Amanatidis, G., Klumper, S., Markakis, E., Schäfer, G., & Tsikiridis, A. (2023). Partial Allocations in Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design: Bridging Multiple Levels of Service and Divisible Agents. In International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE) (pp. 41). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS); Vol. 14413). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48974-7_3
Kashaev, D., & Schäfer, G. (2023). Round and Bipartize for Vertex Cover Approximation. In International Conference on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX) (Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs); Vol. 275). https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX/RANDOM.2023.20
2022
Amanatidis, G., Kleer, P., & Schäfer, G. (2022). Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Non-monotone Submodular Objectives: Offline and Online. Mathematics of operations research, 47(3), 1707-2545.
Birmpas, G., Markakis, E., & Schäfer, G. (2022). Cost Sharing over Combinatorial Domains. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation , 10(1), 1. Article 4.
Brokkelkamp, R., Hoeijmakers, S., & Schäfer, G. (2022). Greater Flexibility in Mechanism Design Through Altruism. In International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT) (pp. 41-59). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS)). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15714-1_3
Huizing, D., & Schäfer, G. (2022). The Traveling k-Median Problem: Approximating Optimal Network Coverage. In International Workshop on Approximation and Online Algorithms (WAOA) (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNTCS); Vol. 12982). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92702-8_6
Huizing, D., van der Mei, R. D., Schäfer, G., & Bhulai, S. (2022). The enriched median routing problem and its usefulness in practice. Computers & Industrial Engineering.
Klumper, S., & Schäfer, G. (2022). Budget Feasible Mechanisms for Procurement Auctions with Divisible Agents. In International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT) (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS)). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15714-1_5
van Beek, A., Brokkelkamp, R., & Schäfer, G. (2022). Corruption in Auctions: Social Welfare Loss in Hybrid Multi-Unit Auctions. In International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS) https://www.ifaamas.org/Proceedings/aamas2022/pdfs/p1283.pdf
2021
Kleer, P., & Schäfer, G. (2021). Computation and efficiency of potential function minimizers of combinatorial congestion games. Mathematical programming, 190(1), 523-560.
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