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Sander Onderstal. KAFEE Lunch Seminars 2005.

Event details of The optimality of ignoring lobbyists
Date 19 September 2005
Time 12:15 -13:15

Sander Onderstal:

The optimality of ignoring lobbyists

Abstract
We study a situation in which interest groups compete in an all-pay auction for a political prize. Using mechanism design techniques, we derive conditions under which the government optimally balances the costs and the benefits of lobbying by ignoring all lobbying activities and by always assigning the prize to the interest group with the highest ex ante value for it.

Keywords: All-pay auction; Lobbying; Social welfare.

Organization:

  • Marcos Poplawski-Ribeiro (AE) (poplawski@tinbergen.nl)
  • Cesar Ariza Rojas (C.J.ArizaRojas@uva.nl)

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