Máté Széles is a PhD Candidate at the Accounting Section of the Amsterdam Business School. He graduated cum laude from the master program Accounting and Control from the Erasmus University Rotterdam. Máté worked as an Executive Compensation Research Assistant at Ernst & Young Netherlands. Currently, he is on a research visit at the University of Utah. Máté is working on research projects related to insider trading, CEO inside debt holdings, bank CEO compensation and compensation of externally hired executives. Máté is involved in teaching activities as a tutor of the Financial Statement Analysis and Financial Accounting I courses and as supervisor of bachelor and master theses.
My research interest lies at the intersection of financial accounting, corporate governance, and executive compensation. I study information asymmetry among corporate insiders and capital providers, and the role of executive compensation contracts in mitigating information asymmetry. I am interested in corporate decisions to (re-)contract with executives, decisions about specific contract features, and how corporate contracting decisions provide context for value-relevant information signals to capital providers. Broadly speaking, I am interested in insider trading, insider ownership, executive succession, contract negotiation, the timing of equity grants, and executive compensation disclosure choices. I am further interested in the institutional setting shaped by proxy advisors, compensation consultants, insider trading rules, binding and non-binding corporate governance rules.