as to raise the child he had by her as his own. "Even this the Athenians would have called kindhearted; only that he had been chiefly responsible, by supporting the decree, for the massacre of all the adult male inhabitants of Melos."<sup>97</sup> Cornford speculates that Thucydides omits Alcibiades' role in this decision because "cold-blooded cruelty was not the dominant trait in that mutable disposition . . . Alcibiades is not to appear like a second Cleon; for it was not he, but Athens, that was mad and blinded with the thirst of gain and the thirst of blood."<sup>98</sup>

Paul Cartledge has written that Alcibiades around 415 "favored expansionist imperialism in the west as a means of turning the cold war against Sparta into a hot one."<sup>99</sup> Donald Nielsen also seems to contradict our categorization of Alcibiades as a noncoercive policymaker, stressing that "Alcibiades was not only among those who wanted to put an end to the temporary peace

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<sup>93</sup> There is a possibility that Thucydides' complex treatment of Alcibiades may have to do with his deriving much of the information in the *History* from Alcibiades himself while at the same time remaining critical of his personality. See H. D. Westlake, "The Influence of Alcibiades on Thucydides, Book 8," *Mnemosyne* 38/facs. 1/2, 1985, pp. 93-108.

<sup>94</sup> The Melians hope that Sparta will come to their rescue, apparently counting on the multilateralist sentiment expressed by the likes of Sthenelaidas.

<sup>95</sup> On Cleon's role in this context see James A. Andrews, "Cleon's Ethopoetics," *Classical Quarterly* 44/1, 1994, pp. 26-39. It should be noted that, in general, Thucydides presents Cleon in a highly critical light. Whether this is due to the possibility that Cleon may have been the author of Thucydides' banishment from Athens after the defeat at Amphipolis is a matter for debate. Compare, for example, Thomas Hobbes "On the Life and History of Thucydides," in David Grene, *The Peloponnesian War, Thucydides* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), and I. G. Spence, "Thucydides, Woodhead, and Cleon," *Mnemosyne* 48, September 1995, pp. 411-437.

<sup>96</sup> Cornford, *Thucydides Mythistoricus*, p. 186.

<sup>97</sup> Plutarch quoted in Cornford, *Thucydides Mythistoricus*, p. 186. See Plutarch, *Lives* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1959). In the eleven volumes of this edition, Plutarch's biographies of Pericles and Nicias are included in vol. 3, those of Lysander and Alcibiades in vol. 4.

<sup>98</sup> Cornford, *Thucydides Mythistoricus*, pp. 186-187.

with Sparta..., but was also 'the most ardent supporter of the expedition' against Sicily ...."<sup>100</sup>

Instead of the Peace of Nicias, which inaugurates, at least in theory, an Athenian-Spartan alliance, he supports an alliance with Argos. Thucydides writes:

Foremost among those who desired an immediate renewal of war was Alcibiades, the son of Cleinias, a man who was still of an age that would in any other city have been thought youthful, but influential on account of his illustrious ancestry. He really thought that the Argive alliance was the better policy, but he took that side, against Sparta, because his pride and ambition were piqued. The Lacedaemonians had negotiated the peace through Nicias and Laches, neglecting him on account of his youth and showing no respect for their old connexion with his family, which his grandfather had renounced, but he had set his heart on renewing ... . He thought that on all hands he was being put in the background.<sup>101</sup>

According to Plutarch, Alcibiades' "disposition was full of shifts and inconsistencies."<sup>102</sup> "There were many violent passions in his nature; but strongest of all was ambition and the desire to be first."<sup>103</sup> In keeping with his image, "the statecraft of Alcibiades was treacherous and fake."<sup>104</sup> The worst charge against him is a malicious trick by which, as Thucydides tells, he was indeed successful at putting an end to the Peace of Nicias by making the Spartans appear untrustworthy to the Athenians.<sup>105</sup> It should be noted that, while Nicias is routinely identified with the peace and Alcibiades with the ill-fated Athenian expedition to Syracuse, Nicias generally acts in keeping with the role of general, rarely arguing for strategies of persuasion, while Alcibiades is known as a schemer. It seems as if in truth neither Alcibiades nor Nicias are keen on using force, although they both threaten to use it where they deem it necessary. Our interpretation of Alcibiades mainly follows Donald Kagan, according to whom historical evidence suggests that the real Alcibiades was quite different from the legend he created about himself.<sup>106</sup>

According to Kagan,

<sup>99</sup> Paul Cartledge, "Alcibiades of Athens," *History Today* 37, October 1987, pp. 15-21.

<sup>100</sup> Nielson, "Pericles and the Plague." The quote is from Thucydides.

<sup>101</sup> Quoted in Cornford, *Thucydides Mythistoricus*, p. 191. The connection in question involves a *xenia*, or inter-city friendship. Alcibiades' ancestors had held the post of *proxenos*, that is official representative of Sparta in Athens. Cartledge points this out as an important clue as to the apparent ease with which Alcibiades would betray Athens to Sparta. See his "Alcibiades of Athens."

<sup>102</sup> Plutarch quoted in Cornford, *Thucydides Mythistoricus*, p. 192.

<sup>103</sup> Plutarch quoted in Cornford, *Thucydides Mythistoricus*, p. 192.

<sup>104</sup> Plutarch quoted in Cornford, *Thucydides Mythistoricus*, p. 192.

<sup>105</sup> See Thuc. V.44-45.

there must have been a lively debate over the instructions to be given to the commanders, for these would determine the purposes of the expedition.<sup>107</sup> ... Thucydides presents the Athenians as aiming from the outset at the conquest of all Sicily.... He also tells us that Alcibiades intended to conquer not only Sicily but also Carthage....<sup>108</sup>

However, he reports no supporting evidence for such grandiose plans. At the first assembly Alcibiades asks for only 60 ships for the expedition to Sicily.

Still, according to Kagan, Nicias is "led to reopen the question of the whole expedition at the second assembly because he 'thought that the city ... with a slight and specious pretext meant to conquer all of Sicily.'"<sup>109</sup> At that point Alcibiades does adopt a more imperialist rhetoric.<sup>110</sup> He claims that the expedition is very likely to succeed, as the Sicilians are divided among themselves, disorganized, and weak. By taking action against them now, he continues, the Athenians might eventually "'gain control of all Greece, since their power would be reinforced by the addition of Sicily.'"<sup>111</sup> Alcibiades' real strategy, which has apparently been discussed privately among the three generals, is a diplomatic one. He wants to enlist the friendship of Sicilian cities and win the native Sicels away from Syracuse. Such friends could provide valuable grain and soldiers. After having succeeded in bringing these allies over to their side, the Athenians could attack Syracuse and Selinus, "unless Selinus came to terms with Segesta and Syracuse permitted them to restore the Leontines to their homeland."<sup>112</sup>

As Kagan points out, this

plan was characteristic of Alcibiades. Essentially diplomatic in nature, it relied more on skills of persuasion than on military ability and even left open the possibility that Selinus and Syracuse might yield without a fight. If there were to be fighting, moreover, much of it would be done by others on behalf of the Athenians.<sup>113</sup>

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<sup>106</sup> See especially Kagan, *The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981), pp. 255-256.

<sup>107</sup> Alcibiades, Nicias, and Lamachus, as the three commanders, would have independent authority over the implementation of the strategy for conquest.

<sup>108</sup> Kagan, *The Peace of Nicias*, p. 171. The historian was in exile from Athens at the time and could only have reached this conclusion considerably after the fact.

<sup>109</sup> Kagan, *The Peace of Nicias*, p. 172.

<sup>110</sup> For the speech of Alcibiades see Thuc. VI.16-18.

<sup>111</sup> Kagan, *The Peace of Nicias*, p. 184, (Thuc. VI.18.4). According to Cornford, "the most remarkable part of this speech is the opening defense of the speaker's [own] lavish magnificence, as being a public benefit." He claims that "it seems very unlikely that Alcibiades at such a moment would have actually used language so offensively boastful" and suggests that this is a case where Thucydides is straining historical probability for the sake of character portrayal. See Cornford, *Thucydides Mythistoricus*, p. 212.

<sup>112</sup> Kagan, *The Peace of Nicias*, p. 213.

<sup>113</sup> Kagan, *The Peace of Nicias*, pp. 213-14.

This must have been the reasoning behind Alcibiades' request of only 60 ships and no infantry at the first assembly. He had never planned for the Athenians to "bear the brunt of the fighting."<sup>114</sup> Nicias does not seem to trust Alcibiades or to believe his plan feasible. In response to his speech, he recommends sailing to Selinus with a huge force, hoping that the enormous cost of the suggested campaign might make the Athenians reconsider. The great increase in the Athenian expeditionary forces which is inadvertently brought about by Nicias' intervention does not lead Alcibiades to change his mind: He still wants to follow the original strategy, rejecting Lamachus' plan for a direct attack on Sicily. However, the size of Athenian force will make a difference and likely works against the prospects of Alcibiades' plan. A force of 60 Athenian triremes without infantry might well have gained the support of Sicilian cities, hostile to and frightened of Syracuse and seeking to use the Athenian force in their own interests. They could not fear that Athens would try to conquer the island with such a force.<sup>115</sup> The larger armament that arrives in 415, however, must seem to most Sicilians a greater threat than Syracuse. Even if Alcibiades had not been recalled, his scheme would have been unlikely to work under these conditions.

After his escape to Sparta, Alcibiades tells the Spartans that Athens is pursuing a strategy to use conquests in Sicily and then Italy and Spain as a basis to conquer the Peloponnese and rule over all Greeks. He claims that "the generals who are left will carry out the same plans, if they can, without any change."<sup>116</sup> This grand design has never been mentioned before, and Alcibiades' actions in connection with the Sicilian expedition give no evidence that he has or had such a goal. While this does not prove that Alcibiades has not been keeping more grandiose plans to himself and planning to pursue them if his strategy gained control of Sicily, "we must remember that he claims that such a plan was the official goal of the Athenians, shared and pursued with equal vigor by Lamachus and Nicias."<sup>117</sup> It seems reasonable to conclude with Kagan that

the grand design was an invention intended to impress the Spartans with the greatness of Alcibiades and his potential value to them, as well as to make them fight Athens again out of fear. Once enunciated, however, the plan was believed and became part of the legend of Alcibiades.<sup>118</sup>

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<sup>114</sup> Kagan, *The Peace of Nicias*, p. 214.

<sup>115</sup> Kagan, *The Peace of Nicias*, pp. 213-14.

<sup>116</sup> Kagan, *The Peace of Nicias*, p. 254. For Alcibiades' speech to the Spartans see Thuc. VI.89-92.

<sup>117</sup> Kagan, *The Peace of Nicias*, p. 254.

<sup>118</sup> Kagan, *The Peace of Nicias*, p. 255. Thucydides himself accepts Alcibiades' explanations in Sparta.

### **Hermocrates: an MCI Orientation: Multilateral, Coercive, Anti-Involvement**

Hermocrates may be characterized as a multilateralist basically because he favors a regional security arrangement for the Sicilian states. At Gela, Hermocrates claimed to speak in the interests not only of his own city but of all Sicily.<sup>119</sup> He urged the Sicilians to offer each other concessions in the name of compromise and peace. He dramatized the evil designs of Athens and emphasized her great power, attempting to rally the Sicilians against a common threat. He also advocated the idea that the Greeks of Sicily should ignore the racial differences between Dorians and Ionians which divided them and thereby made them easy prey for outsiders. Instead he put forward the apparently new notion of a nation of Greek Sicily, of a lasting peace for all the Greek Sicilian cities, of Sicily for the Sicilians:

We are, generally speaking, neighbors, and together we inhabit a single land surrounded by the sea and are called by one name, Siceliots. We shall go to war, I imagine, when the situation arises, and we shall always act together to repel them, for if any of us is harmed individually we are all endangered. And we shall never again call in strangers as allies or mediators. If we do these things we shall not deprive Sicily, at the present time, of two advantages: to be rid of the Athenians and of our civil war. As for the future, we will live among ourselves in a free country and less exposed than now to dangers from outside.<sup>120</sup>

As Kagan points out, Hermocrates' speech at Gela has been praised for its apparently selfless defense of the common good. However, it is also clearly not in the interest of Syracuse for the weaker Greek cities of Sicily to call in the powerful states of the Greek mainland. Moreover, because of its leading position in Sicily, Syracuse stands to lose more than its neighbors if Athens' plans were to succeed. In 415 Hermocrates gives us more reason to doubt his sincerity by contradicting certain aspects of his earlier speech. Drawing up a plan for a diplomatic campaign, he urges the Syracusans to invite help against the Athenian invasion not only from the mainland Greek cities of Corinth and Sparta, but even from Carthage.<sup>121</sup> He resurrects the argument for ethnically-based loyalty he has earlier denounced.<sup>122</sup> He will urge the Sicilians to join in the war the Peloponnesians are waging against Athens even after the Athenians have been driven from Sicily.<sup>123</sup>

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<sup>119</sup> Kagan, *The Peace of Nicias*. See especially Thuc. IV.64. See also Monoson and Loriaux, "The Illusion of Power."

<sup>120</sup> Thucydides quoted in Kagan, *The Peace of Nicias*.

<sup>121</sup> See Kagan, *The Peace of Nicias*, pp. 266-8.

<sup>122</sup> Thuc. VI.80.3.

<sup>123</sup> See Kagan, *The Peace of Nicias*, pp. 266-8.

Hermocrates uses the fullest possible range of arguments to urge resistance to Athens.<sup>124</sup> He first asserts that "the Athenians have not come, as they proclaim, to restore the Leontines to their land and to aid Segesta against Selinus, but to destroy Syracuse and conquer Sicily."<sup>125</sup> Nor would anyone think, says Hermocrates, "that the Athenians have come to aid their kinsmen (as Chalcidians, Ionians, and Athenians were thought to be), for they have shown no compunction about enslaving the original Chalcidians on Euboea and all the Ionians in their empire."<sup>126</sup> He incites his listeners' ethnic pride by saying that the Dorian cities of Sicily are not like "slavish Ionians, always serving some master, but free men who should join together against the common enemy."<sup>127</sup>

Hermocrates knows that many Sicilians are jealous of Syracusan power and fear his city's domination more than rule by Athens. To counter these fears he once again emphasizes the evil designs of the Athenians and stresses how much more difficult it would be to resist them once Syracuse were defeated. He claims that existing alliance commitments which some Sicilian cities have with Athens are made null and void by the Athenian threat against Sicily.<sup>128</sup> This threat must now be met and can only be countered by a concerted effort of the Greek city states of Sicily.<sup>129</sup>

Hermocrates is characterized as a coercive policymaker basically because he emphasizes the need to be prepared to use military means if necessary.<sup>130</sup> He will also command the Syracusan contingent against the Athenian fleet.<sup>131</sup> His speech suggests a range of specific actions to be taken immediately for the defense of the city. Most surprisingly, Hermocrates urges the Syracusans to take the offensive by sending a fleet to Taras and the Iapygian peninsula in Italy. He suggests that from there

they could either intercept the Athenian armada in the open sea or attack the Athenians in Italy when they were still weary from the crossing. A show of force at such a forward position might even deter the Athenians from making the crossing, for Hermocrates has

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<sup>124</sup> Thuc. VI.75.3-4.

<sup>125</sup> Kagan, *The Peace of Nicias*, pp. 245-6. This is interesting evidence that, whatever their true intentions, the Athenians are careful to adhere publicly to the officially limited purposes of the expedition.

<sup>126</sup> Kagan, *The Peace of Nicias*, pp. 245-6.

<sup>127</sup> Kagan, *The Peace of Nicias*, pp. 245-6.

<sup>128</sup> The alliance which concerns Hermocrates is an alliance between Athens and Camarina.

<sup>129</sup> Kagan, *The Peace of Nicias*, pp. 245-6.

<sup>130</sup> Hermocrates did, in his speech at Gela, also stress the value of peace among the Sicilians. It is part of his argument for multilateralism. However, with respect to his response to the approach of the Athenians, he remains a coercive policymaker.

<sup>131</sup> Cartwright, *A Historical Commentary*, p. 279 (Thuc. IV.58n, VIII.29).

heard that 'the most experienced of the Athenian generals' has been reluctant to undertake the expedition in the first place and might seize on the evidence of resistance to abandon the project.<sup>132</sup>

Recognizing that this is a very bold proposal, Hermocrates urges his listeners to at least take the other steps he has recommended at once: "The enemy is certainly coming against us, and I am sure that they are already under sail and almost here."<sup>133</sup>

Hermocrates may be characterized as anti-involvement despite the fact that he wants to send a fleet out to meet Athens' navy because he seems in truth to pursue purely defensive precautionary measures. According to Kagan,

most of what Hermocrates says is unquestionably sound. His information about the Athenian expedition, its movements, and the attitude of Nicias was correct. His opinion about Athenian goals was at least plausible; in any case Syracuse was certain to be a target. His advice about diplomatic actions was beyond reproach, but his final suggestion is of a different character. Most modern scholars have condemned it as impractical and dangerously mistaken.<sup>134</sup>

Kagan points out that during an earlier Athenian attempt on Sicily, all the Sicilians combined never put many more than 30 ships to sea at once. When the Athenians arrive in 415, the Syracusans have no fleet at all. It is clear that the Athenians are incomparably superior in naval power to the Syracusans, who have not even fought a naval engagement in many years.<sup>135</sup>

According to Kagan, "we must agree with Dover that 'if Hermocrates' proposal had been adopted ... the probable outcome ... [would have been] the annihilation of the Sikeliot fleets and the rapid imposition of Athenian rule on Sicily and South Italy.'"<sup>136</sup>

As Kagan points out, there is something else wrong with Hermocrates' plan. Deterring the Athenians with a show of force before they could cross over from Corcyra has already become impossible at this point. The Athenian armada is gathered at Corcyra as Hermocrates speaks. It would take at least two months to build, gather, and train a Sicilian fleet, by which time the Athenians would certainly have advanced further. "All the strategic advantages Hermocrates claims for his plan are mythical, not merely because he downplays Athenian numerical and

<sup>132</sup> Kagan, *The Peace of Nicias*, pp. 219-220.

<sup>133</sup> Kagan, *The Peace of Nicias*, pp. 219-220.

<sup>134</sup> Kagan, *The Peace of Nicias*, pp. 219-220.

<sup>135</sup> Kagan, *The Peace of Nicias*, pp. 219-220.

<sup>136</sup> Kagan, *The Peace of Nicias*, pp. 219-220. See Gomme et al., *A Historical Commentary*, vol. IV, p. 299 (The author responsible for this volume of the commentary is K. J. Dover).

tactical superiority at sea, but because his plan is chronologically impossible.”<sup>137</sup> Hermocrates must have known this, as the closing words of his speech make clear that the Athenians “are already under sail and almost here.”<sup>138</sup> According to Kagan, the most plausible explanation for Hermocrates' suggestion is that

the bold plan is merely a rhetorical device. Knowing that the Syracusans were reluctant to take any action and certain that they would in any case do less than what was suggested, he advanced his daring plan in the hope that they would at least initiate the diplomatic campaign he thought vital.<sup>139</sup>

An unnamed general supports Hermocrates in defense of the policy that would win the war for Syracuse: The city should bury its political divisions and act as one, doing everything necessary to overcome the threat from the outside. The Syracusans decide to take some precautions against a possible Athenian attack. In 413, Syracuse, aided by the Spartan general Gylippus, defeats the Athenian expedition and inflicts grievous losses on the Athenian forces. In 412, many of Athens' allies rebel, and in 411 the democratic government of Athens is overturned in favor of an interim oligarchic arrangement known as the Four Hundred.<sup>140</sup> The Athenian fleet forces a return to democracy the following year. The *History* of Thucydides ends abruptly at this point. It is likely that he did not live to continue his account of the war to its end.

#### **Phase 4: The End of the War: Lysander and Pausanias in Sparta**

In the following passage we will contrast the positions of two Spartan military commanders at the end of the war, Lysander and Pausanias.<sup>141</sup> The two differ on, among many other points, the question of what terms Sparta should offer the vanquished Athenians. Given the available data, their characterizations are based less on their words (as reported by Thucydides) than on their actions.

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<sup>137</sup> Kagan, *The Peace of Nicias*, p. 221.

<sup>138</sup> Kagan, *The Peace of Nicias*, p. 221.

<sup>139</sup> Kagan, *The Peace of Nicias*, p. 221.

<sup>140</sup> Alcibiades, who in the meantime has had to flee Sparta and is cooperating with the Persians, is instrumental in bringing about this coup, as it enables him to return to Athens.

<sup>141</sup> This Pausanias is not to be confused with the Pausanias who led the Greeks against the Persians at Plataea in 479 and afterwards served as the commander in chief of the Hellenic confederacy. See Simon Hornblower, *A Commentary on Thucydides* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), vol. II, p. 355. Compare also Johnson, *Thucydides*, or Kagan, *Pericles of Athens*.

In the spring of 407, a new Spartan navarch, Lysander, enters the Aegean to take up his command at the expiration of the term of his predecessor, Cratesippidas.<sup>142</sup> He is most effective at wooing Greeks on the Turkish coast away from Athens. Like Gylippus, the Spartan hero at Syracuse, he is a *motbax*, the son of a Spartan father and a *helot* mother or perhaps the child of a Spartan family which has lost its status because of poverty. In either case he will have been raised by some Spartan of adequate means as the companion for his son, educated in the Spartan manner, and made eligible for full citizenship by the grant of an allotment of land.<sup>143</sup>

Lysander possesses indisputable military and leadership abilities, but his ambitions arouse suspicion among other Spartan leaders, notably the kings Pausanias and later Agesilaus. Pausanias is a member of the Spartan peace party, which professes concern about the corrupting influence of imperialism. He attempts to restrain the ambitious newcomer Lysander.

**Figure 6, The Foreign Policy Orientations of Lysander and Pausanias**

	Multilateral		Unilateral	
	Coercive	Noncoercive	Noncoercive	Coercive
Pro-involvement				<b>Lysander</b>
Anti-involvement		<b>Pausanias</b>		

**Lysander: an MCI Orientation: Unilateral, Coercive, Pro-Involvement**

Lysander may be characterized as a unilateralist, because he acts in pursuit of the narrow interests of Sparta. Like Alcibiades, he really pursues his own ambitions in the name of his city. He may be characterized as a coercive policymaker because his basic means to reach his political goals is the use of force, although he is also adept at diplomacy and rhetorically persuasive. He

<sup>142</sup> Kagan, *The Fall of the Athenian Empire* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).

<sup>143</sup> Kagan, *The Fall*, pp. 297-8.

may be characterized as pro-involvement basically because he is actively engaged in the war in the east and pursues an imperialist policy. Thucydides describes Lysander as a man in whom considerations of personal advantage consistently triumph over considerations of traditional values or justice. Plutarch's verdict is even more damning: He presents Lysander as an unscrupulous trickster, subtle and deceitful, and highly immoral - a person who corrupts honor by extolling justice for the sake of narrow gain.<sup>144</sup> It is clear that Lysander's ambition "was not satisfied by glory; he also wanted power."<sup>145</sup> He is even believed to have tried to alter the Spartan constitution to allow himself to become king.<sup>146</sup> According to Kagan, "there is every reason to believe that such powerful ambitions, which dominate the first part of his life during his years in Sparta and his later career after he has achieved eminence and greatness, also guide his behavior when he takes up his naval command in 407."<sup>147</sup>

Once in control, Lysander strikes up an alliance with Cyrus the younger, prince of Persia. This alliance provides the Spartans with "a place to gather and maintain large numbers of ships and men in safety and sufficiency until they chose to fight at a time and place advantageous to them."<sup>148</sup> With Cyrus' protection Lysander is able to shape his men into a disciplined and effective navy. In 407, he confronts the Athenian fleet at Notium. When the two fleets meet, Lysander has ninety ships, while Alcibiades, back in command for Athens, has eighty. In spite of this numerical advantage, however, Lysander does not offer to fight right away. "As part of his preparations, he has pulled his triremes out of the water to dry them and effect repairs, and they may very well have remained on the beach when the Athenians took up their station at Notium."<sup>149</sup> Letting some time pass, Lysander is able to improve the quality of his ships and to receive reinforcements.<sup>150</sup>

According to Kagan, "Lysander deserves great credit for the victory at Notium."<sup>151</sup> Resisting the temptation to rush into battle, he waits until circumstances are most favorable to his side. Moreover, his men perform extraordinarily well, proving his ability as a commander.<sup>152</sup> While another Spartan navarch might have shown the same military qualities, however, what

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<sup>144</sup> Plutarch, *Lives*.

<sup>145</sup> Kagan, *The Fall*, p. 301.

<sup>146</sup> See Irad Malkin, "Lysander and Libys," *Classical Quarterly* 40/2, 1990, pp. 541-545.

<sup>147</sup> Kagan, *The Fall*, p. 301.

<sup>148</sup> Kagan, *The Fall*, p. 302.

<sup>149</sup> Kagan, *The Fall*, pp. 310-11.

<sup>150</sup> Kagan, *The Fall*, pp. 310-11.

<sup>151</sup> Kagan, *The Fall*, p. 319.

truly distinguishes Lysander is his ability to successfully cooperate with the Persians. As Kagan points out, "the behavior of Lysander's successor would show that some Spartan commanders, and perhaps most, would be unwilling or unable to cooperate with the Persians effectively and gain from them the regular and sufficient support" which Lysander did.<sup>153</sup> Lysander is ideally suited to strike up the Spartan-Persian alliance because he pursues not only the interests of Sparta but also his own.

The needs of his state and of his own political future call for success in the war, but his personal ambitions require that he demonstrate his unique qualities, establish a firm base of political support, allow no other Spartan to make an important contribution to victory, and show himself to be essential and irreplaceable.<sup>154</sup>

By winning the favor of Cyrus he is able to make himself indispensable to the Spartan cause.

If it troubles him to surrender Greeks to the charity of Persians, and it may have, for he seemed to have in mind the establishment of a Spartan empire to replace the Athenian empire, he does not seem to find it difficult to dissimulate. It is entirely possible that Lysander is the only Spartan of his time who could work so well with Cyrus as to gain the support needed for victory.<sup>155</sup>

### **Pausanias: an MCI Orientation: Multilateral, Noncoercive, Anti-Involvement**

Pausanias may be characterized as a multilateralist basically because of his Panhellenic persuasion and desire for peace among the Greeks. He may be characterized as a noncoercive policymaker because he does not want to continue the war effort. He works to deny Lysander the final military victory in Athens, "stressing diplomacy rather than force."<sup>156</sup> He twice leads an army to Athens for the purpose of preventing Lysander from taking the city. He may be characterized as anti-involvement because he is wary of over-extension and believes that Sparta should reign in its imperialist ambitions.

His activities designed to counter the influence of Lysander seem to include the sponsorship of a rival navarch, Callicratidas.<sup>157</sup> According to Kagan, the historical evidence suggests that Callicratidas represents the views of that Spartan faction which sides with "the

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<sup>152</sup> Kagan, *The Fall*, p. 319.

<sup>153</sup> Kagan, *The Fall*, p. 303.

<sup>154</sup> Kagan, *The Fall*, p. 301

<sup>155</sup> Kagan, *The Fall*, p. 304.

<sup>156</sup> Kagan, *The Fall*, p. 328.

<sup>157</sup> Kagan, *The Fall*. Callicratidas is an MCI actor. As a Spartan navarch, he spares cities arguing that no Greek should be enslaved and calls for Panhellenism. Callicratidas is portrayed by Xenophon in *Hellenica*. See also J. L. Moles, "Xenophon and Callicratidas," *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 114, 1994, pp. 70-84.

Agiad kings, the late Pleistoanax, who has died in 408, and his son Pausanias."<sup>158</sup> Pleistoanax had for a long time supported peaceful and friendly relations with Athens and was one of the strongest defenders of the Peace of Nicias. His son Pausanias, according to Kagan, "would show himself to be a deadly enemy of Lysander and the leader of a political faction in Sparta that has been characterized as a 'moderate, traditionalist group which objected to the erection of the Spartan Empire.'"<sup>159</sup> This faction, which now supports Callicratidas against Lysander, attempts to limit Sparta's activities abroad to the Peloponnese, stressing the use of diplomacy rather than military force. With respect to domestic politics, it wishes to counteract the "corrupting influence of the introduction of wealth and luxury which imperialism would bring" and advocates "a return to the austere principles of the Lycurgan constitution."<sup>160</sup>

When Callicratidas is indeed elected to the position of navarch, it becomes obvious "that the behavior of Lysander in Asia, his close relationship with Cyrus, and his organization of political clubs loyal to him personally has raised more fears in Sparta than his victory at Notium has won support for him."<sup>161</sup> However, Lysander appears for the moment unstoppable. After the Athenians are able to achieve a short-lived last victory at Arginusae, Lysander destroys almost the entire Athenian fleet at Aegospotanu in 405. With a fleet of 150 ships he then sails towards Athens. Sparta sends a huge army led by Pausanias over land to join him in confronting the Athenians and with the intention of persuading Athens to surrender without a long siege.<sup>162</sup>

Around this time, Sparta calls a congress of her allies to discuss the fate of Athens, whenever it should fall. According to Pausanias, Lysander and Agis, who has succeeded his father Archidamus to become the second Spartan king, "on their own initiative and without the approval of the Spartan assembly, brought a proposal before the allies to destroy Athens root and branch."<sup>163</sup> In 404 Athens is besieged and forced to surrender. The Second Peloponnesian War is over. While Athens is not laid to waste, Lysander does subjugate the Athenians under the oppressive government of the Thirty Tyrants and delivers her subject cities to oligarchic rule.

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<sup>158</sup> Kagan, *The Fall*, p. 328.

<sup>159</sup> Kagan, *The Fall*, p. 328.

<sup>160</sup> Kagan, *The Fall*, p. 328.

<sup>161</sup> Kagan, *The Fall*, pp. 328-9.

<sup>162</sup> Kagan, *The Fall*, pp. 398-9.

<sup>163</sup> Kagan, *The Fall*, p. 400.

Pausanias' entire career shows him to be an enemy of Spartan imperialism and a champion of traditional Spartan values and policies.<sup>164</sup> He clearly opposes Lysander's policies and is likely also jealous of the influence and fearful of the ambition of so powerful a subject. Even Agis, who has collaborated with Lysander and like him favored a more aggressive policy towards Athens, grows critical. In 403, the two kings join forces to deprive Lysander of the command of the Spartan army sent to restore order in Athens, an act which leads to the fall of Lysander's friends whom he has provided with positions of power, and the restoration of the democracy in Athens.<sup>165</sup>

Around the same time, Darius II, the king of Persia, dies. His son Cyrus is accused of plotting to murder his older brother and the legitimate successor, Ataxerxes II, to secure the throne for himself. The Spartans now repay Cyrus for helping them to defeat Athens. They lead an army of Greek mercenaries to accompany Cyrus to the battle for the Persian throne. At Cunaxa, Cyrus is killed, but the Greek troops win and manage a heroic retreat. This marks the beginning of a short period of Spartan hegemony in Greece.

#### 4. Summary

In this article we have elaborated an analytical framework that emphasizes the role of basic motives in foreign policy decisionmaking. This framework assumes: (1) that three motives—fear, interest, and recognition—play essential roles in every foreign policy decision; (2) that individual dispositions toward each of these basic motives can be conceived to form one primary dimension of variance: a coercive—noncoercive dimension, a pro-involvement—anti-involvement dimension, and a multilateral—unilateral dimension, respectively; and (3) that these dimensions can be understood as capturing variation in the perception of the basic characteristics of actors' situations, in their choice of general goals, and in their choice of behavioral strategies to achieve these goals.

Eight ideal types are constructed representing all possible combinations of bipolar positions on these three dimensions. These ideal types are used to identify eight generic foreign policy orientations in the real world. We identify eight figures from Thucydides' *History of the*

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<sup>164</sup> See Charles D. Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories: Politics and Diplomacy in the Corinthian War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1979), pp. 82-83.

<sup>165</sup> Kagan, *The Fall*, p. 407. The last we hear from Thucydides of Pausanias' career once again presents him in the light of an imperious and power-hungry man, as did his early performance as commander in chief of the Hellenic

*Peloponnesian War* to illustrate these foreign policy orientations. Four pairs of individuals, taking antithetical positions on all three dimensions, are compared and discussed in detail.<sup>166</sup>

**Figure 7, X-Y-Z Matrix Showing Individuals Representing the Eight Types of Foreign Policy Orientation**

	Multilateral		Unilateral	
	Coercive	Noncoercive	Noncoercive	Coercive
Pro-involvement	<b>Sthenelaidas</b>	<b>Thucydides (Son of Melesias)</b>	<b>Alcibiades</b>	<b>Lysander</b>
Anti-involvement	<b>Hermocrates</b>	<b>Pausanias</b>	<b>Archidamus</b>	<b>Pericles</b>

In order to compare the dispositions of these eight foreign policy decisionmakers, we examine their perceptions of the historical situation, their general goals, and especially their behavior in relation to each basic motivational dimension. While they are fairly easy to classify, it should be noted that there are significant differences even between actors sharing positions on any one dimension. We are, after all, dealing with real world individuals, whose natural diversity results partly from the integration of all three motivational dimensions in one personality. On the coercive-noncoercive dimension Pericles, Sthenelaidas, Hermocrates and Lysander all advocate coercive measures; Thucydides, Archidamus, Alcibiades, and Pausanias do not. But the military measures favored by Sthenelaidas and Lysander are different from those of Pericles and Hermocrates. Sthenelaidas and Lysander advocate coercive actions that may utterly destroy their adversary, whereas Pericles and Hermocrates prefer defense efforts which will discourage their opponents. There are also important differences between those who advocate noncoercive

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confederacy. Spinning intrigues to make his own arrangements with the Persians and plotting to restore himself to lost glory, he is murdered by fellow-Spartans.

<sup>166</sup> If we conceive of the x-y-z matrix as a chunk of chessboard, the differences between foreign policy orientations may be compared to the moves of various chess pieces. For example, pairs with one dimension of difference may be

measures. Thucydides and Pausanias are skeptical of military measures because of the negative consequences that they associate with them; Archidamus and Alcibiades are clearly prepared to use military means if negotiations fail.

On the pro-involvement—anti-involvement dimension Thucydides, Sthenelaidas, Alcibiades, and Lysander are pro-involvement; Pericles, Archidamus, Hermocrates, and Pausanias are anti-involvement. But the pro-involvement orientation of Thucydides and perhaps even Alcibiades is different from that of the others. Thucydides and Alcibiades want to extend the commercial advantages and prestige of Athens; Sthenelaidas and Lysander want to destroy a rising empire and create a new empire respectively. There are also differences among those who advocate anti-involvement. Pericles accepts the inevitability of war; he chooses inactivity because he believes that is the most expedient way to fight. Archidamus does not want war; he is bidding for time in the hope that it may be possible to negotiate with Athens (although he is ostensibly seeking time to build capacity). Hermocrates also wants to avoid war; he hopes that strong defensive measures may discourage Athens, although he may also see an opportunity to forge a Sicilian empire once Athens has left Sicily. Pausanias wants to avert the destruction of Athens because he believes that a Spartan empire would have debilitating effects on Sparta itself.

On the multilateral-unilateral dimension Thucydides, Sthenelaidas, Hermocrates and Pausanias are considered multilateralists; Pericles, Archidamus, Alcibiades, and Lysander, unilateralists. But the multilateralism of Thucydides and Pausanias is different from that of Sthenelaidas and Hermocrates. Although the former are dealing with a particular event, they seem to be viewing it in the larger context of Hellenism; whereas Sthenelaidas and Hermocrates are dealing with a particular alliance system. Likewise, the unilateralism of Pericles and Archidamus is different from that of Alcibiades and Lysander. Whereas the former individuals are seemingly prepared to put themselves at a disadvantage in order to do what is best for their city-state, the latter seem to put their own personal interests before those of their state. Clearly, all three dimensions need to be taken into account to properly distinguish our actors' positions, confirming our original claim.

In essence, what we do in this article is to explore whether the categorization of basic motivation which is represented by our ideal types is plausible. At the same time we illustrate the

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identified by the moves of a rook, pairs with two dimensions of difference by the moves of a bishop, and pairs with three dimensions of difference by the moves of a knight.

reasoning behind our theory and typology. We will consider our effort successful to the extent that two criteria have been met. Our characterizations must do justice to the individuals we describe, and the individuals we describe must illustrate the dispositions which we attribute to them. We have tried to meet the first criterion by basing our portrayals on the scholarship of others. Meeting the second criterion has been our original contribution.

Since this framework for analysis suggests so many interesting relationships between motivation and other factors believed to be important in foreign policy decisionmaking, we would like to conclude this article by considering the implications of the proposed framework for future research in international relations and foreign policy.

## **5. Implications for Future Research**

Research focusing on motivation is condemned openly by many international relations scholars on the grounds that it is reductionist.<sup>167</sup> Even most foreign policy analysts avoid taking into account the role of motivation, mainly because of an assumed unmanageable complexity which reduces its value as a predictor variable. In the meantime, the field of international relations, divided as it is by multiple paradigms, theoretical approaches, methods, and preferences for different levels and units of analysis, arguably faces a greater than ever need for integrative frameworks. If we can explain much of foreign policymaking and international interaction in terms variation on three basic motivational categories, our framework for analysis is hardly too complex and potentially highly useful for integrating diverse strands of scholarship.

Much additional work remains to be done, of course, in particular to enable us to measure subtle differences along all three motivational dimensions. By concentrating on basic motivation, moreover, the proposed framework for analysis disregards a host of other factors that are also relevant in the decisionmaking process. Links need to be elaborated to complementary fields of research. For example, decisionmakers' reactions to challenges posed by their environment depend on how they perceive this environment, and not all perception is motivated. Variation in individuals' grasp of relevant information, cognitive resources, and personality, to name but some of the most obvious factors, also influence what and how they will perceive. Moreover, the

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<sup>167</sup> While traditionalist scholars in IR often explicitly base their analysis on assumed motivation, behavioralist scholars usually hide such assumptions. See Annette Freyberg-Inan, *What Moves Man: The Realist Theory of International Relations and Its Judgment of Human Nature* (New York: SUNY Press, 2003). We contend that, since

goals which they pursue can be instrumental, and thus difficult if not impossible to explain with reference to basic motivation. The popular idea that politics corrupts has to do with the tendency, observed among public leaders, to concentrate increasingly on instrumental goals as opposed to basic ones which, by virtue of being “basic” and thus without apparent cause or justification, may be difficult to defend and difficult to achieve.

Once we move from observing decisionmakers’ preferences and intent to their actual decisions and behavior, the picture becomes even more complicated. In making decisions to act, individuals consider what is possible and what is opportune, and attempt to take into account the likely and the possible consequences of various courses of action. At times, their actual behavior may provide to the observer no clues as to their original intent, and to attempt to understand their motivation based on observation may thus be very difficult. It is also clear that the motives of individual foreign policy decision-makers are not always the same as the objectives pursued by states abroad. There are other factors that need to be considered in explaining foreign policies, such as form of government. Because the discipline’s emphasis is on the foreign policies of collectives, such as states, we need to develop further on the links between different levels of analysis, that is, how individual motives, perceptions, and calculations feed into small group, governmental, societal, and finally international activity. A number of innovative approaches have already been developed along these lines. For example, Hermann and Preston have shown how motivation, cognition, and personality affect leadership style and group decision-making.<sup>168</sup> Herrman, Tetlock, and Visser have examined the interaction between cognitive and situational factors in foreign policymaking.<sup>169</sup>

Although our framework cannot include all of these potentially relevant factors, its focus has a number of advantages. First, motivation affects foreign policy decisionmaking at every stage of development—from problem identification to evaluation. By encompassing important aspects of perception, goal selection, and behavior it can deal with many aspects of the decisionmaking process. Second, motivation can be clearly and systematically linked to other factors which impact on decisions. Hermann and Preston have demonstrated how central motivation is in understanding a host of other decision-making factors, including cognitive

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motivational assumptions in one form or another inform every approach to the explanation of foreign policies, they can usefully serve as a focus for efforts at integration.

<sup>168</sup> Hermann and Preston, “Presidents, Advisors, and Foreign Policy.”

<sup>169</sup> Herrman, Tetlock, and Visser, “Mass Public Decisions to Go to War.”

structure, personality, and group dynamics.<sup>170</sup> Page and Shapiro have shown that the significance of many demographic variables routinely included in foreign policy decisionmaking studies pales in comparison to that of ideology, a concept which can easily be tied to motivation.<sup>171</sup> Third, a focus on motivation can help us identify hypotheses that might be tested to sharpen our overall understanding of the foreign policymaking process. Recent work has shown that we can test such hypotheses employing multiple methods and levels of analysis. Herrman, Tetlock, and Visser have used both experimentation and survey research to determine the relative values of competing hypotheses explaining foreign policy decisionmaking.<sup>172</sup> Thomas S. Mowle uses hypotheses involving different levels of analysis to test the relative validity of propositions drawn from different theoretical approaches.<sup>173</sup>

We want to reiterate our claim that all three basic motives must be taken into account in explaining foreign policy decisions. Future research should combine the explanatory power of all three basic motives rather than testing one against another. It is important to stress this point because to this day most foreign policy analysts either emphasize the motivating power of fear (realism) or that of interest (liberalism). They often overlook the third motive, recognition, entirely.<sup>174</sup> For example, neoconservatives and the Bush administration place an inordinate amount of emphasis on only one motive, fear. In their zeal to be effective in pursuit of security, they have largely ignored the values of community (recognition) and perhaps even prosperity (interest).

Throughout the 1990s, most American foreign policy analysts refused to accept the importance of the multilateral-unilateral distinction that lies at the heart of the community domain. They often confused multilateralism with a pro-involvement, or an anti-involvement, orientation or even with noncoerciveness.<sup>175</sup> Yet, today no one in the same context discusses foreign policy without reference to multilateralism-unilateralism as distinct from these other dimensions. Of course, our assumption that all three basic human motives must be taken into

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<sup>170</sup> Hermann and Preston, "Presidents, Advisors, and Foreign Policy."

<sup>171</sup> Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro, *The Rational Public* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992).

<sup>172</sup> Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser, "Mass Public Decisions to Go to War."

<sup>173</sup> Thomas S. Mowle, "Worldviews in Foreign Policy: Realism, Liberalism, and External Conflict," *Political Psychology* 24/3, 2003.

<sup>174</sup> This argument is also made by Freyberg-Inan in *What Moves Man*. She demonstrates realism's excessive reliance on the motive of fear as well as the problematic consequences of this emphasis.

<sup>175</sup> See William Chittick and Keith Billingsley, "The Perils of Flatland," paper delivered at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Convention in London, 1989.

account does not mean that they are equally salient in every case—only that each plays an important, independent role in foreign policymaking which must not be overlooked.

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