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Jochen Bigus (Universität Osnabrück). ACLE Seminars.

Event details of Auditors’ Liability and Prospect Theory
Date 14 November 2005
Time 15:15 -16:30

Jochen Bigus (Universität Osnabrück):

Auditors’ Liability and Prospect Theory

This paper analyzes unilateral auditors’ liability assuming that the auditor has preferences according to Prospect Theory, thus, it considers loss aversion, risk-seeking behaviour with losses and weighting of probabilities. Compared to an Expected Utility maximizer the auditor has less incentives to take care under Prospect Theory when there is strict liability or negligence with a precise standard of due care. With a vague standard of due care results are mixed. With Prospect Theory, a negligence rule induces
less distortions than a strict liability regime.

More information and download paper on the ACLE website.