25 August 2026
Since 2015 border restrictions were introduced almost 500 times in total within Europe, peaking during the coronavirus pandemic, with numbers remaining high thereafter.
‘Before 2015 this was often due to political summits and terrorist threats, but after 2015 migration and pandemics have been the main reasons,’ Herbig notes. ‘What was once intended as an exceptional emergency measure seems to be becoming normal, and that is problematic.’
Herbig sought to answer questions that have rarely been asked: What impact do intra-European border controls and closures have on Europe’s citizens? Do people become less positive about the EU? Do their attitudes towards migrants change? And does it matter how politicians justify such measures? Her focus was on Germany, France and the Netherlands. She analysed surveys from the COVID-period, as well as the political communication of border policies more broadly, and examined their effects through survey experiments among residents.
Border closures during the pandemic turned out to influence people’s attitudes very quickly. ‘In the first weeks after borders closed, people living in the affected border regions felt less attached to the European Union and became more negative about migrants,’ Herbig explains.
But these effects faded quickly within the first month of the closures. ‘That is good news in itself, but it shows how quickly border policies can have an effect. Now that border controls are being used frequently as political instruments, this potential impact should not be ignored.’
Equally striking, says Herbig, is how citizens think about border controls in general. ‘A majority supports free travel within Europe but is also in favour of national border controls.’ This apparent contradiction can be explained, she argues, by the fact that people benefit personally from open borders but prefer others to shoulder the burden of keeping out the ‘unwanted other’.
It also seem to matter who introduces controls or closes the border. ‘If a neighbouring country shuts its border and effectively excludes residents of the other country, trust among those citizens in their own government declines, because their country is apparently being cast as a risk or a problem.’
Border policy is not just a technical instrument; it is also a symbolic signal between countries,Lisa Herbig
According to Herbig, that effect is more persistent than the short, initial shock to European attachment. ‘Border policy therefore is not just a technical instrument; it is also a symbolic signal between countries, which resonates in how citizens assess their government.’
How governments justify their decisions appears less important than often assumed. ‘Whether border controls are justified in terms of security, the economy or health hardly increases or decreases public support.’
What does matter is that there is an explanation that meets basic standards of due care: is it lawful, has there been consultation with neighbouring countries, and are other stakeholders taken into account? ‘Such arguments increase the perceived legitimacy of the measure.’
Notably, support for border controls falls once the tangible burdens for citizens are explicitly spelled out, such as waiting times, tailbacks or shortages of goods.
A major risk, Herbig warns, is that border controls shift from an exception to a standard instrument, as it is currently the case. ‘This ongoing normalisation increases the temptation for governments to reach for border controls at every new conflict or incident, even when effectiveness is doubtful and the legal basis shaky. But the political side effects for European citizens and the Union as such – eroding trust, growing hostility and tensions between member states – should not be underestimated.’
Lisa Herbig, 2026, ‘The Politics of Borders. How Intra-European Border Policies Shape Political Attitudes in the European Union’. Supervisor: Prof. Dr T. Kuhn; Co-supervisors: Dr K. Gattermann and Dr O. Eisele
Thursday 3 September, 14:00–15:30, Aula, Amsterdam