11. The Netherlands. A Heartland Full of Insights Into Populist Communication

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Introduction
Populism has played a pivotal role in the Dutch political landscape since the 2000s. The rise and rapid decline of Pim Fortuyn’s right-wing populist party Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) in 2002 marks the start of influential Dutch populism (Schafraad, Scheepers, & Wester, 2010). Although the party’s success was short-lived, Lijst Pim Fortuyn was the first populist party that managed to obtain a large share of the vote in the national elections, eventually winning 26 seats in parliament. After Fortuyn’s death in 2002, Dutch politics witnessed a few relatively quiet years, with a quarreling Lijst Pim Fortuyn and several offshoots of Fortuyn’s party, such as One Netherlands and the Party for the Netherlands. Successful populism re-entered the stage with Wilders’ Freedom Party (PVV) in 2005. In 2010, the Freedom Party even became the third largest party in the general elections, winning 24 seats in parliament. During the last decade, various populist parties such as Verdonk’s right-wing Proud of the Netherlands (ToN) and the 50Plus Party (for the senior population) entered the political stage in the slipstream of Lijst Pim Fortuyn and the Freedom Party, albeit with less electoral success.

Research on Populism in the Netherlands
Authors have predominately reached agreement on how to define the core characteristics of populism in the Netherlands. Populism is defined as a “thin”-centered ideology, of which the core consists of the following three characteristics: (a) focus on the people, the homogenous in-group; (b) belief that the homogenous in-group is threatened by the homogenous out-group; (c) view of society as divided into two antagonistic groups: the pure and blameless Dutch people versus the culprit out-group (Houtman & Achterberg, 2010a; Houwen, 2012; Van Reybrouck, 2011). For left-wing populism, this out-group encompasses culprit political elites, and for right-wing populism, it ranges from Islam to immigrants. When conceptualizing populism in the Netherlands, authors predominantly cite internationally acknowledged key works on populism (see Chapter 2 in this volume).

Despite agreeing on how to define populism’s core, the reviewed literature disagrees as to whether charismatic leadership and the exclusion of horizontally constructed out-groups define or merely facilitate populism. Specifically, some authors argue that charisma in the Weberian sense, indicating a direct bond between leader and followers, cannot be identified as a characteristic of populism in the Netherlands (e.g., Koopmans & Muis, 2009; van der Brug & Mughan, 2007). Indeed, van der Brug and Mughan (2007) found empirical evidence indicating that populist leaders are no more likely to shape electoral outcomes than leaders of mainstream parties. In contrast, other authors state that Dutch populist leaders like Fortuyn and Wilders are charismatic by arguing that they possess all the qualities of charismatic leadership (e.g., d’ Anjou, 2005; Dorussen, 2004; Ellemers, 2002). The discrepancy in the findings thus seems to be caused by differential definitions of charismatic leadership.
Some authors argue that Dutch populism by definition entails the exclusion of people perceived as “others,” such as immigrants and people identifying with Islam (e.g., Houtman & Achterberg, 2010b; Houwen, 2012). These studies are predominantly single-case observations of the Dutch right-wing populist parties Lijst Pim Fortuyn and the Freedom Party. Other authors more carefully distinguish right-wing or anti-immigration populism from left-wing, anti-establishment populism (e.g., Fennema, 2005). Yet another line of research opts for a minimal definition of populism, emphasizing the distinction between the homogenous people and the corrupt elite as the populist core (e.g., Akkerman, Mudde, & Zaslove, 2014).

The source of disagreement among authors publishing on Dutch populism may be identified by taking a closer look at the distribution of empirical versus theoretical work. One strand of research draws on empirical findings (e.g., Bos & Brants, 2014b; Rooduijn, 2014a, 2014b; van der Brug & Mughan, 2007), whereas the other only offers rationalizations, often post hoc, why certain actors, political parties, or content can be described as populist (e.g., Heijne, 2011; Houtman & Achterberg, 2010a, 2010b). Specifically, the extant literature on Dutch populism contains 17 theoretical works and 36 empirical works. Most of the theoretical works (n = 12) are published in the Dutch language, whereas the empirical works are predominately (n = 31) published in international journals. Throughout this chapter, theoretical publications and empirical research are distinguished by using terms such as “argue,” “indicate,” and “point to” for theoretical arguments and “found,” “findings,” “results,” and the like, for empirical conclusions.

Concerning the empirical works, a great variety of methods have been employed to study populism in the Netherlands. Most authors have conducted content analyses of party manifestos or media content. To provide insights in the demand-side of populism, many authors conducted longitudinal surveys (e.g., Belanger & Aarts, 2006). Yet, the effects of populist communication remain understudied, and we know even less about the mechanisms underlying these effects. However, some authors have conducted experiments to provide insights into how the populist communication strategy affects the electorate (e.g., Bos, van der Brug, & de Vreese, 2013). Moreover, some studies provide insights into populism’s media effects by pairing content analysis with panel survey data (e.g., Bos, van der Brug, & de Vreese, 2011). Other studies have employed qualitative methods to provide a more in-depth understanding of how populism is interpreted by citizens (e.g., de Lange & Art, 2011; Mepschen, 2005).

Most studies focus on populism as a phenomenon that is distinct from mainstream politics. Consequently, the results of these studies are based on single-case observations or comparisons of populist parties within the populist party family (e.g., Akkerman, 2005; van Kessel, 2011). Other scholars argue that one has to include the mainstream parties in the analysis to make a valid comparison between populist and mainstream parties (e.g., Bos et al., 2011; van der Brug, Fennema, & Tillie, 2000). We found multiple studies that compared populism between countries. Akkerman (2011) compared media coverage on populism in Britain and the Netherlands. Van der Brug et al. (2000) compared mainstream parties to populist parties in different European countries. De Lange and Rooduijn (2011) looked at different Western European countries to see whether the populist zeitgeist actually exists. Moreover, Rooduijn (2014a) compared media content in five different European countries and found that the degree of populism in the media is related to the success of populist parties in Europe.
As stated in this chapter’s introduction, the most successful populist parties in Dutch history are the Freedom Party and Lijst Pim Fortuyn. All authors publishing on Dutch populism define these parties and their leaders as populist. Some authors refer to populist parties of the past, such as the Center Democrats (e.g., Mudde, 1996) and The Farmers’ Party (e.g., van Kessel, 2011). Few studies mention left-wing populist parties, such as the Socialist Party (e.g., Rooduijn, de Lange, & van der Brug, 2014).

Following Jagers and Walgrave’s (2007) typology of populism, the extant scientific literature considers the Freedom Party as an example of complete populism. Hence, it is argued that this party’s rhetoric refers to the common Dutch citizen and aims to appeal to citizens by using simplified language. Moreover, the Freedom Party emphasizes the opposition between the ordinary people and the political elite. Doing so, it communicates anti-establishment populism. Muslims and immigrants are the excluded out-groups constructed as a threat to the Dutch nation. The categorization of the Freedom Party is based on theoretical observations (Fennema, 2010), on empirical studies analyzing party manifestos and media appearances (Vossen, 2010), and on comparative research (Rooduijn et al., 2014). The other populist parties that witnessed electoral or media success, Lijst Pim Fortuyn and Proud of the Netherlands, are also categorized as instances of complete populism. Although the reviewed literature does not agree on whether the Socialist Party can be regarded as (left-wing) populist, it could be argued that this party’s rhetoric reflects anti-establishment populism since it emphasizes the opposition between the ordinary people and the political elite governing the country, without excluding segments of the people.

In the light of contextual factors, it has been argued that the success of populist messages depends on the perception of a crisis threatening the nation state (Heijne, 2011). Indeed, most literature on populism covered in this review emphasized that the construction of the heartland being in a state of crisis forms the breeding ground of (right-wing) populism (e.g., Ellemers, 2002; Houtman & Achterberg, 2010b; Vossen, 2012). This crisis needs to be constructed as a situation that can be dealt with by populist actors (Vossen, 2012). Against this backdrop, the supply of populist actors that are able to convince the people of their key role in solving the crisis is necessary in order for populism to prevail. The reviewed literature does not provide insights into specific contextual factors resulting in the rise of left-wing populist parties in the Netherlands—unsurprisingly, as it turns out, since left-wing populism has been less successful than right-wing populism.

Populist Actors as Communicators
The extant literature on populism in the Netherlands provides insights into the unique communication style of populist actors. Populists in the Netherlands speak directly to the people in the name of the people (Lucardie, 2007). The populist style of communication is defined as direct, simple, offensive, and based on common sense (Bos et al., 2013; Fennema, 2005). Furthermore, populist communication is characterized by a strong critique of the establishment or the elites, who are blamed for polluting the purity of the heartland (Bosman & d’Haenens, 2008; Vossen, 2012). Another distinguishing feature is the use of emotions—negative emotions of fear and threat toward the out-group (Akkerman, 2005) and positive emotions of belonging to the Dutch heartland (Van Reybrouck, 2011). Hence, populists construct a crisis of the heartland that has lost something that needs to be regained. The mission of the reluctant populist politician is to resolve this crisis by removing the culprits that caused it (Bos et al., 2013).
Personalized leadership is marked as another distinguishing feature of populism (Bos & van der Brug, 2010). Some literature explicitly refers to the charisma of political leaders as a prerequisite for a populist style (e.g., Ellemers, 2012; Houwen, 2012; Lucardie, 2007). Van der Brug and Mughan (2007) refuted the necessity and centrality of charismatic leadership for populism. The results of their content analysis and survey indicate that the Weberian definition of charisma does not apply to the relationship between Dutch populist leaders and their followers. As argued by Vossen (2012), charismatic leadership can be part of populism but should not be considered as one of the key defining characteristics.

The literature offers some insights into the different tactics that political actors in the Netherlands use when approaching the media. On a general note, Houwen (2012) and Pels (2011) have argued that populist actors use a personalized approach. More specifically, Bos, van der Brug, and de Vreese (2011) have argued that, in order to be effective, populist actors should use a communication strategy that emphasizes distance from the political establishment as well as disdain of anti-democratic forces. Moreover, populists have to make clear that they oppose the political elite but not liberal democracy as a principle (Mudde, 1996). In contrast, mainstream politicians do not appear effective when they adopt a populist style of communication (Bos et al., 2011).

Muis and Scholte (2013) pointed to the flexibility of the populist communication strategy. Populist party leaders like Geert Wilders are able to adapt their communication strategy to fit the electorates’ and media system’s demands. Hence, they are active entrepreneurs of their own fate. Rooduijn et al. (2014) have found that the media coverage of populist actors becomes less populist when electoral success is gained.

The empirical findings of Bos and Brants (2014b) and Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011) indicate that the communication style of populist parties is significantly more populist than the communication strategy of mainstream political parties. Hence, there is no convincing empirical evidence that populism is contagious (Rooduijn et al., 2014), as some assume. Still, the literature shows some disagreement on whether both populist and mainstream politicians use a populist style to approach different media. Rooduijn et al. (2014) found that only populist actors approach the media using a populist communication style. Similarly, Bos et al. (2013) concluded that mainstream parties only adopt features of the populist presentation style and not the rhetoric. In contrast, Houtman and Achterberg (2010b) emphasized the omnipresence of the populist zeitgeist. According to them, both populist and mainstream politicians approach the media in a populist way, which is even more prevalent on the forums of online and tabloid media. The different propagated viewpoints on the populist zeitgeist between Houtman and Achterberg (2010a), on the one hand, and Rooduijn et al. (2014), on the other hand, may be explained by differences in how populism and the media are defined. Since Rooduijn et al.’s inclusion criteria for media formats is stricter and populism is defined more narrowly, it may be no surprise that Houtman & Achterberg found a populist zeitgeist where Rooduijn et al. were unable to detect it empirically.

The reviewed literature predominantly agrees that the communication style of populist political parties distinguishes them from mainstream political parties (Rooduijn, de Lange, & van der Brug, 2012; Van Reybrouck, 2011). The most crucial difference is the populist emphasis on “the other” as a threat to the in-group of the common people (Fennema, 2010). How “the other” is constructed differs among different types of populism. The right-wing complete populism of Wilders, for example, constructs both the political elite and dangerous others (i.e., Islam, immigrants) as threats to the nation (Vossen, 2011). According to a more
minimal definition of populism, “the other” is the political establishment constructed as a culprit (Houtman & Achterberg, 2010a; Rooduijn et al., 2012).

Populism’s focus on exclusive identity is emphasized by Heijne (2011), who has argued that populists communicate how the freedom of others should be limited to save the freedom of the real Dutch in-group. Houtman & Achterberg (2010b) even went so far as stating that populist actors use a xenophobic style to communicate their views on society. Heijne (2011) supplemented this view by stating that populism is targeted at reconstructing the lost Dutch heartland. In this view, populism is predominantly a quest for identity.

Whereas mainstream political parties use complex language to elaborate on political problems, populist parties simplify political problems in order to make them understandable to the common people (Uitermark, Oudenampsen, van Heerikhuizen, & van Reekum, 2012). The populist style of language is characterized by short sentences, one-liners, common sense, and direct speech to the people (Aalbers, 2012; Lucardie, 2007). Furthermore, populist language is framed in binary oppositions constructing the people as in-group against the elite as out-group (Houwen, 2012). The populist style aims to speak directly to the people by framing the populist leader as the solution to the collectively experienced problems of the Dutch heartland. In their empirical tests of the singularity of this populist style, Bos, van der Brug, and de Vreese (2010) found results only confirming populism’s uniqueness. Bos and Brants (2014b), found significant differences in the way Dutch populist and mainstream politicians present themselves.

All in all, systematic research on Dutch populist actors as communicators reveals that the communication style of populist leaders in the Netherlands is different from mainstream politicians. Populists’ distinguished style aims to circumvent the elite in an appeal that speaks directly to the people. Although some scholars theoretically assume populism is contagious, empirical research has found the opposite.

The Media and Populism
The literature on populism in the Netherlands has not reached a consensus on how to position the media in populist discourse. Bos and Brants (2014a) pointed to an important distinction between populism by the media and populism intended for the media. The former type of relation taps into the concept of media populism (Krämer, 2014; Mazzoleni, 2003), whereas the latter type of relation concerns the media’s receptivity to populist ideas. Various authors have argued, on theoretical grounds, that media outlets actively engage in populism (e.g., de Lange, 2011; Houtman & Achterberg, 2010a; Uitermark et al., 2012). These studies contend that the content of tabloid media is populist since it emphasizes a binary opposition between the corrupt elite and the blameless people. Uitermark et al. (2012) and Vossen (2012) argued that the Dutch tabloid newspaper de Telegraaf actively engages in a populist style of communication, whereas quality newspapers are less likely to be populist. Moreover, Uitermark et al. (2012) argued that Dutch television shows actively engage in populism by positioning the viewer, the common man on the street, as central to the program.

However, the extant literature provides limited empirical support for the existence of media populism. Based on findings from a content analysis, Bos and Brants (2014b) concluded that the tabloid newspaper de Telegraaf is not significantly more populist than the elite newspaper NRC Handelsblad. These results are in line with very similar findings of Rooduijn (2014a) and Bos et al. (2011). It thus seems unlikely that tabloid newspapers actively engage in populist news coverage.
The extant literature provides more convincing support for the second type of the media-populism relationship distinguished by Bos and Brants. Hence, it is argued that the media create a discursive opportunity for populist actors to ventilate their ideas (Koopmans & Muis, 2009). However, that does not mean that journalists are just passing on information from populist parties. Schafraad, Scheepers, and Wester (2010) looked at two decades of media coverage of right-wing parties, starting in 1984. Their study showed that newspaper coverage of right-wing populist parties is predominantly negative but does not ignore or stigmatize right-wing populism. Moreover, toward the end of the studied period, newspaper coverage of right-wing populism did become more versatile and increasingly more supportive of the populist ideology in the Netherlands.

The literature offers mixed evidence for the ways in which distinct media outlets deal with populism, with the main focus on the difference between tabloid and quality newspapers. Bosman and d’Haenens (2008) argued that the left-leaning, elite newspaper Volkskrant reacted negatively to the rise of Pim Fortuyn, whereas the tabloid newspaper de Telegraaf did not show a clear negativity bias in reporting on Fortuyn. In line with this claim, Akkerman (2011) found that the tabloid newspaper and the quality newspaper both stigmatized Wilders in some cases, but that the former also defended Wilders against stigmatization. Yet, that stance did not prevent the newspaper from taking on the elitist perspective in covering the release of Wilders’ anti-Islamic movie, Fitna. In contrast, Schafraad et al. (2010) found no significant difference in the favorability of media coverage on populism between tabloid and quality newspapers.

The extant literature provides some insights into the appearance of populism outside the realm of traditional media. Houtman and Achterberg (2010b) and Uitermark et al. (2012) have argued that online media such as Twitter and entertainment shows on television allow populists to send self-related messages to citizens. Drawing on ethnographic research, Mepschen (2011) argued that people interpret their social world using populism as a classifying frame of reference. Similarly, Houtman and Achterberg (2010b) stated that populism resonates in citizens’ discourse because it is strongly represented in comments on online forums of tabloid newspapers such as de Telegraaf.

Uitermark et al. (2012) argued that online media versus offline media and journalistic versus citizens’ discourse are not necessarily decoupled by populist actors and communicators. In their view, different types of media are integrated with the central aim of engaging the ordinary citizen in the debate. This assumption is confirmed by the study of Bos and Brants (2014b), who found a large amount of populist content in talk shows.

In sum, the reviewed literature on populism in the Netherlands indicates that the media are more likely to be receptive to populist rhetoric rather than to actively engage in populism themselves. Certain types of media (e.g., tabloid newspapers, interactive media) may be more receptive to populism, but it has not been proven that they are actually more populist than mainstream media.

Citizens and Populism
Research on the success of populism can be roughly divided into studies on the demand side of populism (e.g., Rooduijn, 2014b) and the supply side of populism (e.g., de Lange & Art, 2011; Muis & Scholte, 2013). Supply-side theories assume that the communication strategies
of well-organized populist parties are effective, since they fill a space that is left open by mainstream political parties. Their chameleon-like communication strategy is better able to adapt to the electorate’s needs compared to mainstream political parties (Muis & Scholte, 2013). Moreover, supply-side explanations help us understand why some populist parties are more successful in gaining popularity than others—for instance, because their performance is perceived to be more effective (Bos & van der Brug, 2010) or because they or their issues gain visibility in the mass media (Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart, 2007; Bos et al., 2011).

Demand-side studies on populism provide more insights into the motives and backgrounds of citizens who vote for populist political parties. A first motive that is frequently mentioned in the extant literature is citizens’ political discontent (Belanger & Aarts, 2006; Van Kessel, 2011). Hence, voting for populist parties is a way of expressing discontent with the establishment (Akkerman, 2001). Schuitema and Rooduijn (2013) found that only protest motives distinguish Dutch populist party voters from voters for mainstream parties. Van der Brug (2003), however, argues that the effect works the other way around: Voters for the populist Lijst Pim Fortuyn become more discontent because they voted for the populist party. It thus remains unclear whether discontent is a cause or effect of populist voting.

Another motive for populist party voting is agreement with the statements communicated by these parties. As indicated by the supply-side studies, populist parties fill a gap that is left open by mainstream political parties (Koopmans & Muis, 2009). Van der Brug et al. (2000) found that citizens vote for Dutch right-wing populist parties because they agree with their anti-immigration stance. Moreover, Akkerman (2005) found that agreement with another issue owned by right-wing populist parties—crime—increases support for the right-wing populist party Lijst Pim Fortuyn.

The final (but contested motive) found in the literature concerns the appeal to a strong, charismatic leader (Aalbers, 2012; Bosman & d’Haenens, 2008). It has been argued that citizens identify with charismatic leaders because these politicians present themselves as the people’s representatives and, as such, better able to offer practical solutions for political issues than their competitors. Van der Brug & Mughan (2007), however, refuted the charismatic leadership hypothesis by arguing that voters for mainstream parties and populist parties base their vote equally on leadership qualities.

Voters for Dutch populist parties share some background characteristics. Dutch populist voters are predominantly defined as less-educated, younger males (Dorussen, 2004). These citizens feel threatened by the out-groups constructed as the enemies in populist rhetoric (Mudde, 1996). They experience both anger and toward and fear of immigrants or the corrupt elite that blocks them from reaching their goals (Fennema, 2005). Moreover, Fennema has argued that citizens experiencing a lost connection to identity are attracted to right-wing populism because it promises to revive the lost national identity. Hence, social isolation and the quest for social identity is another distinguishing feature of the (right-wing) populist voter. Akkerman et al. (2014) found that people who have stronger populist attitudes are more likely to vote for populist parties.

The extant literature points to differences between individuals in the reactions to populist messages. Bos et al. (2013) have argued that the populist communication style positively affects the perceived legitimacy of rightwing populists but only among lower educated, politically cynical, and lower politically efficacious citizens. They have argued that these characteristics that make people susceptible to the populist message are overrepresented.
among the electorate of right-wing populist parties, which may explain their electoral success.

Citizens who are confronted with immigrants in their daily lives are argued to be more susceptible to persuasion by populist communication (Fennema, 2005; Koopmans & Muis, 2009). These citizens feel threatened because they have to compete with immigrants for jobs and social security resources (de Koster, Achterberg, and van der Waal, 2013). As the populist message offers solutions to remove the ones blocking citizens’ goals, the populist message may be particularly attractive for people who experience others as a threat.

The reviewed literature has argued that populist messages raise a sense of fear of out-groups, constructed as a threat to the purity of the heartland (Vossen, 2012). Hence, the emotional effect of populist messages can be strong attachments to the national identity and charismatic populist leaders, fear for specific societal out-groups, and feelings of hate toward the political elite (Heijne, 2011; Houtman & Achterberg, 2010b; Houwen, 2012; Uitermark et al., 2012). Empirical research on populism’s emotional effects is lacking.

Since populist political messages construct out-groups as threatening, citizens’ perceptions of ethnic minorities and immigrants are negatively biased (Aalbers, 2012; de Lange, 2011; Houtman & Achterberg, 2010b; Pels, 2011). Citizens’ general trust in and satisfaction with politics are also affected by populist messages (de Lange, 2011; van der Brug, 2003). Since populist messages emphasize how mainstream politicians have failed to keep their promises and how they are currently not solving any problems in society with their bureaucratic practices, citizens may lose their faith in mainstream politicians.

In sum, the reviewed literature has indicated that Dutch citizens support populist parties for a variety of reasons. The motives most frequently mentioned in the literature are political dissatisfaction and agreement with (right-wing) populist ideas. Dutch populist party voters are predominantly defined as less-educated, younger males. These citizens are made to believe that their heartland is in a severe state of crisis. The populist leader who offers solutions to solve this crisis has proven to be an attractive alternative to mainstream politicians.

**Summary and Recent Developments**
The literature published on Dutch populism offers valuable, systematic insights into the content, effects, and mechanisms of the populist communication strategy. Internationally published studies have been predominantly based on empirical findings. The Dutch-language literature, however, is predominantly theoretical in content. Therefore, on its own, the Dutch literature offers only limited systematic empirical knowledge of the state of populism in the Netherlands.

The literature agrees on the definition of populism as a “thin”-cored ideology with an appeal to the homogenous in-group of the nation versus the corrupt elite as out-group. It was found that the populist rhetoric distinguishes itself from mainstream politics by simplifying political problems to binary oppositions of “us” against “them.” The communication style of populists distinguishes itself by using simple and direct language, one-liners, and provocative statements directed toward the elite and other out-groups. The media may influence the populist discourse in multiple ways. First, it was argued that the media logic in the Netherlands resonates with the core values of populism. Second, the literature discussed how the media provide populist party leaders with publicity, which they need in order to succeed. Third, some literature argued that media engage actively in a populist communication style themselves. However, disagreement still exists about the notion that tabloid media are more
aligned with the populist communication strategy than quality newspapers. Moreover, empirical research has only demonstrated limited evidence for populism by the media.

Citizens are attracted to populist messages for a variety of reasons. First, populist parties have issue ownership over problems that citizens perceive as important but are not dealt with sufficiently by mainstream parties. As populist parties close this gap, citizens who prioritize these issues feel represented by the populist parties. Second, the anti-establishment rhetoric of populism boosts citizens’ political discontent (although the causal order is possibly reversed). Third, the charismatic leadership qualities of populist leaders are mentioned as a motive for populist support. Again, this finding is not uncontested in the reviewed literature. Finally, identity concerns and a perceived threat of identity by others may make citizens susceptible to the populist message. However, no systematic empirical research that taps into Dutch citizens’ identity concerns was found.

The reviewed literature provided insights into the effects of populist messages on citizens. First, as a result of populist messages, citizens may perceive the political elite and immigrants as more internally consistent, negative, and evil since they are blamed for causing problems in the Netherlands. Second, populist messages may result in feelings of fear toward out-groups that are constructed as a threat to the nation. Third, populist actors who emphasize political distrust and promise to resolve the nation’s pressing issues may increase citizens’ intentions to vote for populist parties.

To conclude this chapter, the literature on Dutch populism has shown that populist political parties are currently more influential than ever in the Netherlands. The communication style of populist actors emphasizes a distinction between the pure Dutch citizens and the corrupt elites. In the Dutch case of right-wing populism, “the other” is also defined as Muslims and immigrants. The media are receptive to populist ideas, but empirical research has not pointed to the existence of populism in the media themselves. The populist message influences citizens in multiple ways, and it may even affect populist perceptions and voting behavior. All in all, the extant literature on Dutch populism has resulted in systematic insights but at the same time left room for future research to shed more light on the content and mechanisms underlying populism, and its effects.

References


