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prof. dr. T.J.S. (Theo) Offerman

Faculty of Economics and Business
Section Microeconomics
Photographer: FEB

Visiting address
  • Roetersstraat 11
  • Room number: 7.28
Postal address
  • Postbus 15867
    1001 NJ Amsterdam
  • Profile

    Background and interests

    My current position is professor of Behavioral Game Theory at the University of Amsterdam (since 2005). My academic interests include the fields of Behavioral Economics, Experimental Economics and Game Theory. Recently, my research has focused on topics like auctions, positive and negative reciprocity, public goods, strategic communication (cheap talk and signaling) and discrimination. I am a fellow of the Tinbergen Institute and a CESS research fellow.

    Research group

    Website of CREED

    Curriculum Vitae 

  • Publications

    2019

    • He, S., Offerman, T., & van de Ven, J. (2019). The power and limits of sequential communication in coordination games. Journal of Economic Theory, 181, 238-273. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.02.004 [details]
    • van Leeuwen, B., Offerman, T. J. S., & Schram, A. J. H. C. (2019). Competition for Status Creates Superstars: An Experiment on Public Good Provision and Network Formation. Journal of the European Economic Association. https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvz001

    2018

    2017

    2016

    2015

    2014

    • Nosenzo, D., Offerman, T., Sefton, M., & van der Veen, A. (2014). Encouraging compliance: bonuses versus fines in inspection games. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 30(3), 623-648. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewt001 [details]
    • de Groot Ruiz, A., Offerman, T., & Onderstal, S. (2014). For those about to talk we salute you: an experimental study of credible deviations and ACDC. Experimental Economics, 17(2), 173-199. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-013-9362-z [details]

    2013

    2011

    2009

    • Offerman, T., & Onderstal, S. (2009). Making uncompetitive auctions competitive: a survey of experiments. In J. Hinloopen, & H-T. Normann (Eds.), Experiments and competition policy (pp. 231-266). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [details]
    • Offerman, T., & Schotter, A. (2009). Imitation and luck: an experimental study on social sampling. Games and Economic Behavior, 65(2), 461-502. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.03.004 [details]
    • Offerman, T., Sonnemans, J., van de Kuilen, G., & Wakker, P. P. (2009). A truth serum for non-Bayesians : correcting proper scoring rules for risk attitudes. The Review of Economic Studies, 76(4), 1461-1489. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00557.x [details]

    2008

    • Eliaz, K., Offerman, T., & Schotter, A. (2008). Creating competition out of thin air: an experimental study of right-to-choose auctions. Games and Economic Behavior, 62(2), 383-416. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.05.004 [details]
    • Schram, A., Offerman, T., & Sonnemans, J. (2008). Explaining the comparative statistics in step-level public good games. In C. R. Plott, & V. L. Smith (Eds.), Handbook of experimental economics results. - Vol. 1 (pp. 817-824). Amsterdam: North-Holland. [details]

    2006

    2004

    2003

    2002

    2001

    1999

    1998

    1997

    • Offerman, T. J. S. (1997). Beliefs and Decision Rules in Public Good Games - Theory and Experiments. Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer. [details]

    1996

    • Offerman, T. J. S., Schram, A. J. H. C., & Sonnemans, J. H. (1996). Value orientations, expectations and voluntary contributions in public goods. Economic Journal, 106, 817-845. https://doi.org/10.2307/2235360 [details]

    2006

    • Offerman, T. J. S. (2006). Economisch Design. Tijdschrift voor Politieke Ekonomie, 27(4), 22-39. [details]

    2005

    • Offerman, T. J. S. (2005). Optimale Veilingen in de Praktijk. In KNAW Yearbook 2005 KNAW.

    2000

    • Offerman, T., & Sonnemans, J. (2000). What is causing overreaction? An experimental investigation of recency and the hot hand effect. Unknown Publisher. [details]

    1999

    • Goeree, J. K., & Offerman, T. J. S. (1999). Competetive bidding in auctions with private and common values. CREED Working Paper. [details]
    • Offerman, T. J. S., & Potters, J. J. M. (1999). Does Auctioning of Entry Licences Affect Market Prices? An Experimental Study. CREED Working Paper. [details]

    1998

    • Cox, J. C., Offerman, T. J. S., Olson, M., & Schram, A. J. H. C. (1998). Competition For vs On the the Rails: A Laboratory Experiment. Working Paper. [details]
    • Guth, W., Offerman, T. J. S., Potters, J. J. M., Strobel, M., & Verbon, H. A. A. (1998). An Experimental Study of Inter- and Intragenerational Solidarity in a Model with Multiple Families. Working Paper. [details]
    • Offerman, T. J. S. (1998). Hurting Hurts More Than Helping Helps: The Role of the Self-Serving Bias. Discussion paper - Tinbergen Institute, 99-018/1. [details]
    • Offerman, T. J. S., & Sonnemans, J. H. (1998). What's causing overreaction? An Experimental Investigation of Recency and the Hot Hand Effect. Working Paper. [details]
    • Offerman, T. J. S., Potters, J. J. M., & Verbon, H. A. A. (1998). Cooperation in an Overlapping Generations Experiment. Discussion paper - Tinbergen Institute, 99-019/1. [details]

    1997

    • Offerman, T. J. S., & Sonnemans, J. H. (1997). What's causing overreaction? An Experimental Investigation of recency and the hot hand effect. Discussion Paper centER, 9736. [details]
    • Offerman, T. J. S., Potters, J. J. M., & Sonnemans, J. H. (1997). Imitation and Belief Learning in an Oligopoly Experiment. Discussion paper - Tinbergen Institute, 97-116/1. [details]
    • Offerman, T., Sonnemans, J., & Potters, J. (1997). Imitation and belief learning in an oligopoly experiment. (Tinbergen Institute discussion paper; No. 97-116/1). Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute. [details]
    • Potters, J. J. M., Sonnemans, J. H., & Offerman, T. J. S. (1997). Imitation and Belief Learning in an Oligopoly Experiment. Discussion paper - Tinbergen Institute, 97-116/1. [details]

    1996

    • Offerman, T. J. S., Schram, A. J. H. C., & Sonnemans, J. H. (1996). Quantal response models in step-level public good games. (TI discussion paper; No. 96-20/1). Amsterdam: Tinbergen Institute. [details]
    • Offerman, T. J. S., Schram, A. J. H. C., & Sonnemans, J. H. (1996). Strategic behaviour in public good games. (TI discussion paper; No. 96-111/1). Amsterdam: Tinbergen Institute. [details]
    • Offerman, T. J. S., Sonnemans, J. H., & Schram, A. J. H. C. (1996). Belief learning in pubic goods games: sophisticated strategics versus naive bayesians. (TI discussion paper 95-132). onbekend: Afdeling Algemene Economie. [details]

    1995

    • Offerman, T. J. S., Sonnemans, J. H., & Schram, A. J. H. C. (1995). Value orientations, expectations, and voluntary contributions in public goods. (TI discussion paper 95-008). onbekend: Afdeling Algemene Economie. [details]
    • Sonnemans, J. H., Schram, A. J. H. C., & Offerman, T. J. S. (1995). Public good provision and public bad prevention: the effect of framing. (TI discussion paper 95-009). onbekend: Afdeling Algemene Economie. [details]

    2012

    • Offerman, T., Onderstal, S., & Poort, J. (2012). Advies: Veiling van vergunningen 800, 900, 1800 MHz: antwoord op vragen Ministerie van Economische Zaken, Landbouw en Innovatie, DG Energie Telecom en Markten. Amsterdam: Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Research in Experimental Economics and Political Decision Making [etc.]. [details]

    2018

    • Jagau, S. D. (2018). Listen to the Sirens: Understanding psychological mechanisms with theory and experimental tests. [details]

    2017

    • He, S. (2017). Cooperation, coordination and competition: Theory and experiments. [details]
    • Smerdon, D. C. (2017). ‘Everybody’s Doing It’: Essays on trust, social norms and integration. [details]

    2015

    2012

    1996

    • Offerman, T. J. S. (1996). Beliefs and decision rules in public good games. Amsterdam: UvA. [details]

    2015

    • He, S., Offerman, T., & van de Ven, J. (2015). The sources of the communication gap. Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam. [details]
    • Hu, X., Offerman, T., & Zou, L. (2015). How Risk Sharing May Enhance Efficiency in English Auctions.
    • Kopányi-Peuker, A., Offerman, T., & Sloof, R. (2015). Team production benefits from a permanent fear of exclusion. (CREED working paper). Amsterdam: Center for Research in Experimental Economics and Political Decsion Making, Universiteit van Amsterdam. [details]
    • Kopányi-Peuker, A., Offerman, T., & Sloof, R. (2015). Team production benefits from a permanent fear of exclusion. (Tinbergen Institute discussion paper; No. TI 2015-067/VII). Amsterdam: Tinbergen Institute. [details]
    • de Groot Ruiz, A., Offerman, T., & Onderstal, S. (2015). Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games. (Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper; No. TI 2015-012/VII). Amsterdam/Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute. [details]
    • van Leeuwen, B., Offerman, T., & Schram, A. (2015). Competition for status creates superstars: an experiment on public good provision and network formation. Toulouse/Amsterdam: IAST, Toulouse School of Economics/CREED, University of Amsterdam. [details]

    2014

    • van Leeuwen, B., Noussair, C. N., Offerman, T., Suetens, S., van Veelen, M., & van de Ven, J. (2014). Predictably angry: facial cues provide a credible signal of destructive behavior. Toulouse: Institute for Advanced Study. [details]

    2013

    • Hu, A., Offerman, T. J. S., & Zou, L. (2013). How Risk Sharing May Enhance Efficiency in English Auctions. University of Amsterdam.
    • Kopányi-Peuker, A. G., Offerman, T. J. S., & Sloof, R. (2013). Fostering Cooperation Through the Enhancement of Own Vulnerability. University of Amsterdam.
    • Kopányi-Peuker, A., Offerman, T., & Sloof, R. (2013). Fostering cooperation through the enhancement of own vulnerability. Amsterdam: CREED, University of Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute. [details]
    • Nosenzo, D., Offerman, T. J. S., Sefton, M., & van der Veen, A. (2013). Discretionary Sanctions and Rewards in the Repeated Inspection Game. University of Amsterdam.
    • Offerman, T., & Palley, A. (2013). Lossed in Translation: An Off-the-Shelf Method to Recover Probabilistic Beliefs from Loss-Averse Agents. (CREED Working Papers). Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam. [details]
    • Offerman, T., & van der Veen, A. (2013). How to Subsidize Contributions to Public Goods: Does the Frog Jump Out of the Boiling Water? (CREED Working Papers). University of Amsterdam. [details]
    • de Groot Ruiz, A. W., Offerman, T. J. S., & Onderstal, A. M. (2013). Equilibrium Selection in Cheap Talk Games: ACDC Rocks When Other Criteria Remain Silent. University of Amsterdam.
    • de Groot Ruiz, A. W., Offerman, T. J. S., & Onderstal, A. M. (2013). Power and the Privilege of Clarity: An Analysis of Bargaining Power and Information Transmission. University of Amsterdam.
    • de Haan, T., Offerman, T. J. S., & Sloof, R. (2013). Discrimination in the Labor Market: the Curse of Competition between Workers. University of Amsterdam.
    • de Haan, T., Offerman, T. J. S., & Sloof, R. (2013). Money Talks? An Experimental Investigation of Cheap Talk and Burned Money. University of Amsterdam.
    • van Leeuwen, B., Offerman, T., & Schram, A. (2013). Superstars need social benefits: an experiment on network formation. (Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper; No. TI 2013-112/I). Tinbergen Institute. [details]

    2012

    • Hu, A., Offerman, T., & Zou, L. (2012). How risk sharing may enhance efficiency in English auctions. (CREED Working Papers). Amsterdam: Universiteit van Amsterdam. [details]
    • Kopányi-Peuker, A., Offerman, T., & Sloof, R. (2012). Fostering cooperation through the enhancement of own vulnerability. (CREED Working Paper). Amsterdam: Center for Research in Experimental Economics and Political Decision Making, Universiteit van Amsterdam. [details]
    • Kopányi-Peuker, A., Offerman, T., & Sloof, R. (2012). Fostering cooperation through the enhancement of own vulnerability. (Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper; No. TI 2012-132/1). Amsterdam: Tinbergen Institute. [details]
    • Nosenzo, D., Offerman, T. J. S., Sefton, M., & van der Veen, A. (2012). Discretionary sanctions and rewards in the repeated inspection game. (CREED Working Papers). Amsterdam: Universiteit van Amsterdam. [details]
    • Nosenzo, D., Offerman, T., Sefton, M., & van der Veen, A. (2012). Encouraging compliance: bonuses versus fines in inspection games. (CREED Working Papers). Amsterdam: Universiteit van Amsterdam. [details]
    • de Groot Ruiz, A., Offerman, T., & Onderstal, S. (2012). An experimental study of credible deviations and ACDC. (CREED Working Papers). Amsterdam: Universiteit van Amsterdam. [details]
    • de Groot Ruiz, A., Offerman, T., & Onderstal, S. (2012). Equilibrium selection in cheap talk games: ACDC rocks when other criteria remain silent. (CREED Working Papers). Amsterdam: Universiteit van Amsterdam. [details]
    • de Groot Ruiz, A., Offerman, T., & Onderstal, S. (2012). Power and the privilege of clarity: an analysis of bargaining power and information transmission. (CREED Working Papers). Amsterdam: Universiteit van Amsterdam. [details]
    • de Haan, T., Offerman, T., & Sloof, R. (2012). Discrimination in the labor market: the curse of competition between workers. (CREED Working Papers). Amsterdam: Universiteit van Amsterdam. [details]
    • de Haan, T., Offerman, T., & Sloof, R. (2012). Money talks? An experimental investigation of cheap talk and burned money. (CREED Working papers). Amsterdam: Universiteit van Amsterdam. [details]

    2011

    • Nosenzo, D., Offerman, T. J. S., Sefton, M., & van der Veen, A. (2011). Encouraging compliance: bonuses verses fines. Amsterdam: Universiteit van Amsterdam.
    • de Groot Ruiz, A., Offerman, T., & Onderstal, S. (2011). An experimental study of credible deviations and ACDC. (Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper; No. TI 2011-153/1). Amsterdam / Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institue. [details]
    • de Groot Ruiz, A., Offerman, T., & Onderstal, S. (2011). Equilibrium selection in cheap talk games: ACDC rocks when other criteria remain silent. (Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper; Vol. TI 2011-037/1). Amsterdam / Rotterdan: Tinbergen Institute. [details]
    • de Groot Ruiz, A., Offerman, T., & Onderstal, S. (2011). Power and the privilege of clarity: an analysis of bargaining power and information transmission. (Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper; No. TI 2011-055/1). Amsterdam / Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute. [details]
    • de Haan, T., Offerman, T., & Sloof, R. (2011). Discrimination in the labor market: the curse of competition between workers. (Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper; No. TI2011-174/1). Amsterdam/Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute. [details]
    • de Haan, T., Offerman, T., & Sloof, R. (2011). Money talks? An experimental investigation of cheap talk and burned money. (Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper; No. TI2011-069/1). Amsterdam/Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute. [details]
    • de Haan, T., Offerman, T., & Sloof, R. (2011). Money talks? An experimental investigation of cheap talk and burned money. Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam, School of Economics. [details]

    2010

    • Goeree, J. K., Offerman, T. J. S., & Sloof, R. (2010). Demand Reduction and Preemptive Bidding in License Auctions. Universiteit van Amsterdam.
    • Hu, X., Offerman, T. J. S., & Zou, L. (2010). Premium Auctions and Risk Preferences. Universiteit van Amsterdam.
    • Nosenzo, D., Offerman, T. J. S., Sefton, M., & van der Veen, A. (2010). Inducing Good Behavior: Bonuses versus Fines in Inspection Games. Universiteit van Amsterdam.
    • Offerman, T. J. S., & van der Veen, A. (2010). How to subsidize contributions to public goods - Does the frog jump out of the boiling water? Universiteit van Amsterdam.
    • de Groot Ruiz, A., Offerman, T., & Onderstal, S. (2010). Equilibrium selection in cheap talk games: ACDC rocks when other criteria remain silent. (CREED working paper). Amsterdam: Center for Research in Experimental Economics and Political Decision making. [details]
    • de Haan, T., Offerman, T. J. S., & Sloof, R. (2010). Noisy Signaling: Theory and Experiment. Universiteit van Amsterdam.

    2009

    • Fong, Y., Huang, C-Y., & Offerman, T. (2009). Guilt driven reciprocity in a psychological signaling game. Amsterdam: Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde. [details]
    • Goeree, J. K., Offerman, T., & Sloof, R. (2009). Demand reduction and preemptive bidding in multi-unit license auctions. (Working Paper Series; No. 430). Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam. [details]
    • Hu, A., Offerman, T., & Onderstal, S. (2009). Fighting collusion in auctions: an experimental investigation. onbekend: Afdeling Algemene Economie. [details]
    • Hu, A., Offerman, T., & Zou, L. (2009). A theory of premium auctions. Amsterdam: Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde. [details]
    • Offerman, T., & van der Veen, A. (2009). How to subsidize contributions to public goods: Does the frog jump out of the boiling water? Amsterdam: Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde. [details]
    • de Haan, T., Offerman, T., & Sloof, R. (2009). Noisy signaling: theory and experiment. Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam. [details]

    2008

    • Goeree, J. K., Offerman, T., & Sloof, R. (2008). Demand reduction and preemptive bidding in multi-unit license auctions. Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam. [details]
    • Offerman, T., & Schotter, A. (2008). Imitation and luck: an experimental study on social sampling. Amsterdam: Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde. [details]

    2007

    • Fong, Y., Huang, C-Y., & Offerman, T. (2007). Guilt driven reciprocity in a psychological signaling game. (Working Paper University of Amsterdam). Amsterdam: Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde. [details]
    • Fong, Y., Huang, C-Y., & Offerman, T. J. S. (2007). Guilt driven reciprocity in a psychological signaling game. (Discussion Paper, University of Amsterdam). Amsterdam: Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde.
    • Hu, A., Offerman, T., & Onderstal, S. (2007). Fighting collusion in auctions: an experimental investigation. (Working Paper University of Amsterdam). Amsterdam: Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde. [details]
    • Offerman, T., & Schotter, A. (2007). Imitation and luck: an experimental study on social sampling. (C.E.S.S. working paper series; No. 0020). Center for Experimental Social Science: New York. [details]
    • Offerman, T., Sonnemans, J., van de Kuilen, G., & Wakker, P. P. (2007). A truth-serum for non-Bayesians : correcting proper scoring rules for risk attitudes. Amsterdam: Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde. [details]
    • de Haan, T., Offerman, T. J. S., & Sloof, R. (2007). What is the informational impact of randomness in signaling costs? Theory and experiment. Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam.

    2006

    • Eliaz, K., Offerman, T. J. S., & Schotter, A. (2006). Creating competition Out of Tin Air: Market Thickening and right-To-Choose Auctions. (New York University Working Paper). Amsterdam: Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde.
    • Fong, Y., Huang, C., & Offerman, T. J. S. (2006). Guilt Driven Reciprocity. (UvA Working Paper). Amsterdam: Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde.
    • Goeree, J. K., Offerman, T. J. S., & Sloof, R. (2006). Demand Reduction and Preemptive Bidding in License Auctions. Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam.
    • Offerman, T. J. S., & Onderstal, S. (2006). Making Uncompetitive Auctions Computitive: A Survey of Experiments. (Working Paper). Amsterdam: Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde.
    • Offerman, T. J. S., & Schotter, A. (2006). Sampling for Information or Sampling for Imitation: An Experiment on Social Learning with Information on Ranks. (Working Paper). Amsterdam: Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde.
    • van de Kuilen, G., Offerman, T. J. S., Sonnemans, J. H., & Wakker, P. P. (2006). Correcting Proper Scoring Rules for Nonlinear Risk Attitudes. (Working Paper). Amsterdam: Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde.

    2005

    • Offerman, T. J. S., & Onderstal, A. M. (2005). Making Uncompetitive Auctions Competitive: A Survey of Experiments. Amsterdam: Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde.

    2001

    • Goeree, J. K., & Offerman, T. J. S. (2001). Making Uncompetitive Auctions Competitive: An Experimental Studie. CREED Working Paper. [details]
    • Sonnemans, J., & Offerman, T. (2001). Is the quadratic scoring rule behaviorally incentive compatible? (CREED Working Paper). Amsterdam: Universiteit van Amsterdam. [details]

    2000

    • Goeree, J. K., & Offerman, T. J. S. (2000). Efficiency in auctions with private and common values: An experimental study. (Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper; No. TI 2000-045/1). Amsterdam / Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute. [details]
    • Goeree, J. K., & Offerman, T. J. S. (2000). News and Winner's Curses in Second-Price Auctions: An Experimental Study. CREED Working Paper. [details]
    This list of publications is extracted from the UvA-Current Research Information System. Questions? Ask the library or the Pure staff of your faculty / institute. Log in to Pure to edit your publications. Log in to Personal Page Publication Selection tool to manage the visibility of your publications on this list.
  • Ancillary activities
    • No ancillary activities